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Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Service (MAR)

Miscellaneous Corona Harvest Inputs

GROUP 4
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PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
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Combat Aircrew Recovery in Southeast Asia

Hq USAF (AFCCS)

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

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1. (S) The Commander MATS, and the Commander ARS, conducted personal tours of Southeast Asia Combat Air Rescue/Recovery units during September-October 1965. Conditions encountered on these respective visits clearly revealed unacceptable deficiencies and limitations throughout the entire Combat Recovery System. On 28 October 1965, the Commander MATS presented a formal briefing (Attachment 14) to the Chief of Staff, USAF, and selected members of the Air Staff, on this subject. This briefing covered background, current situation, deficiencies, corrective actions in process, and specific recommendations to Headquarters USAF for further improvements. The Chief of Staff directed that a letter be submitted outlining the problems encompassed in this briefing with specific recommendation to correct this serious situation.

2. (S) Current deficiencies in combat aircrew recovery capability are direct results of failure to recognize this requirement as a distinct combat mission, and failure to develop compatible combat aircrew recovery resources concurrently with development of tactical mission capability. The USAF rescue/recovery force of the Korean War era was reduced to only 58 fixed-wing aircraft by September 1961, and all Air Rescue recovery helicopters were retired. Under the concept that war contingency tasks should be accomplished as an extension of peacetime efforts using the same resources, Air Rescue Service efforts were limited to peacetime tasks. The woefully inadequate aircrew recovery capability in Southeast Asia today is concrete evidence of the invalidity of this concept. Rescue aircraft and equipment designed for wartime roles will almost always fulfill peacetime mission requirements. However, similar resources developed solely for peacetime activity generally fail to satisfy wartime requirements. The introduction of non-combat equipped recovery forces into Southeast Asia as an interim measure and crash modification/procurement programs which result in minimum acceptable capability, at excessive cost, illustrates the urgent need for orderly development of an adequate combat aircrew recovery force. An in-being aircrew recovery force, fully capable of operation in combat or peacetime environments, is essential to meet foreseeable requirements. In May 1965, the Commander MATS reacted to the initial recognition of this mission, contained in USAF Wartime Guidance Document of March 1965, with a comprehensive ARS Projected Requirements Study. This study, which set forth the doctrine and force posture essential to meet global requirements, should be used as a guide to create the necessary recovery capability. To achieve the required force posture, the following elements are essential:

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a. The combat aircrew recovery mission must be recognized, at all levels, as a clear and distinct USAF task which requires the development and maintenance of an in-being force of specially trained personnel and mission compatible equipment.

b. Development of the combat aircrew recovery capability must be expedited to attain a level consistent with that of air technology applied to tactical forces.

c. Those policies which, in the past, have resulted in complete degradation of combat aircrew recovery capability, must be revised to insure that this essential capability is kept apace the state-of-the-art advances in tactical force capabilities regardless of peace or war conditions.

3. (S) Recovery forces in Thailand and Viet-Nam to respond to expanding tactical mission activity consist of one squadron and 10 helicopter detachments equipped with 28 helicopters. In addition, nine fixed-wing aircraft are maintained TDY in the area to provide mission control and extended search capability. Preplanned missions, in response to 2nd Air Division frag orders, consist of fixed-wing rescue aircraft orbiting at forward locations to monitor strike activities and to provide SAR mission control and coordination as required. Helicopters, staging from forward operating locations, are scrambled and directed by the orbiting mission control aircraft which requests and controls tactical aircraft to suppress hostile activity in the recovery area. In addition, rescue forces maintain an alert posture at operating locations to respond to unforecast rescue requirements. Aircraft and equipment currently in use are not adequate for the mission. The HU-16B and HC-54D are restricted in altitude and airspeed and cannot effect personnel recoveries from land surfaces. Recovery capability is limited to HH-43 helicopters designed for short-range local base rescue missions and the severely limited water landing capability of the HU-16 amphibian. In addition to operational deficiencies of current rescue aircraft, location and recovery of personnel is limited by the following:

- a. Inadequate personal survivor communications and visual signaling devices.
- b. Lack of navigational aids at forward operating locations.
- c. Lack of forward operating locations accessible to northeastern areas of North Viet-Nam.
- d. Limited night combat recovery capability.
- e. Limited refueling equipment at forward operating locations.
- f. Inadequate suppressive armament for recovery helicopters.

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g. Inadequate organization, command and control of rescue and recovery units in SEA.

h. Outdated combat recovery doctrine, tactics and procedures.

These items are discussed in detail in Attachments 1 through 13.

4. (S) As of 28 October 1965, limiting factors notwithstanding, 70 combat personnel have been rescued including 36 USAF, 15 USN, 15 USA, and 4 VNAF. During the same time period, 177 rescue requests were received resulting in a totally unacceptable effectiveness rating of 34 per cent. Significant improvement in recovery mission effectiveness is vital to our combat effort.

5. (S) A thorough study of the deficiencies that exist in the Air Rescue Service which seriously limit their capability to accomplish assigned tasks, vividly points out corrective actions that are of an immediate and urgent nature. Some of the deficiencies can be corrected by this headquarters and action is being taken. However, corrective actions that are beyond the capability of this command are enumerated below:

a. The lack of recognition of the combat aircrew recovery role precludes the support that Air Rescue Service needs to develop the combat capability required. Publication of a new AFR 20-54 which establishes combat aircrew recovery as a valid mission of Air Rescue Service is needed. (See Attachment 1)

b. The rotary wing aircraft being used by the Air Rescue Service for combat recovery are woefully inadequate in terms of range, instrument flight capability, armor, and speed. Aircraft that were designed to satisfy peacetime requirements were diverted and marginally modified for combat use. Delivery of HH-3E helicopters should be accelerated commensurate with the ability to train aircrew and support personnel. (See Attachment 2)

c. Due to the requirement for operations deep into enemy territory, extended range is a paramount consideration. Even with new type aircraft, this extended range and loiter capability can only be realized by air-to-air refueling. Development of an operational air-to-air refueling system must be accelerated. (See Attachment 3)

d. The inability of rescue aircraft to suppress enemy ground fire lengthens the time that the combat crewman is exposed. Suppressive armament now being provided rescue crews and aircraft is inadequate to suppress enemy ground action and recoveries are being delayed awaiting the arrival of tactical aircraft to provide the necessary suppressive fire. Selection, testing, and provision of suppressive armament for helicopters must be accomplished without delay. (See Attachment 4)

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e. Due to the stepped up activities over the past few months, experience has demonstrated inadequacies of rescue organization and command and control of rescue units in Southeast Asia. USAF approval of the proposed ARS reorganization, as outlined in MATS 1st Indorsement, 14 September 1965, subject: ARS Activities in Southeast Asia, is needed. (See Attachment 5)

f. Due to weather and range requirements, rescue units must operate from forward locations which are accessible to northeastern areas of North Viet-Nam. Forward operating locations are available west of North Viet-Nam. However, due to the lack of any friendly territory east of North Viet-Nam, accessibility to Northeastern Viet-Nam is extremely limited. Consideration should be given to providing appropriate surface vessels with helicopter pads. These vessels could be stationed near the eastern coast line of North Viet-Nam and provide helicopters with a faster response to rescue requests in Northeast Viet-Nam. (See Attachment 6)

g. The equipment now being provided to the aircrew members for personal survival is inadequate. The personal survival equipment is deficient in range and battery life. A high failure rate is being experienced as well as shortages in supply and test equipment. Development of more reliable and more rugged personal survival equipment must be effected. (See Attachment 7)

h. Visual signal devices such as pen-gun flares and strobe lights are practically useless in a combat situation. Visual signaling devices suitable for use under combat conditions must be made available. (See Attachment 8)

i. Since rescue aircraft must operate from forward operating locations in order to provide the necessary range over enemy territory, improvement in navigational aids and ground equipment at forward locations is urgent. (See Attachments 9 and 11)

6. (S) In addition to the actions outlined above which deal primarily with the immediate and near term period, steps must be taken to improve ARS capability in the future. Implementation of the following recommendations are essential to acquire the combat aircrew recovery capability needed today and to insure availability of a mission compatible force to meet future requirements:

a. A joint MATS (ARS)/TAC/AFSC Combat Aircrew Recovery Systems Test force should be established on a permanent basis to evaluate aircraft tactics, techniques and related aircrew survival equipment for suitability prior to employment in combat environments. Other commands should be represented as required.

b. Within the Air Staff, a Program Element Manager (PEM) should be designated now to direct cohesive action and response for

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prompt development and acquisition of the required Combat Aircrew Recovery System. Only by this means can fragmentation of effort be eliminated and the necessary capability be acquired at minimum cost. Initial action should include:

- (1) Initiation of necessary actions to expedite installation of aerial refueling capability in those HC-130H and HH-3E aircraft destined for SEA.
- (2) Acceleration of HH-3E deliveries (SOR 190-2) to provide a total of 32 aircraft and attendant resources in SEA as soon as possible, but not later than end CY 66. (See Attachment 3)
- (3) Selection and acquisition of suitable automatic weapons for immediate installation on combat aircrew recovery helicopters to improve mission effectiveness and provide self-protection.
- (4) Establishment of a study group to evaluate missile electronic locator devices and other advanced technology for possible application to personal survival equipment. Development and procurement techniques similar to Big Safari should be used to expedite resolution of this problem area.
- (5) Provide monitorship for the activities of the joint test force recommended in paragraph 5a above.

c. AFSC should be directed to establish a group within its existing advanced technology branch tasked with the specific responsibility to determine future rescue/recovery requirements and to insure that capability is kept abreast of state-of-the-art developments. Initial efforts for this group would include evaluation of the SOR 210 and other V/STOL aircraft as potential rescue/recovery vehicles.

d. Appropriate directives must be revised to establish combat aircrew recovery as a separate and distinct USAF mission to provide adequate emphasis for development of the required force.

7. (U) It is urgently requested that Headquarters USAF endorse and implement the recommendations contained herein to make available adequate combat aircrew recovery capability to support tactical air operations.

8. (U) This letter is classified Secret to protect future programming plans/actions.

SIGNED

GLEN R. BIRCHARD
Maj Gen, USAF
Vice Commander

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ARXDC

Combat Rescue/Recovery Tactics

ARODC

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13 Jul 65.

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No 0003567

1. (S) The USAF Wartime Guidance (WG) document, 1 Mar 1965, specifies in part that MATS will provide trained and equipped combat ready search and rescue units to perform world-wide air recovery services with specific tasks of providing rescue coverage for aerial lines of communication and support of combat operations. The MATS Short Range Wartime Requirement Plan (WPS) specifies in part that ARS will train and equip combat ready search and rescue units in support of combat operations and that recovery and evacuation of downed aircrews in enemy territory will be of primary importance in supporting tactical and strategic operations.
2. (S) Actions are currently in progress to provide a force of 16 HH-3 aircraft in RVN for the ACR mission. There also appears to be a strong possibility that supplemental 1966 funding may be provided to procure 15 additional HH-3 aircraft to be located in CONUS. These aircraft and crews will provide a base for rotation of trained crews to and from RVN and will also provide an interim standby capability to respond to a second front situation, should one develop prior to the planned build-up of the combat recovery forces.
3. (S) Due to the fact that combat aircrew recovery has not been an assigned mission of ARS since the deactivation of the 8 AR Gp., formal procedural documents governing the prosecution of rescue/recovery missions in a combat zone are lacking. In addition, the experience level and know-how that was available as a result of previous ACR responsibilities has been diluted or depleted through retirement, transfer, or other loss of the personnel involved.
4. (U) It is strongly recommended that action be taken to formulate a procedural manual based on current experience in RVN which can serve as a basis for combat recovery operations in any war zone and which may also be used as a basis for training replacement crews. The manual would be upgraded as experience is gained in the ACR role and changed or supplemented as required for various theater conditions and levels of conflict. Consideration must be given to the use of fixed wing aircraft, as well as helicopters, including long range behind-the-lines recovery operations. Communications procedures will, of course, be of the utmost importance.
5. (U) The combat rescue/recovery manual may emerge as a sole source document for ACR operations, of value not only to ARS but also to the

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major operating combat commands. Instructions to the tactical or strategic crews could be included which would assist ARS in expediting recovery. As the USAF agency charged with the accomplishment of the ACR mission, ARS has a responsibility to pursue this project without delay.

6. (U) If any assistance is required from ARXDC in the formulation of this document, a project officer will be appointed to assist the ARODC project officer as required. Your comments are invited.

BESTOW R. RUDOLPH
Colonel, USAF
DCS/Plans

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PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

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Nov 6, 1968

CATEGORIED

No. 0003572

Subject: CORONA HARVEST Study (U) (ARXDC Ltr, 3 Oct 68)

TO: ARXDC

1. (U) The following background information is provided as requested in your letter.

- a. Period assigned to SEA: 10 Jan 62 to 2 Apr 62.
- b. Designation of unit to which assigned: SAR Center in the AOC, which eventually became Det 3, PARRC.
- c. Duty assignment while in SEA: SAR Controller.
- d. Type of aircraft assigned: None.

2. (C) The following is a narrative of events during the period of assignment:

a. We initially went to Tan Son Nhut AB to establish a SAR Center in the AOC, and a SAR network for South Vietnam. The authority establishing our unit in SEA was a PACAF Operations Order which also established the AOC and other actions to meet this contingency. Initial personnel consisted of three officers and three airmen. The SAR Center operated under the auspices of the 13th Air Force JSARC. We reported in to the AOC which was a Jamesway hut adjacent to the runway at TSN. Initially, facilities were inadequate in that we could not even obtain a desk within the AOC. However, all functional areas were quite crowded and we did the best we could. Eventually (approximately 30 days) we transferred to a building which housed the AOC. The initial concept of operations was not to involve any ARRS aircraft in Vietnam, since the magnitude of the operation at that time was limited. Also, the total Air Rescue posture was limited. To establish a SAR network, Captain

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McGuire and myself contacted the Army advisors to each of the Corps areas in Vietnam and were authorized to arrange rescue support with the Army helicopter squadrons on a non-interference basis. The cooperation of the Army in this effort was excellent. We used the existing communications system as best we could to arrange contacts to alert the Army helicopters for search and rescue, when required. Also, the USAF forces at Bien Hoa composed of C-47, B-26, and C-123 aircraft were to be used for search and a communications CAP. SAR network was established through the AOC and the outlying ASOCs in each Corps area, and SAR procedures were developed for duty controllers in the ASOCs. In addition, we contacted the Navy MAAG in downtown Saigon to utilize whatever Navy forces might be available in the event of an emergency. The communication picture initially in South Vietnam was very poor. As a matter of fact, we (SAR controllers) developed the first communication diagram for use within the AOC, using all the various communication forces we had located, to assist us in contacting the Army, Vietnamese bases, etc. Timely SAR efforts were hampered by poor communications, lack of a system of filing flight plans and passenger lists, and the lack of an adequate flight following capability. More often than not, search would be initiated when an aircraft did not return in the evening. Although I do not paint a very bright picture, we did the best we could with the limited facilities at hand and did have an established SAR network approximately ten days after arrival.

b. In my estimation, the combat aircrew recovery capability of rescue service in 1962 was practically nil. The HU-16 was limited and the HH-43s

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were tied to a local base rescue mission. The old "saw" that wartime SAR is an extension of peacetime SAR is not adequate. Local base rescue and duckbutts were the main capabilities. I realize this was not the desire of Rescue Service, but an expediency for achieving budget reductions. I think one of the most important things to emphasize in the CORONA HARVEST Study is that Rescue Service maintain an aircrew recovery capability during peacetime. We must realize that you can't fully utilize a wartime capability during peacetime, however, timely response and a capability to operate in a hostile environment must be maintained.

c. Another item is to insure that we maintain a reaction standard commensurate with that of the tactical forces we are supporting, i.e., CONUS LBR/ACR must be ready to respond as a unit. Maintaining the capability to respond is not enough - the rescue unit must be alerted for deployment in the initial Operations order which deploys the tactical forces. Due to a time lag in identifying rescue requirements during the Gulf of Tonkin, the tactical forces always moved before we could get an LBR enroute. Rapid reaction can only be achieved through close coordination with the major command and/or Air Force component commander deploying tactical forces.

d. We encountered great difficulty in acquiring rescue helicopters for Vietnam. Actually it took months of work at PARC. We finally got the HH-43F which was really too little and too late. It took a long time to convince Air Force that we should have HH-3 helicopters; namely, we needed the range and lift capability of these aircraft. This has become our ACR force. I reiterate, we must maintain this ACR during peacetime.

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Another problem we encountered was breaking loose LER rescue units from CONUS to support the war in Vietnam. CONUS LER units should be identified to move with the tactical forces deploying overseas. It seems to me that it is more important to provide LER rescue to those tactical forces operating in a wartime environment than to continue support in the CONUS if we have to make a choice between the two. With regard to the LER unit deploying to Takhali AB, Thailand in June 1962, I have very little detailed knowledge, except that this unit was employed primarily in the classic LER role. We also established a SAR Center at Don Mueang Airport in Bangkok. This SAR Center provided SAR control for Thailand and was operated under the 13th Air Force, JSARC.

3. (U) If I can be of assistance to expand on these comments, or provide additional information, please contact me at extension 2847 or 2536.
4. (U) These comments are classified CONFIDENTIAL since they reveal the capability to react during contingencies.

SIGNED

/s/ Albert R. McNamee
ALBERT R. MCNAMEE, Lt Colonel, USAF
Special Plans Division

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3RD AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY GROUP
AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY SERVICE (MAC)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

4 Jan 1966

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

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DATA LOGGED

No. 0003576

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 3RD RGCO

SUBJECT: Commander's Monthly Letter

TO: Colonel Allison C. Brooks
Commander
Hq Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Service

Sir:

1. (S) Detachment 10, Bien Thuy, which was scheduled for activation on 4 December, was delayed for a period of three weeks by 2nd Air Division; reason being lack of facilities, communications, firefighters and medics. Transfer of aircraft took place on 22 December and the Detachment became operational at 1500 hours on 25 December. The aircraft accident at Detachment 5 precluded placement of two "F" models at Detachment 10. An "F" and "B" model will be used until such time as depot repair is completed, allowing transfer of the second "F" model.
2. (S) The 5th and 6th HH-3C helicopter arrived at Detachment 5, Udorn on 9 December. They were in commission and available for operational support on 15 December.
3. (U) Precautionary orbit mission requirements during tactical take-offs have been deleted or reduced by all detachments except for the detachment at Takhlil. The host Base Commander there insists that a precautionary orbit be provided for all tactical take-offs. Our point in desiring a reduction of orbit time is to permit limited proficiency training time for aircrew personnel and to maintain aircraft within allocated time for purpose of orderly maintenance and supply support.
4. (U) Coordination was initiated with host Base Commanders for necessary logistical support which will be required by implementation of ARRS programming plans 571 and 574.
5. (U) A story of Rescue activities in Southeast Asia was written for Time magazine by Mr. Arthur Zich, Saigon bureau. Captain Ruters of Detachment 5 supplied the banner line story following an aircrew recovery mission. Our latest understanding of this is that it will be a part of the story of General Westmoreland being selected for the man of the year. In this connection, the local correspondent of the Washington Star has approached me regarding doing an article of the hometown release variety which will of course be slanted toward Rescue.

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6. (S) On 23 Dec 65, the 1st Mobility Communications Group, acting on our request to the 1964 Comm Group, completed the installation of our SSB net. The complex includes 2 KWM-2A's at the RCC Udorn (Compress), 2 KWM-2A's at Da Nang (Queen) and 3 KWM-2A's at the JSARC Tan Son Nhut (King). We now have excellent SSB communication coverage of the entire SEA theater.

7. (U) Commencing 2 December the JSARC includes the rescue aircraft status in their daily briefing of 2AD Commander. The prior procedure of including our status in the 6250th Support Group briefing often resulted in erroneous information being presented. By briefing the status ourselves we more closely associate the aircraft with rescue and the status is more up to minute than the figures carried by base materiel.

8. (C) During the month of December we prosecuted 76 missions which resulted in 11 combat saves and 5 non-combat saves. Of special interest is the number of search sorties conducted for three lost aircraft. Although 93 of the total 105 sorties were flown by aircraft from units other than rescue, the missions were directed by rescue controllers. Throughout the entire search it was apparent that a definite lack of communications existed. Sometimes hours would go by without contact with the search aircraft resulting in a sense of futility and frustration on the part of the controllers. Since the likelihood of more search missions seems inevitable the need for UHF and VHF communications in the JSARC and RCC's appears to be mandatory. The size of our present facilities will not accommodate any more equipment, however we have requested more suitable quarters and are studying the problem with a view toward installation of the radio equipment as a part of the overall move.

9. (U) In an effort to keep all of the tactical units in SEA familiar with Search and Rescue procedures, we give briefings to all newly arrived units and repeat briefings to all units on a frequent basis. We have developed a briefing that can be utilized by each of our detachments which is designed to improve the quality of information provided. We are continuing to aggressively pursue our slogan of "REDUCE REACTION TIME". Our efforts are apparently paying dividends as 95% of all missions were launched in less than 5 minutes including required refueling.

10. (U) We received Budget Authorization for 3RD ARRG effective FY 3/66. The amount we received was the total requested for FY 2 through 4/66. This could possibly cause some problems in spending these funds (\$19,905) in the remaining two quarters.

11. (U) Plans have been developed to establish administrative operating procedures for 3RD ARRG. Group directives are being prepared. Consolidated Group publication requirements are being compiled and will be forwarded to Hq ARRS within the next two weeks. We will prepare a letter to ARRS, Director of Administrative Services requesting that MAC and ARRS publications be sorted out by series, to preclude the tremendous workload

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experienced when we received our Command publications last September for the 38th ARS. We received about 6 boxes of publications all intermingled and in no semblance of order. It took 6 clerks 18 days (14 hours per day) to segregate and sort out needed publications from housekeeping publications which were also unneeded. I would like to preclude this happening again since we cannot afford the loss in productive manhours.

12. (U) Many actions initiated by the 2AD materiel people several months ago have finally began to pay off with a resultant vast improvement in supply support. Although the transportation situation through normal channels continues to be a problem an increased use of courier flights to deliver NORS parts through the postal system has reduced the NORS time on an average of two days per aircraft. Large items must continue through transportation channels, however property has been moving faster due to the NORS Expedite System at 8th Aerial Port becoming operational. Instances of lost or delayed property have been decreasing throughout the month.

13. (U) A program begun last September to increase the amount of available supplies in stock has been showing results. The long resupply line from WRAMA now seems to be filling up. By increasing stock levels to a realistic point the number of items available for issue has doubled. Problem areas in long delivery times are still evident for selected items which are in short supply everywhere. WRAMA has included a buy of 25 sets of HH-43 blades specifically for our use which should alleviate our present blade shortage to some extent. An improved manpower situation at FB 5269 BASO has aided in the proper receipt and storage of property. A tremendous backlog has been reduced to three days in property accounting. AFIC has input 72 TDY people for storage and property accounting purposes, and has been instrumental in the reduction of this backlog. Because of the size of the supply account a wall-to-wall inventory has been cancelled. An inventory by Federal Stock Class has been scheduled and should begin in January.

14. (U) Activity begun in November to have each Detachment supported by their host Base Supply has resulted in positive actions by all but two bases. At this time Detachments 3, 6, 7, and Det Provisional First are receiving support through their host Base Supply. Beginning 1 January at least two additional bases in Thailand, Detachments 4 and 5, will also receive their entire support from their host Base Supply, providing 13th AF concurs. This action should reduce bottleneck problems presently encountered by sending all property into FB 5269. Transportation difficulties caused by transshipment of property will diminish with this conversion. A great deal of lateral support will be required for a period of at least 90 days until property begins flowing into the various new Base Supply accounts. Detachments 9 and 10 will be base supported as soon as facilities are completed at Pleiku and Bien Thuy. At Takhli last week I had to sleep in the trailer with the Deputy Wing Commander and therefore became well acquainted with him and also got to know the new DM very well. He assured me that they will do everything to assume the account of our Detachment 2 there by the end of January. The Detachment also has much equipment which needs to be turned in as excess of their needs and they hope to be able to accomplish this in the near future.

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15. (C) I have visited all units now and am real pleased with progress being made in just about all areas of endeavor. At Ubon they have just moved into a new hutment and about half of it is airconditioned for a crew lounge and administrative area. At Takhli they have started building a large leanto alongside their hutment which will allow them to discontinue operating from the many Conex boxes. At Korat their biggest problem is dust control in their landing area. About the most Gung-ho outfit is the one at Pleiku. They have continued to add to the building that they started from scratch, now they have a macadam parking area and have built such an outstanding bunker that the Wing Commander told he he would probably take it over for a command post in the event of an attack. I am extremely proud of this group, who are all TDY, including one officer from Thule.

16. (S) In my last letter I mentioned a possible move of the Dep of 2AD from Udorn to Korat. I am now informed that this move will be delayed probably until next September. Major General Bond, the new 2AD deputy at Udorn is presently here and General Myers asked me at a party last night to stand by to brief him on Rescue sometime today. This party, by the way, was in honor of Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Brown who has been here since Sunday. I hit quite a bonanza at this affair because of my personal friendship with an old rescue hand, Brig General Bill McBride who has been in the office of the Secretary for several years. He took me over to meet the Secretary and told him that I headed up rescue in the area. The Secretary then went into a 5 minute discourse on what a fine reputation rescue had back home, what we were doing, etc. He seemed very knowledgeable of the subject. I suggested perhaps he would like to meet some of the troops at Udorn who have participated in some of the missions. He not only wanted to but seemed eager and so it has been arranged for today during his visit there. I called Gen Murphy at 0730 and he is laying it on so that Major Haynes, plus at least one pilot who has been involved in a recovery, will spend some time with the Secretary and he will visit the unit and see the equipment, etc. General Murphy is also going to ask the Secretary to present the Purple Heart to SSgt Naugle for wounds received on mission No. 1110. We got the medal on the courier last night and it had arrived this AM.

17. (U) We have been having quite a problem here because of the unsatisfactory location and facilities of the helicopter section. We think we have it resolved and the CES people are preparing plans for a new location, possibly two hutments with one of them having an airconditioned lounge. An area has to be paved or PSP'd, however there are already communications lines and power in the area so it should work out very well and is ideally located. Ground should be broken around 20 January and not later than 1 February.

18. (U) I would appreciate any information available on the CONUS force structure for ARRS effective around 1/67. Many people here are going to have to forecast in the very near future for their rotation. Most people would like to forecast for ARRS however need to know what and where units will be located. I realize this would be a guesstimation or a WAG but anything would help.

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19. (U) I am looking forward to visits from the staff and had anticipated that those who were unable to come with Col Beaudry would be getting their requests in before now. It appears that a turn down may be in store for Lt Col McKinley and SMSgt Woodall, primarily because of the short time notice and my assurance that we would not be asking for waivers to the 30 day notification except in emergencies. The request was ill timed also because of the current overloading and billeting problem.

20. (U) I still need a secretary badly to assist in alleviating the administrative backlog and hope some progress is being made on my previous request. In the meantime, a couple of your old friends have volunteered to move over here when and if I get the authorization. However I'm sure they may be more than a GS-5 and doubt if my initial authorization would be any more (anyless would be almost impossible to fill).

21. (U) Communications still remain one of our biggest and most frustrating problems even though we did manage to get two more telephone during the month. I recently received an airmail letter from Udorn that was 12 days in getting here. Airmail from Orlando usually takes 5 days. We are still receiving some airmailed messages and not getting the electrically sent copy.

22. (U) Some miscellaneous items you may be interested in:

a. The new exchange is now open and operating under the AFEX system rather than Navy.

b. The area behind the BOQ where you lived is now just about filled with 50-60 foot trailers and the Generals are living in a cluster of three sited in a U shape with an enclosed patio and porch affair filling the inside part of the U.

c. Ground has been broken and the foundation started for the new 2AD addition where we hope to have the Group and JSARC one of these days.

23. (U) Please thank Major Johnson and the OI staff for their quick response to my request for pictures of ARS aircraft. The package arrived here today.

24. (U) If I seem to get somewhat detailed in these letters it is only because I know of your intense interest in the happenings here and your intimate familiarity with the situation and the operational environment.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

ARTHUR W. BEALL, Col, USAF
Commander

Copy to: Col Smith

5.

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~~SECRET~~

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

3 Feb 66

DATA LOGGED

No 0003577

RGCO

Commander's Monthly Letter

Colonel Allison C. Brooks
 Commander
 Hq Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Service

Sir:

1. (U) For the first time since arrival I'm sitting here as I write looking up at my NORS(G) status board and there is not a single item listed. With the receipt of the HH-3 APU last night we were able to wipe the board clean. I think all levels became involved in rendering assistance and it is certainly appreciated. A 50% reliability rate for this item and an inadequate depot stockage of APU's has resulted in this one aircraft being NORS for 21 days this month. This is an area where MAC will have to work thru AFLC to insure that an adequate buy program is in effect and that sufficient stocks are available to meet our requirements.

2. (U) In fact the most significant event during the month of January concerning our Supply Section was the lowering of the NORS rate. Receipt of dynamic Hi-Value components has been the primary contributing factor to this improvement. A daily status check between PARRC, ARRS, WRAMA and the 3rd ARRGp has provided an immediate response to meet any particular demand. The majority of our NORS hours were accumulated during the periods when required items were in transportation between Detachments giving lateral support. The bases have been very helpful in the lateral support area. For example about a week ago the base at Korat sent a C-47 to Tan Son Nhut just for the purpose of picking up a set of blades for our unit there. This type of support helps us immeasurably.

3. (C) Future requirements for Detachment at Phan Rang have been initiated during this past month. Although there is no completed Base Supply at Phan Rang there is a contingent from FB 5281 working in Base Supply at Tan Son Nhut. Completed actions during January were the screening of stocks here and issue of AGE on hand to Phan Rang to be held in stock pending the arrival of our people for Detachment 1. For those items required but not on hand a requisition was submitted to WRAMA with info copies sent to PARRC and ARRS. These items will be sent directly to BASO at Phan Rang and upon arrival they will be segregated and held for our unit. Because of a lack of Phan Rang supply personnel, we filled out the requisitions for them. All AGE requirements are now either on hand at Phan Rang being held for us or on order to depot.

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ARXDC 66-119

(147)

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4. (U) Beginning this month, and continuing thru next month, was the requisitioning of the Material Control Listing of aircraft spares to serve as initial stockage at FB 5281 Phan Rang. All stocks will be laid in at FB 5281 thus preventing any problem of MOB support from FB 5269 at Tan Son Nhut. Prompt filling of our requests made thru FB 5281 to WRAMA will insure supply support for Det 1. The BASO at Phan Rang is expected to be fully operational on or about 1 March 1966.

5. (U) Host Base support for our Detachments has been a continuing process during this past month. Takhli Base Supply began supporting our Det 2 at the beginning of the month. Support for Det 5 at Udorn has been delayed but we presently have a representative at Udorn to determine the cause for this delay and try to speed up their supporting our unit. Dets 9 and 10 are still receiving support from Tan Son Nhut BASO FB 5269 but at the present time 2AD DM is pressing Pleiku and Bien Thuy to assume responsibility for supporting their own aircraft. The problem in this area is a lack of proper facilities at both locations. They will begin to lay in stock for us as soon as they can possibly become operational. It is anticipated that Pleiku will be the first with support beginning sometime this month.

6. (U) There were many significant organizational actions initiated during January 1966. The following is a complete recap of actions directed by ARRS Programming Plan 571.

Activation of 3rd ARRGp plus Dets 1&2 effective 8 Jan 66.
 Activation of 37th ARRSq & Det 1 effective 8 Jan 66.
 Redesignation of 38th ARSg to 38th ARRSq effective 8 Jan 66.
 Moved Det 1, 38th ARRSq from Nakhon Phanom AB, Thailand to Phan Rang AB, RVN on 15 Jan 66.
 Deactivate Detachment Provisional First and activated Det 8, 38th ARRSq at Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN effective 18 Jan 66.
 Activated Det 11, 38th ARRSq, Tuy Hoa AB, RVN effective 18 Jan 66.
 NOTE: There were no personnel assigned to the following units:
 37th ARRSq and its Det 1; Det 1, 38th ARRSq, Det 11, 38th ARRSq.

7. (U) Activation of 3rd ARRGp caused a complete revision of operating procedures with the Group and 38th ARRSq. Group directives were written and published and files established. However, the largest change was in internal operating procedures on processing incoming and outgoing correspondence and messages. Confusion reigned for a short period however, flow of administrative personnel actions have smoothed out. We are actually functioning as one unit, i.e. our true descriptive designation could conceivably be Hq 3rd ARRG/38th ARRS.

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8. (U) The manning of Det 8, 38th ARRSq with PCS personnel was accomplished in late January. TDY personnel are to be released for return to ConUS in first week of February on a one for one basis. To accomplish this it was necessary to augment this detachment with TDY personnel from within our own resources.

9. (U) Adjustment of tours in SEA, in accordance with Hq USAF message AFCUC to ALMAJCOM 421/66/66, 22 Jan 66, is currently under study and until guidelines from Hq ARRS are received (requested in my message RGAD 00060 1 Feb 66) the full impact on rotation of personnel, if any, cannot be fully determined.

10. (S) I hear informally that Gen Bond is taking the position that the proposed move of the Deputy Commander 2AD/13th AF from Udorn to Korat should be cancelled. It would be more advantageous to us if this came to pass and I will be following the situation with interest and keep you informed. There are several newly programmed units for Udorn and it had been proposed that Nakhon Phanom be converted to a strictly Recovery force base, with the HC-130s, one HH-3 unit and the A-1s to all be stationed there. A study was made of this and presented to Gen Simler this week. Although the move would have obvious operational advantages the study concluded that logistically it would be very impractical and too costly to be feasible. There is inadequate fuel storage, the PSP runway would have to be replaced for the 130 operation, additional housing built, etc. We will not move our forces there. Of course we will have to continue to TDY our crews there as in the past and this is now becoming an expensive operation since 13th AF IG wrote up the base for footing this bill and we will have to start paying our own way. An increase in our budget request has been submitted. The daily requirements for deployments to forward locations is an expensive operation. We knew we should have been paying for this but were keeping mum about the situation.

11. (S) The installation of TACAN at Lima 36 has been on and off again for the past couple of months. I do not know if it will ever be resolved. The only place they can install it is down in a kind of bowl which makes reception unsatisfactory and there are no secure areas in the upper elevations. Speaking of this location, intelligence reports indicate possible insecure conditions during night time so we have been moving in every morning and withdrawing at night. Primarily this adds to our flying time and reduces our night recovery posture. With the added night activity we have stepped up our night posture in this area.

12. (S) With the cessation of bombing in the DRV and the resultant reduction in SAR mission activity it could possibly be assumed that the workload here is reduced. I assure you that such is not the case. The sortie rate for just about all combat units increased during this period and we had the same alert and airborne commitments throughout this period. In fact my guess is that the total flying time, particularly of the fixed wing units, increased during this period.

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13. (S) The activation and opening of the base at Tuy Hoa is very much up in the air with the probability that it may be cancelled. I'm told the decision is at CINCPAC for resolution. I'll advise when it is firm.

14. (U) During the month of January much time and effort was devoted to improving air crew knowledge of rescue procedures, which has resulted in improved command relationship. On 7 - 12 January Capt Arauj, Senior Controller, JSARC represented 3d Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group on the 2D Air Division briefing team, which visited the newly arrived aircraft carrier Ranger. During the visit Capt Arauj gave 11 separate briefings which, from all reports, were well received, and should do much to improve aircrew morale.

15. (U) Also, briefings were given to the crews of incoming units on an average of two per week. Proof that the briefings are effective is indicated in the following example:

a. On 15 January Lt Col Karschner gave a briefing at Cam Ranh Bay to approximately 200 crew members of the 12th Tactical Fighter Wing. On the following day 2 F-4C crewmembers, who were in the audience, bailed out and were picked up by a HH-3C from Det 5. The operation officer of the 12th TFW personally called us on the telephone to tell us that all concerned were convinced that the information gained the day before had done much for the peace of mind of the crew members while they were on the ground, and that the rescue was considerably facilitated because these crewmembers were familiar with the rescue procedures. This type of aircrew rescue education is made possible by the increase in rescue supervisory personnel in the theater since October 1965.

16. (U) Although there has been a slight delay in the ground-breaking for the new location of the LBR section here, this past week they have acquired a new trailer and are moved in and are operational in it, and are now independent of the Navy on whom they had been dependent for an operations facility. When the new area has been leveled off we have agreed to lay our own PSP, the base will pour the foundation for the hootches and we will erect the prefabricated buildings. We will retain the new trailer when we move and are anticipating the do-it-yourself kits any day now.

17. (U) Maj John Peterson has arrived here from the 48th Sq and is assigned to 2AD. Although I would have liked to have had him in my plans slot he will be most helpful to us in his present position. He is the SAR officer in 2AD Hq and also responsible for Life Support Equipment and other projects relating to SAR. We work very closely with whoever fills this position and it is certainly to our advantage to have an old Rescue head in it.

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18. (U) Much of our time and efforts over the past couple of months has been expended in putting out fires and responding to emergency conditions throughout the system. As we have gotten our procedures and controls established we are becoming more and more able to perform the supervisory functions and furnish the necessary assistance to the subordinate units to mold ourselves into the professional organization we must be. For example, we are in the process at the present time of performing our first "in depth" safety survey. We kicked this program off at Danang, where we feel the biggest problem exists.

Sincerely,

Signed

ARTHUR W. BEALL, Colonel, USAF
Commander

Copy to: Cmdr PARRC

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Reg No 45230

~~SECRET~~
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PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

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CATALOG

No 0003578

RGCO/Col Basil/4313

Commander's Letter

Colonel Allison C. Brooks
Commander
Hq Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Service

Sir:

1. (C) Lt Col Vette, Commander 37th AERS and Lt Col Johnson, Operations Officer, 37th AERS arrived Tan Son Nhut on 30 May 1966, and 29 May 1966, respectively. Both officers have visited with Hq 3AERG for orientation briefing and the current status of facilities and aircrew members of the 37th AERS. They departed for Danang on 2 June. With respect to 37th aircrew members, the first 37th aircrew with the exception of an RCC from the 33d was in place at Danang on 25 May 1966, to start flying missions. Scheduling of 37th AERS aircrew members is being coordinated between 3AERG, 33d and 31st AERS to insure 37th AERS aircrews are used to the maximum extent possible at Danang. 33d and 31st are conducting necessary training to certify 37th aircrews combat ready. During discussions with Lt Col Vette we reached agreements on many aspects of his and my relationship with Det 1. Basically we agreed that Det 1 would be treated as an entirely separate unit such as the way AERS treated the many Dets back in 1960 when many of the squadrons were redesignated as Dets. An example was the 57th at Lajes which had Det 1 at Wheelus and Det 2 at Prestwick. These Dets were handled as entirely separate units with no connection to the parent unit. In other words, although called a Det they were treated as Squadrons and functioned as such. There are really too many problems involved in communications, transportation, etc, between Danang and Udorn to work any other way and have semblance of efficiency. In summary, I will rate both Lt Col Vette and Lt Col Rhoades. Things are in very good shape at Udorn for the receipt of Det 1. Col Smith sent out Maj Halloran from the 76th to assist in preparing for this unit and he is doing an outstanding job. Lt Col Vasmiller, Maj Erwin and Maj Bray from the 37th are at Udorn helping prepare for Det 1 and also performing duty as Airborne Mission Commanders. Det 1 will be able to start operating almost immediately upon arrival with vehicles, office furniture, etc, already at their disposal.

2. (S) Coordination visits to Nha Trang in preparation of Det 12 activation during June 1966 were accomplished by Group staff sections. The 14th Air Commando Wing is in a state of flux from one day to the next which has made difficult a permanent beddown location. Personnel inputs are arriving and are being placed on station at Nha Trang.

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Hq AERS SC No. 661956
66-AD-0439

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ORG
OPS
DET 12

This appears to be another case of "LBR self-help" to obtain facilities to adequately prosecute our mission. 7th AF granted a delay of operational ready date until 20 June 1966 due to runway completion date slippage. Original date, 7 June 1966. 7th AF is still firm on their requirement for a LBR although the A-1H's are presently ENR to Thailand. The aircraft spare parts ordered by Nha Trang HAFB are continuing to arrive. All required AGE has been ordered and arrangements made for the receipt of a TA-171 kit from Fort Worth AFB, Texas. Furniture for the offices and a crew alert lounge has been placed on requisition. Most of the required office furniture required was issued and put in place by our materiel representative. The Wing Director of Materiel has expressed his appreciation for the advance planning for this activation. No other weapons system has been introduced into Nha Trang having supply support available upon their arrival.

OPS
HH-43B's

3. (U) The two HH-43B helicopters from Minot AFB were delivered to Tan Son Nhut AB and Ubon AB on 19 and 20 May. Both were operational within three days of arrival.

OPS
TRNG
DETS
S+7

4. (S) Two HH-3E helicopters were delivered to Det 3, Udorn, on 24 May 66. One was reassembled, test flown and placed in commission on 29 May. Combat damage was reported on 30 May during prosecution of a rescue mission. Target date for having these two HH-3E's and three aircrews with support personnel in place at Det 7, 38 AERS, Danang, is 15 June 66. This will allow Det 5 sufficient time to give necessary orientation training to newly assigned co-pilots. Moving these aircraft to Det 7 may be deferred dependent on several actions here.

OPS
37th Sq
HH-43B's

5. (S) I have been unable to determine the current status on the 31 UK HU-16's for the 37th AERS. In this respect I have requested the 31 and 37 AERS to obtain any current information as to location and arrival date their stations for these HU-16's. With the flying time being generated out of Danang, these air frames are urgently needed to continue the operation. In this connection an item which has puzzled us for a long time pertains to the number of HU-16's authorized for the 37th AERS. Based on operational flying hours per month, five is hardly enough to perform the mission. As you know, one aircraft is on station from first light until dark or until the end of the days strike activity, whichever comes first. This averages 18-20 airframe hours per day, 30 days per month or 550 or more hours per month total. Also we find ourselves flying more and more missions other than the normal. For example, there are days when we must fly all four of the available aircraft. A good round monthly average flying time requirement will be 600 hours. With only 5 aircraft assigned this comes out to about 120 hours per aircraft per month. As the WFO for the 37th is based on an allocation of 50 hours per month per airframe it appears we are rather short and should have 10 or more aircraft to perform the mission with an absolute minimum of eight. This time makes no allowance for any training, flight checks, ferrying time, upgrading, etc. If the permanent beddown base for this unit is at any location other than one in the Danang area the flying time requirement will be materially increased. I recommend that this be given further study by the staff for a feasible solution.

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6. (S) The discussion in paragraph 5 above leads into an eventual problem which must be faced pertaining to the adequacy of 8 HH-3's to perform the mission from Danang when the HU-16's are phased from the program. With the HU-16 operation in the Gulf of Tonkin we never plan on crossing the NVN coast line because there is no way to effect a recovery over land. When we introduce the HH-3 to this operation we must plan on crossing the line. To assure maximum capability to effect a recovery we must continue to employ the HH-3's in pairs as we are currently doing. A daylight to dark orbit by the HH-3's in the Gulf will double the amount of airframe hours currently being flown by the HU-16's or at least 1200 hours per month without considering the slower airspeed of the HH-3 in proceeding to and from station. The current UND for Det 7 is based on 31 hours per month per airframe. This would seem to require 37 aircraft to perform the mission, however if we increase the flying hour allocation to 50 hours per month perhaps 24 airframes could perform the job. This again does not take into consideration any training time, etc, nor does it take into consideration the daily requirement for two aircraft to be on constant alert at Quang Tri or other location just south of the DMZ, and possibly two others to be on alert at Danang to cover the area to the East and South of Danang. I realize this seems exorbitant however some figure in the vicinity of twice as many as the current US authorization of 8 would seem to be indicated. Also, if the sites in northern Laos are not returned to our use so we can remain over night, and we must continue to deploy a minimum of four aircraft to L-39 and orbit two continuously on the border north of there during heavy strike activity, 8 HH-3's are not adequate for the Det 5 mission. In fact Det 5 could use 10 HH-3's at the present time as activity continues to increase. We are seriously considering diverting 2 of the HH-3's from Det 7 to Det 5 after the first 3 are in position at Det 7, Danang, and we can take over the coverage now being furnished by the Marines. Perhaps the premise of Gen Estes that the HU-16 will be with us here in SEA for a long time, regardless of the program for phase-out, has some validity. At any rate, we must plan for the long haul, like everyone else is doing here. Again I recommend consideration be given to this problem.

7. (U) Seven officer and nine airman controllers have reported in to the Group. Two officer assignments have been cancelled (Maj's Brown and Hester) and MSgt Ellis has not yet arrived. Six officers and eight airman have completed the indoctrination training program and have been assigned to shifts. The others should complete their training in approximately two weeks. All three of the Control Centers are now fully manned by PCS personnel. Although none of the officers have had prior experience in Rescue or control work they should progress rapidly and the units will profit from the stability of the PCS assignments.

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8. (U) As though we don't have enough problems, we have had two break-ins within the past week. In one the screen door was cut on this hootch and a typewriter and an adding machine was missing. Two nights ago the screen on the side of the hootch was cut and another typewriter plus my personal raincoat was missing, ensignia and all. The APs and QCs have caught the culprits but have not recovered the goods as yet. They were 4 VNAF dependent teenagers. My guess is that the goods are now in the black market someplace.

9. (U) A writer in the area is in the process of getting USAF/MACV approval to write a book on SAR in SEA. I will advise if this develops into a firm project however I think quite a bit has already been done through the local IO. I wish we had that primary duty IO to take the load off others who have plenty to do in their own field, but so far we have nothing on arrival. When the MAC IO was out here in January I thought we would have someone within 30 days.

10. (U) There is a big move under way to get people onto TSN and out of downtown because of the worsening security situation. The plan is to have everyone on base by this time next year. A new building for MACV is in the program to be built just outside of the main gate down toward the civilian terminal in that big triangle I'm sure you are familiar with.

11. (U) Very few of the maintenance people who have arrived for the 37th have any experience with the HU-16 nor are they showing up with tool kits which is quite a problem in getting a maintenance capability under way.

12. (U) The paperwork on the reorganization proposal looks great and we hope it goes through with no hitch in record time. I would have liked to see a personnel technician in Det 1, 37 ARRS but suppose we can get along without one by doing much of their work here.

13. (U) Just as we were getting up to strength in the operations shop and people starting to produce and get some of the back projects out of the way Lt Col Ryan had to get himself shot and Capt Passman had to return to the CONUS for emergency leave. We have heard nothing from Capt Passman but do hope things are working out well for him. Although we hope he returns to us it will certainly be understood if he doesn't. He has been doing an outstanding job here and is badly missed. I had a note from Lt Col Ryan a couple of days ago. As you know he is in the hospital at Tachi for some surgical repair work on his leg muscles. The slug entrance hole has healed pretty well but the exit hole on the back of the leg is still giving trouble. He is trying to talk them into releasing him within the next week or so and get on back down here. He really had a narrow escape which could have been extremely serious.

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14. (U) We have been advised by 7AF Comptroller that effective 13 Jun 66, PACAF assumes funding for all tenant units in SEA. This includes services as well as TDY funds. 7AF will fund units in RVN and 13AF will fund out of country units. Since this is a new TDY order for all rescue units in SEA there will be many administrative problems on citing funds. We are working with 7AF and 13AF to try and resolve this problem. Reference your message ARRBH 04111/19 May 66, which quoted MAC message HARBHAM 16886/5 May 66. Apparently there has been a change in the policy as stated by MAC that all common service will be furnished by host command with exception of civilian pay and TDY travel.

PERS
TDY
FUNDS

15. (S) As I mentioned in paragraph 1 above we are using three well qualified persons from the 37th to act as Airborne Mission Commanders on the HC-130. We plan on using them at least until we get some Det 1, 37th people qualified. We still have a firm requirement for the types we have asked for in our UNO change request and are wondering what the status of this might be. As the tempo of the operation increases here multiple simultaneous missions are becoming more and more common and the AMC job gets more complicated. 7AF now uses three ABCCC (Airborne Battlefield Command Control Center) aircraft in their operation and at times we work with each of them in different areas at the same time. Coordinating Rescue, helicopters, MIG cover, fighter assistance on fire suppression, tankers, etc, and keeping track of bingo times, ordnance capability and requirements, enemy movements, etc, can become a chore. To say nothing of the continuous requirement that the JSARC be continuously advised of every movement so that we in turn can keep the Command Post informed so that they can keep the generals constantly informed on a minute by minute basis. It is in this latter area where much trouble can be caused if the information we are getting from the AMC is not timely and accurate and from someone who has given mature consideration to situation at hand. Regardless of last fall's conclusion that a separate console with plotting and status boards, etc, was not required for the AMC we are now pretty well firm in our ideas that one is required regardless of who performs this duty. We are evaluating the systems currently in use on the ABCCC to determine what might be best to fulfill this requirement.

CPS
TRNG
AIRBORNE
MISSION CTR
JSARC

Sincerely,

ARTHUR W. BEALL, Colonel, USAF
Commander

Copy to: PRCCO

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Declassify after 12 years

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REPLY TO
ATTN OF: RGCO
SUBJECT: Informational Letter

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

D 3 March 1966
DO NOT DESTROY

CATALOGUE

No. 0003609

TO: ARRS (ARXDC)

Dear Rudy,

1. I'm enclosing two messages on the subject covered in your letter of 25 February. One is from PACAF and the answer from 2AD. The 2AD wire is hard to read because of the chopped up fashion they are now using.

2. Also find enclosed our copy of a publication we get every week that I thought you might find interesting if not useful. We only get one copy of this and if you like I'll send you about every fourth one. Let me know. Be sure and not take its contents as gospel and a firm program because sometimes they change pretty much from week to week. As Col Brooks says; "stay flexible."

3. Strange that you should mention something about when the present business in SEA is wrapped up because I've been giving that some thought also. In fact it is one of my reasons for feeling strongly about this unit not being under the command line of PARRC. I feel we should be like a task force that goes wherever the action is and has a capability of rapid expansion to suit that action. When no action is in progress (seems a remote chance from here) this unit should train and participate in tactical exercises, etc, as part of the exercise. It should constantly be trying to further the state of the art, developing and testing new life support equipment under operational environment, etc. It should have at least a nucleus which is prepared to deploy anyplace in the world and work under the operational control of the theatre commander involved. It should be an entirely independent specialized command with a command line direct to ARRS as I feel it should be at the present time. As far as I'm concerned we would be in deep trouble at the present time if it were not for the fact we are functioning in this manner. Ooops, better not get started too strongly along these lines.

4. We certainly appreciate you getting into the act on the fuel dump system and getting the thing off dead center. If I'd have had any idea your people weren't working on it I would have asked you for help long ago. We are anxiously awaiting the kits and instructions which have not arrived as yet.

5. How about having someone drop me a line if and when you get a copy of the film I asked to be sent you. The AAVS people here sent it to Lookout Mt for developing and the people there said they had

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mailed a copy to you personally. We got our copy back here and it turned out pretty good, really gives a different perspective on the problems of making a recovery from a jungle area. We have a lot of things going for us in the IO business and hope you are getting most of it back there. We have no way of knowing just what does get out, except through the wives intelligence source and sometimes I don't know how to classify this.

6. This letter is classified SECRET to uphold classified attachments and will be downgraded to unclassified when attachments are withdrawn.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

ARTHUR W. BEALL, Colonel, USAF
Commander

3 Atch

1. (S) Msg DO 31334 Mar 66

2. (S) Msg DOPR-SS 05951
Mar 66

3. Recent, Programmed, and
Proposed Actions, 2nd Air
Division, 30 Mar 66

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PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

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23 April 1966

CATA' CCED

No. 000 3613

Dear Rudy,

When I got my letter off to you the other day my plan was to get this one off at the same time but there has just been too much happening and I've really been tied up. My main purpose is to try and recount the ups and downs of the Command and Control problems of this unit for as far back as I can find records. Ed Krafka should be able to shed some light on the finer details of the situation.

The earliest records on file in this Hq indicate that sometime prior to 1 August 1965 the operational control of all rescue forces was vested in the Air Rescue Commander (Det 3 PARRC). For some unknown reason, in July and August 1965, the Deputy Commander 2AD/13AF convinced the operations staff that operational control of SAR forces in DRV (now NVN), Thailand and Laos should rest with him. (see attach. #1). This was confirmed by a 2AD message (attach #2) on 24 August 1965. Only the pre-positioning of the out-country SAR forces was retained by 2AD and Det 3 PARRC.

Sometime around 5 November 1965 and just prior to my arrival there was some kind of a rhubarb over a mission that didn't go well because of a C&C problem. Col Ken Mask was at Udorn at the time and sent out a message recommending that ARRS regain the ops control of all SEA forces again. Gen Murphy happened to be at PACAF at the time and hit the ceiling when he saw it. Col Smith contacted Mask immediately and directed that he immediately rescind the message. Therefore the situation remained the same as it had been in August.

From the November incident on we continually and persistently attempted to gain the confidence of 2AD and prove that the control rightfully belonged to us, acting in the name of the Cmdr 2AD for all SEA SAR forces. The publication of 2ADR 55-20, 4 March 66 however formalized the previous 2AD directions and retained the out of country control at Dep Cmdr 2AD/13AF level. I understand you have a copy of this regulation.

On 23 March Gen Simlar, 2AD DO called a conference to clarify C&C procedures for SAR in SEA. This conference was prompted because of some misunderstanding between the TACC Airborne Command Post and our own Crown aircraft while conducting a SAR mission over hostile territory. During the three days of discussion we were

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able to convince everyone present that Operational Control logically belonged at a central location under one commander. Gen Myers, Vice Commander 2AD (now 7AF) agreed and directed that operational control return to 3ARRG to be exercised through the JSARC. The necessary amendments to directives have been drafted and should be in effect shortly and would have been except for the receipt of a proposed copy of a PACAF Reg 55-90 which PARRC had been working on without our or 7AF knowledge. The change to para 5 of 55-20 is attached for your info as #3.

At the time Gen Myers directed the return of control to the 3rd Gp he also stated that the Crown aircraft (HC-54/130) would be the Airborne Mission Commander. In his words "this is the man I look to to actually run the rescue mission." This AMC is to command the local situation in the same manner as the Lt. Col. controllers aboard the TACC Airborne Combat Control Center aircraft (C-130s). In fact, in some areas our AMC gets most of his tactical support from the ACCC. Other support agencies are the various TACCs, DASCs, RCCs, JSARC (3rd Gp). These latter links in the control net chain are to provide support, flight following, information of intelligence and other types, and maintain records, etc. A draft of the Airborne Mission Commanders functions approved by the members of the C&C conference and Gen Myers is attached (#4).

All of this was working fine and we felt we had really made money until about two weeks later when we received a printers proof copy of PACAF Reg 55-90 which PARRC had been working on. This gave us operational control OK but pulled it out from 7AF, which I don't agree with because I think the theatre commander in a wartime situation should have ops control of all forces committed to the effort. Everything else assigned here for support is under 7AF under MACV. Anyway the 7AF staff is just waiting for the formal reg to be published and then vent their wrath into action. I'm not very happy with the reg either and Col Smith said to let him know what I wanted but I saw by his reactions that he is going to be pretty adamant on his position. Other items I don't like about the new reg are caused by the almost ignoring of the 3ARRG position and placing all JSARCs in the Pacific under the supervision of PARRC, PARRC provides for JSARC manning rather than 3Gp. Para 3f of 55-90 is very unique in that the 3Gp JSARC is only responsible to PARRC and exercises operational control for Commander PARRC, ignoring the position of Commander 3Gp. I'll enclose the printers proof copy for your perusal. I personally like the way 2AD 55-20 read after the revision discussed above. Needless to say, I and 7AF are not very happy about the situation. I understand Smith insisted it be worded as is over the advice of some of his staff.

This letter is classified only to uphold classification of attachments and will be downgraded upon their withdrawal.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

ARTHUR W. BEALL, Col, USAF
Commander

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PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

28 February 1966

CATALOGED

No 0003615

RGCO

Colonel Bastow Rudolph
Hq ARRS (ARXDC)
Orlando AFB, Fla.

Dear Rudy,

1. (U) Your most informative letter of 11 February received. The only reason I wanted to get the Ops control line changed was to assist in getting PARRC off our back once in a while. There are times when I don't think they realize we are under 2AD. But, no problem; I accept your explanation.

2. (C) If you think you are discouraged by the continuous slippage in the refueling and HH-3 picture you should see me. I feel downright dejected and lugubrious. It is especially hard to take when you sit here and see the job being done at Udorn with inadequate assets and are helpless to do anything about it. It is also hard to explain the situation to 2AD. I really haven't come up with anything to help you on your March 13 talk but we are trying to find if any of the troops have any private films or info we can obtain. I'll let you know ASAP if we come up with anything in time to do any good.

3. (U) We have your message on the latest status on the fuel dump system. I won't say any more but we surely needed that interim system badly 3 months ago and more so today.

4. (C) I had no idea you people didn't know the bases in Thailand were run by 13th AF. This split took place last July when the 2AD went out from under 13th and started working directly for PACAF. Gen Bond at Udorn is the Dep Cmdr 2AD/13th AF and he gives Gen Meyers here a hard time because he bypasses him direct to Gen Moore all the time. In fact there is a lot of hard feeling between the two Headquarters. Most operational control has been delegated to Bond however all frags for both countries come out of 2AD here at TSN. ALL logistics for Thailand are 13th AF. All logistics for RVN are 2AD. Operational planning for both countries is done here at 2AD. Operational planning for both countries is done here at 2AD. If it sounds confusing it should and you should have to work with it yet. I suggest base requirements for Thailand go to Dep Cmdr 2AD/13th AF with info to 2AD and 13th. For RVN direct to 2AD with info PACAF and of course keeping us read in on everything because we work closely with both. 13th has nothing to do with 2AD but does have an overall SAR responsibility in the area.

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5. (S) Concerning the matter of guns on the H-3. We forwarded a ~~SECRET~~ letter to ARXRD on 13 December 65, concerning the reliability of aircraft machine gun 7.62 GAU-18/A. This letter also included some recommendations concerning the selection of a weapon for mounting on the H-3. I am enclosing a copy of the letter in the event you have not seen it. While gunners would be highly desirable on our aircraft, it is a luxury we cannot afford. The additional weight of guns, ammunition, and gunners would restrict our operational capability. I believe the normal crew complement could handle the job. Admittedly, situations will arise where the guns will be left unattended. The most ideal situation of course would be to remotely control the guns from about three positions in the aircraft, say the Pilot, Co-Pilot and Hoist operators stations. Maintenance of the guns should not present much of a problem. I believe, with some training from qualified factory or munitions personnel, our pararescue crew members could maintain them. I would much rather rely upon our own people as long as there is no centralized gun maintenance at Udorn or Danang.

6. (C) 2AD has been requested on several occasions to make AERS an addressee on SEAORs pertaining to rescue aircraft and equipment and had been assigned you were. You were not, however, an addressee on SEAOR #28 which pertained to an IR rescue strobe system. Probably as a result of your confidential message ARXDC 50035 Jan 66, 2AD forwarded copies of SEAORs 27, 28, 29 and 30 to ARXRD. I will take further action to insure AERS is made an addressee on all future SEAORs pertaining to rescue.

7. (S) I regret you are not able to agree with my suggestion that the 130s be located at Udorn. Udorn has been designated as the MOB (Main Operating Base) for the 130s in SEA. I've discussed this with Gen Bond and he can accommodate them and would like to. I would like to see a total of 9 and no more located in one squadron at one location. Rudy, for the life of me I can't visualize that the 130 recovery gear will ever be used in NVN. It would certainly have to be out in a very isolated location and we are just not losing aircraft in those places. Perhaps we may use it in making a recovery from a water area but the HH-3s will be there first. That brings us down to two things we are really talking about doing with the 130; a tanker for the HH-3 and a command and control aircraft. I think 9 can back the job with backup from other PAIRC units if necessary. I also think the 36th and 79th should continue to rotate crews over here periodically for training purposes if nothing else as we are planning on doing with the 16s from the 31st and 33rd after we go PCS. The fact that all 130s would have a home base at Udorn would not mean that they would be operating from there at all times and I would certainly have them operating from other locations such as Danang, Pleiku, etc. Regarding the all-eggs-in-one-basket concept, I think it will be very seldom that they would all be at home station at any one time. I do not agree at all with the concept that they have to be with the HH-3s any more than SAC tankers have to be stationed with the fighter units they service. The tankers used over here now are stationed at Takhli and are fraged to be at their proper position daily according to the strikes.

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I do not foresee the possibility of any bases being wiped out in Thailand at one fell swoop in the foreseeable future unless an all-out war is declared and all of SEA blows up. If that happens the whole picture will certainly change and the entire concept of operational deployment will change with it. That is more reason for promoting the organizational concept I forwarded, and I really think the administrative problems built into the present organizational set-up are astronomical, and extremely inefficient. In any case I don't know where we will put any 130s at Danang, you've never seen such a crowded base with no parking or living space. We will be in tents there for a long time.

8. (S) When the time comes to phase out the HU-16 I anticipate no trouble from 2AD providing we have proved inconclusively that the HH-3 can perform the job better and I see no trouble in doing that. We will definitely have to use both vehicles concurrently for the proving period though and there will have to be a large duplication of effort. By this I mean that two HH-3s and one HU-16 will have to be airborne in the Gulf of Tonkin at all times during strikes. This is going to require many flying hours in duplicated effort but will be necessary to prove the 3C capability. In this connection, just in case some people there have the idea it can be done routinely, I see very little if any possibility that any recoveries will be made where it is necessary to penetrate the coast of NVN from the Gulf. If we do we can certainly expect losses in view of their build up of defenses and intercept capability. I dread the day when we have to try. Coming in from the West side will be a much more feasible operation although requiring a much longer time, particularly since the loss of Lima 36. Just between you and me, if it wasn't so late in the game, I'd just as soon keep the 16 operation just the way it is at present with the TDY set-up. It is working as slick as a whistle and the crews like it and so do we, and we will be unable to furnish any better service on a PCS basis than is done now.

9. (C) The acoustic sensing device could be of real value in locating gun-fire during our recovery operations. Often it is impossible for the helicopter crew to determine from where the gun fire is coming; consequently, it is impossible to plan the best approach to and departure from the recovery site. I suggest that some thought be given to tying this device in with the mini-gun to provide an automatic seek and fire capability. If the mini-gun is remoted to a position beneath the helicopter as we suggest and a tie-in made with the acoustic device, it would free all crew members to concentrate on the recovery. Of course, some limiter would have to be incorporated to prevent the gun from firing around the hoist cable. We do not, however, want this to become a major modification which would hold up delivery of the aircraft. This acoustic device would also be of benefit to our A1E escort aircraft. I will bring this to the attention of 2nd Air Division if you can provide me with more details.

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10. (U) There appears to be no great need for an anti-static device on our helicopters. We have thoroughly debriefed all recovered aircrew members and none have mentioned being shocked by the hoist cable. Normally, the cable comes in contact with branches as it is lowered thru the trees or else it hits the ground before the survivor reaches it. We cannot locate much information pertaining to anti-static devices. The Army uses their ARC-44 and ARC-54 FM radios to achieve a partial discharge. When the homing adapter of the FM set is placed in the "homing" mode a discharge is made through the FM antennas as the mike button is keyed. While we have the ARC-44 radios we do not have the special adapter required for homing. Consequently, we do not have the type antennas which seem to provide maximum discharge. The Navy does not use any anti-static device in this theater as far as we can ascertain.

11. (U) Rudy, I have a very bright young Capt by the name of High who works here in the headquarters as Flying Safety Officer but primarily as an HH-3 expert and advisor. He was previously down at Patrick and has been in the LBR program also. He would like to come into Hq ARRS and would like to be in the plans shop. He has a good writing ability and was also an honor graduate when at Squadron Officers School. He rotates next October and I recommend him highly. He is forecasting now and is asking for Hq ARRS for his next assignment.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

ARTHUR W. BEALL, Colonel, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
Ltr, 38 OPS, Reliability of
Aft Machine Gun 7.62 GAU 2B/A

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22 April 1966

CATALOGEDNo **0003617**

Colonel Allison C. Brooks
Hq ARRS (ARCCO)
Orlando AFB, Florida 32813

Dear Colonel Brooks

I finally completed the full Southeast Asia Rescue visitation after an absence of many months and was greatly impressed with the current organization, management, and motivation and morale of Rescue forces in the area.

Having missed the 31st Squadron at Clark on my recent visit to Pacific area units, I spent a day with Lt Colonel Rybos and his people on the 1st of April. I found the organization to be running well with Colonel Rybos well on top of and thoroughly conversant with his problems. His problems are still the same -- lack of facility consolidation and the need for more training hours to keep crewmembers up in the HU-16. The 31st ARRS has been suffering over a year for the lack of a good backup operations officer to Colonel Rybos. Except for the short period when Lt Colonel Larkin was on duty, Rybos has been carrying the Commander and the Operations Officer load. Though I regret parting with Major Don Clark, Commander of Det 2, PARRC, I willingly will do so effective the date of his transfer to the 31st as their Operations Officer. I feel that Major Clark's job can be filled on an interim basis by Captain Sniegowski until another field grade officer comes in to fill the position. It will be an advantage all around when the new 31st Squadron operations building and ramp are constructed so that a good part of the problem of TDY of aircraft and crews to Southeast Asia may be shifted from Naha to Clark, which is closer to DaNang. We hope to concentrate on this shift of emphasis from the 33d ARRS to the 31st ARRS until the 31st is again carrying at least 50% of the load.

I found little change at DaNang from my previous visit in August, except for different people. The base is still poor, facilities minimal, morale fair, and operations difficult. Also, it was very hot! The TDY controller situation is clearing up with the input of permanent duty personnel. This is better for all concerned, as I am getting some controllers back and Dets 1 and 2 at Fuchu and Clark will soon be on a more operational footing with all of their personnel on hand. Major Hamrick, Commander at DaNang, is no ball of fire, but is doing a good, competent job.

I found everything at Udorn in good shape. I won't repeat what has already been reported to you about Major Baylor Haynes' great duty performance at that station. That, coupled with his extraordinary ability to sell Rescue to General Bond, General Murphy, and other 7 AF personnel, makes him just about indispensable during this period.

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He was working extremely well with the ALE squadron and I think the techniques that they have perfected between them to insure safe entry and exit of HH-3Es on a recovery mission will result in less battle damage overall to our resources. I renewed acquaintance with General Murphy and spent an evening with he and General Bond, whom I found to be a fine officer, and was assured that they are thoroughly satisfied with Rescue in Thailand.

I then visited each LER in Thailand and was greatly impressed with the condition and management of all of the bases in that country. It was so far superior to the bases in South Vietnam, that it was ludicrous. All of our detachments were doing fine and all of the base commanders were satisfied with the results. The regrettable accident at Ubon left everyone depressed. I left Major Tullos at Ubon to work out the substance of what we believe to be a general fatigue problem in the LER detachment there. The base commander was requiring more in airborne alert at Ubon than we believed the LER was capable of performing. We subsequently requested the 3d ARRGp to study the possibility of assigning another pilot to that station, as Major Tullos and Captain Fogg in their study concluded that for the workload involved, Det 3 was one pilot short. I gave the safety lecture to every detachment and Rescue personnel group that I met. Unfortunately, my safety lecture at Ubon was delivered after the accident.

I should state here that the Phan Rang detachment, still manned with TDY personnel, was not up to the standard of the other detachments. They were, however, doing the job under the capable leadership of Captain Vermeys from Det 9, 38th ARRS at Pleiku.

Art Beall met the airplane at Tan Son Nhut. It was the first time I had seen him since our original meeting which lasted fifteen minutes back in November. On landing there we found such utter congestion that we could not park the airplane, so it went elsewhere for the next few days. From Tan Son Nhut I borrowed a Blue Canoe and pilot and visited Cam Ranh Bay, Phan Rang, and Bien Thuy. I also altered my original plan by extending one extra day in the Saigon area to join General Birchard for the MAC briefings. Art Beall covered delay in HH-43 delivery, night recovery, Lima site loss, indoctrination of aircraft commanders in control aircraft, TDY controllers, turn-over of 3d ARRGp personnel in the Fall, routing of personnel on consecutive tours, and fuel dump for HH-3s.

He also talked about the need to reorganize the 3d Group/38th ARRS headquarters into one cohesive group headquarters. This last subject needs immediate attention. One is uncertain of delegated authority and is only sure that Beall is in charge. The progress since my last visit to Saigon is evident. The 3d Group facilities are very good, Art is well known and liked by 7 AF personnel and as you know, he shares living quarters with key 7 AF staff officers, so holds excellent status. I discussed the new PACAF Reg 55-90 with him, particularly the specifics that direct operational control of

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Rescue forces from CINCPACAF to Commander, PARRC, to Commander, 3d ARRGp. Seventh Air Force can no longer exercise operational control of Rescue forces. Commander, 3d ARRGp, contributes full Rescue support to Commander, 7 AF, but personally directs Rescue forces at the request of 7 AF. This is great for Rescue and fully supported by PACAF. CINCPACAF understands fully that Commander, MAC, permits operational control only to CINCPACAF, who exercises it through his Rescue commander, who in this case is Commander, PARRC. This regulation even more fully focuses my responsibility to properly represent you to CINCPACAF and staff. In that regard, we are doing our best to stay with the day to day, as well as overall, problems. Please remind your staff to info us on correspondence to Art Beall and to the 3d ARRGp. I know we are getting most of it, but some key issues have passed us by. We think we are a good resource and want you to use us.

After finishing with Major Charles Kay and the Bien Thuy detachment, my friend, Colonel Ed Hathaway, who is Army Advisor to the Commander, 21st Vietnamese Division under General Min, had me picked up in an Army chopper and transported into the interior of IV Corp to an area known as Baclieu, which is Division headquarters and key staff officer housing. I spent the night and the following day listening to Army problems, which turned out mostly to be air problems. The Army has taken to the air. They run their command post, supervise tactics and general operations and rely on forward air controller reports, all while helicopter-borne. Colonel Hathaway's Air Force types still argue with Army pilots over who is going to fly what airplane and who takes the next mission and the relative difficulty of FAC (Forward Air Controller) operations. I guess there are some things that will never be straightened out.

Having covered everything that is great, I should mention a few things that are not. For one thing Beall has got to have an airplane. I see no way that his staff can supervise the Rescue operation in Southeast Asia in 15 or 16 different locations without immediate responsive transportation from Tan Son Nhut. He holds an elaborate chart detailing all of his staff's assistance visits, but we picked up too many items of which his staff was unaware to give full validity to the visits that are being made. For one thing, Ken Mask is complaining too much about the operation at Udorn for there not to be some substance to it. We will have him put an officer there to represent the 130 operation to Major Haynes and report accordingly. Beall has asked for this. Additionally, with the ARRS approval for the eleven 130s into Udorn, a real difficult programming problem is coming up. Notwithstanding the uncertainty in 7 AF headquarters about future operations at Udorn with respect to individual units, we must have a firm plan that will assure our capability to operate 130s safely from that base. We are planning to honcho a general conference to deal with this problem and with the nuts and bolts of reorganization at DaNang right away. As for the reorganization at DaNang, we are awaiting your headquarters' reply as a result of my conversation with Tom Thorne and follow-up dispatch concerning

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your opinion of how PACAF should answer CSAF wire in which the two alternatives on the reorganization do not fit our thinking. We have to really move on this one.

Finally, I must say in retrospect, it is remarkable that the previous Commander of the 38th ARRS and his predecessors were able to do so much in management of SAR throughout the Southeast Asia area in consideration of all of the resources that we have put in there to do the same job. Viva Ed Krafka!


This letter is classified confidential as it reveals capability of ARRS forces in combat area.

Sincerely

SIGNED

DONALD T. SMITH, Colonel, USAF
Commander

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HEADQUARTERS
PACIFIC AIR RESCUE CENTER
 AIR RESCUE SERVICE (MATS)
 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
 APO 953, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SEA



PROJECT CORCORAN INVEST

DO NOT DESTROY
 30 July 1964

CATALOGED

No 0003619

Brig General Adriel N. Williams
 Hq Air Rescue Service
 Orlando AFB, Florida

Dear General Williams:

1. (U) Thought you might be interested in the results of the USAF Inspector General Capability Inspection of Air Rescue Service. The IG team, headed by Colonel V. O. Elmore, arrived here on 20 July and departed 29 July. During the intervening period the team was briefed at PARC, inspected the 76th ARS and held additional discussions at PARC. Since this was not a compliance inspection, no report of their findings is available; however they did leave a Field Memorandum with the 76th ARS. During the squadron critique the supply representative stated that the supply officer was not authorized at squadron level. Although I did not have an opportunity to discuss this point with him, it is my impression that his reference is to a squadron operating with a parent unit rather than one operating independently. There were no major items of discrepancy noted in the squadron; however, I feel that this is normal for a capability inspection and does not in any way reflect the true status of the squadron.
2. (U) Discussions held at PARC both before and after the squadron inspection were toned toward picking my brain about the capability of ARS, the limitations imposed by inadequate equipment and what we need to do a first rate job for the USAF in the search and recovery area. I believe that a little pushing on your part, when the team visits Orlando, might pay handsome dividends in the assignment of additional recovery roles to ARS. I believe Colonel Elmore is convinced that these jobs rightfully belong to ARS and should be so assigned by the Air Staff.
3. (C) While on the subject of recovery, I would like to mention an item which has always been crystal clear in my mind, but recent incidents lead me to believe that my understanding may not be in accordance with your policies. Specifically, my reference is to

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Aircrew Recovery and the basic responsibility of ARS. Remarks made by Lt Colonel Hartley during his visit to the Pacific to the effect that ARS did not agree with the PARC action in deploying an LBR/ACR unit, combined with the contents of ARS message ARODC 281-G, creates the impression that the headquarters policy is contrary to our actions. We have voluminous correspondence on this subject from Colonel Rudolph's office, and can find nothing contrary to our belief. I share the headquarters' concern about the continued use of unmodified helicopters and the attendant high risk potential; however, since we are a military fighting force and do not have adequate equipment to do the job, I feel we must do the best we can with what we have until some relief is available.

4. (C) We are also evidently confused by the ARS 510 Plan insofar as application is concerned. Page 2 of the basic plan states that deployed helicopters may be applied against Rescue/Recovery support for deployed Air Force combat units, cold war support operations and USAF contingency plans. In attempting to apply this plan for assistance in the present PACOM contingency, we were informed that the 510 Plan is intended to cover short term contingency and special missions and could not be used for the contingency in progress. Within the meaning of the term "contingency" as used in the Pacific area, it is applied to any situation short of general war. Herein may lie the difference of opinion between ARS headquarters and PARC as to the application of the 510 Plan. We have always assumed that any "contingency" operation exceeding the Pacific resources would be supported from CONUS resources, on request. This assumption is evidently false.

5. (U) To keep us on the straight and narrow path and to be assured that your policies and desires are adequately supported by PARC, it is requested that the problem areas mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 above be clarified for our guidance and compliance.

6. (U) This letter is classified confidential as it reveals combat support capability.

Walter F. Derck
WALTER F. DERCK
Colonel, USAF
Commander

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ARXDC

DO NOT DESTROY

11 Feb 1966

Colonel Arthur W. Beall
 Commander, 3d ARRGp
 APO San Francisco 96307

CATALOGED
 No 0003622

Dear Art

Several items to cover. As a matter of fact, I have so many I don't know where to start. In your 25 January letter, you mentioned errors in the ARRS organizational chart. We have no dispute with the fact that 2d ADiv has operational control of 3d Gp as long as the emergency exists in Southeast Asia. However, on a chart of this fashion, we prefer to make reference only to our own organization; therefore, you might say the line running from PARRC to 3d Gp is a command line only. This, in my opinion, follows the intent of AFM 2-36.

On the air-to-air refueling side, it looks like the Air Force and industry are moving along about as fast as they can taking into consideration all of the red tape problems that we have to contend with. I have been up to ASD for a two-day meeting. Mac and Maj David have been up there several times and left again today for another go at it. It is absolutely pathetic that we can't move things along faster, and in my opinion it's not in the industry side. It's in the administrative procedures that are required in order to give industry the go-ahead. You know my impatience. Maybe I would be better off if I would just sit back and let these laborious procedures work themselves out but it just seems to me that things are not moving fast enough. Anyway, it looks like the HC-130's will be ready during the July-September time period and the choppers will be ready during the October-November time period. Lt Col Mosher, head of the HH-3 SPO, told me on the phone a couple of days ago that although he was being forced to use a November completion date for the chopper refueling kits, he personally believed that this date would be bettered by 30 to 60 days. Knowing Sikorsky Aviation Company the way we do, I believe that this is probably a pretty fair statement. By the way, I understand that I am going to be asked to go to the Sikorsky Plant on 15 March to talk to about four or five hundred of their blue collar workers at some kind of a big banquet they are going to have. Anything that you might be able to pass to me that I could say during this speech would be appreciated. Maybe we can inspire the worker to work a little harder and run over management and the Air Force and DOD's red tape machinery.

On the HC-130H side of the picture - the July-September date will not, or should not interfere with your receiving a PCS 130 organization as scheduled; i.e., end of June this year. These initial airplanes will be silver type and will be replaced on a one for one basis later on with the camouflaged HC-130H tanker type. Also, the October-November date for the chopper air refueling capability is not expected to interfere with delivery of the next 10 HH-3Es.

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We are planning to go ahead and make delivery of the 3E's on schedule. The air refueling capability will be in kit form and will be accomplished wherever the aircraft are at the time. Also, this air refueling kit will have as a part of it a better and quicker fuel dump system; that is, better than the interim system that the materiel people are now working on.

The re-organization letter got here day before yesterday. We are working on it. However, it looks like it will be a rough go to try to take care of the mid-Pacific problem that you mention. I understand the situation as do many people here who are extremely sympathetic and will do what we can. It is not hopeless, but it is close to it.

Colonel Beaudry brought back the fact that the bases in Thailand are actually owned and operated by the 13th AF. Who runs the bases in South Vietnam? Who should we send our base requirements; that is, facilities, to in the RVN complex and in the Thailand complex?

You may know by now that the Information Officer space has been allocated. It is a major position and I think it is effective 3/66. The space will come from MAC Hqs. The 3d Gp has also been allotted one Intelligence Officer and one airman slot effective 3/66 (Vic does not have the grades as of this date).

Reference the problem you outlined in manpower regarding the 2 ADiv comment on figures and MAC messages, etc., I talked this over with Orville Fisher on my last visit to MAC Headquarters and he is in contact with the 2 ADiv manpower people and will work this problem out. Also Vic is checked out on it.

We have been disappointed on a couple of occasions that SEAORs pertaining to our aircraft have not been forwarded to this headquarters. The latest case was the one pertaining to the infra red requirement. We have been working on infra red for several weeks now and have found 2 systems. One is a system being developed by the army using aircraft filtered landing lights and army tank commanders binoculars. The potential of this is extremely limited. We have tried this on our aircraft. Also McLeaish has been out in Texas with an army team working with army aircraft and it has been confirmed there that it was also extremely limited. We favor a Texas instrument approach that the 1st CAG, Eglin, is working with and we hope before too many weeks we will be able to try this system in our Patrick aircraft. This system gives a complete pilot display including horizons, etc. We have seen films of bread board equipment and it is absolutely amazing. McLeaish is going to check on this system again during his stay at ASD today and tomorrow. (I know that you and Mac don't get along too well, but let me assure you that 90% of everything we are doing in the helicopter line for your theater today has been and is being accomplished by McLeaish and David). I cite the IR example in regard to us not getting SEAOR's because it appeared to us, and I think now I can say it is factual, that the Air Force was going down a route on IR that would give you an extremely limited capability, not as far as an IR beacon is concerned but as far as a system in the aircraft is concerned. It may be desirable to go the limited route first and then switch to the Texas instrument system as it becomes available. We have gotten some civilians in ASD fired up on this system and I believe that they are also doing everything possible to forge ahead with this capability.

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Andy Anderson is back in the hospital. He is not looking well at all and we have received round-about information that it doesn't look good for him. He is in Ward 11. If you have time I think he would appreciate a short note from you.

I don't know when I will be able, if ever, to get to Southeast Asia. I talked to Beaudry about it a couple of days ago and he felt it desirable to wait for about 30 days or so until we have a chance to find out whether or not I will be staying here following the summer rotations. I would prefer to wait and send over whoever might be going to take my place. I expect it will be Paul. If the word comes down that I am to remain in the headquarters for another year, then I will immediately put in my request for a visit to the theater. I feel it would be rather foolish for me to go over there and then only have 2 to 2½ months to take advantage of my experience.

Once again, Art, let me assure you that we are doing all we can here in Plans to give you what you need. Please ask the 2 ADiv people establishing requirements to get us a copy of their requirements as soon as possible. Although SEAORs are supposed to have priority over everything else, we repeatedly find that unless we get on the telephone and go and talk to people and continuously kick, thrash and push, the requirements fall into the laboriously slow DOD, USAF, ASD system and they just ain't speeded up. I think that those items we have been able to bird-dog are being accomplished in about one half to two thirds of the time that they would otherwise be made available. Unfortunately, I am losing about half of my officers in the next 2 to 3 months to your effort. This is going to make me extremely short and certainly will make an impact on our ability to improve the 3d Group's operational capability but we will do the best we can. It looks like Don David is going to be a HU-16 pilot and Walt Johnson to be an HU-16 pilot. McLeaish will be an HH-3 pilot and Bill Bright will probably be headed some place late Spring or Summer. As you are well aware the personnel system reacts so slow that it will be early fall before we will have any help.

Please keep me advised. I like to get your letters and I don't mind at all those typed-by-Art Beall's-hand type.

Sincerely

(signed)

BESTOW R. RUDOLPH, Colonel, USAF
DCS/Plans

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PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS 3RD AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY GROUP (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

RGCO

CATALOGED

0003625

No
SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

28 February 1966



TO: Colonel Bestow Rudolph
Hq ARRS (ARXDC)
Orlando AFB, Fla.

Dear Rudy,

1. (U) Your most informative letter of 11 February received. The only reason I wanted to get the Ops control line changed was to assist in getting PARRC off our back once in a while. There are times when I don't think they realize we are under 2AD. But, no problem; I accept your explanation.

2. (C) If you think you are discouraged by the continuous slippage in the refueling and HH-3 picture you should see me. I feel downright dejected and lugubrious. It is especially hard to take when you sit here and see the job being done at Udorn with inadequate assets and are helpless to do anything about it. It is also hard to explain the situation to 2AD. I really haven't come up with anything to help you on your March 15 talk but we are trying to find if any of the troops have any private films or info we can obtain. I'll let you know ASAP if we come up with anything in time to do any good.

3. (U) We have your message on the latest status on the fuel dump system. I won't say any more but we surely needed that interim system badly 3 months ago and more so today.

4. (C) I had no idea you people didn't know the bases in Thailand were run by 13th AF. This split took place last July when the 2AD went out from under 13th and started working directly for PACAF. Gen Bond at Udorn is the Dep Cmdr 2AD/13th and he gives Gen Meyers here a hard time because he bypasses him direct to Gen Moore all the time. In fact there is a lot of hard feeling between the two Headquarters. Most operational control has been delegated to Bond however all frags for both countries come out of 2AD here at TSN. ALL logistics for Thailand are 13th AF. All logistics for RVN are 2AD. Operational planning for both countries is done here at 2AD. ~~Operational planning for both countries is done here at 2AD.~~ If it sounds confusing it should and you should have to work with it yet. I suggest base requirements for Thailand go to Dep Cmdr 2AD/13th AF with info to 2AD and 13th. For RVN direct to 2AD with info PACAF and of course keeping us read in on everything because we work closely with both. 13th has nothing to do with 2AD but does have an overall SAR responsibility in the area.

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GROUP 4

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Declassified after 12 years.

66-AD-0095

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ARXDC 16-21

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5. (S) Concerning the matter of guns on the H-3. We forwarded a SECRET letter to ARXRD on 13 December 65, concerning the reliability of aircraft machine gun 7.62 GAU-1B/A. This letter also included some recommendations concerning the selection of a weapon for mounting on the H-3. I am enclosing a copy of the letter in the event you have not seen it. While gunners would be highly desirable on our aircraft, it is a luxury we cannot afford. The additional weight of guns, ammunition, and gunners would restrict our operational capability. I believe the normal crew complement could handle the job. Admittedly, situations will arise where the guns will be left unattended. The most ideal situation of course would be to remotely control the guns from about three positions in the aircraft, say the Pilot, Co-Pilot and Hoist operators stations. Maintenance of the guns should not present much of a problem. I believe, with some training from qualified factory or munitions personnel, our pararescue crew members could maintain them. I would much rather rely upon our own people as long as there is no centralized gun maintenance at Udorn or Danang.

6. (C) 2AD has been requested on several occasions to make ARRS an addressee on SEAORs pertaining to rescue aircraft and equipment and had been assured you were. You were not, however, an addressee on SEAOR #28 which pertained to an IR rescue strobe system. Probably as a result of your confidential message ARXDC 50035 Jan 66, 2AD forwarded copies of SEAORs 27, 28, 29 and 30 to ARXRD. I will take further action to insure ARRS is made an addressee on all future SEAORs pertaining to rescue.

7. (S) I regret you are not able to agree with my suggestion that the 130s be located at Udorn. Udorn has been designated as the MOB (Main Operating Base) for the 130s in SEA. I've discussed this with Gen Bond and he can accommodate them and would like to. I would like to see a total of 9 and no more located in one squadron at one location. Rudy, for the life of me I can't visualize that the 130 recovery gear will ever be used in NVN. It would certainly have to be out in a very isolated location and we are just not losing aircraft in those places. Perhaps we may use it in making a recovery from a water area but the HH-3s will be there first. That brings us down to two things we are really talking about doing with the 130; a tanker for the HH-3 and a command and control aircraft. I think 9 can hack the job with backup from other PARMC units if necessary. I also think the 36th and 79th should continue to rotate crews over here periodically for training purposes if nothing else as we are planning on doing with the 16s from the 31st and 33rd after we go PCS. The fact that all 130s would have a home base at Udorn would not mean that they would be operating from there at all times and I would certainly have them operating from other locations such as Danang, Pleiku, etc. Regarding the all-eggs-in-one-basket concept, I think it will be very seldom that they would all be at home station at any one time. I do not agree at all with the concept that they have to be with the HH-3s any more than SAC tankers have to be stationed with the fighter units they service. The tankers used over here now are stationed at Takhli and are fragged to be at their proper position daily according to the strikes.

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

I do not foresee the possibility of any bases being wiped out in Thailand at one fell swoop in the foreseeable future unless an all-out war is declared and all of SEA blows up. If that happens the whole picture will certainly change and the entire concept of operational deployment will change with it. That is more reason for promoting the organizational concept I forwarded, and I really think the administrative problems built into the present organizational set-up are astronomical, and extremely inefficient. In any case I don't know where we will put any 130s at Danang, you've never seen such a crowded base with no parking or living space. We will be in tents there for a long time.

8. (S) When the time comes to phase out the HU-16 I anticipate no trouble from 2AD providing we have proved inconclusively that the HH-3 can perform the job better and I see no trouble in doing that. We will definitely have to use both vehicles concurrently for the proving period though and there will have to be a large duplication of effort. By this I mean that two HH-3s and one HU-16 will have to be airborne in the Gulf of Tonkin at all times during strikes. This is going to require many flying hours in duplicated effort but will be necessary to prove the 3C capability. In this connection, just in case some people there have the idea it can be done routinely, I see very little if any possibility that any recoveries will be made where it is necessary to penetrate the coast of NVN from the Gulf. If we do we can certainly expect losses in view of their build up of defenses and intercept capability. I dread the day when we have to try. Coming in from the West side will be a much more feasible operation although requiring a much longer time, particularly since the loss of Lima 36. Just between you and me, if it wasn't so late in the game, I'd just as soon keep the 16 operation just the way it is at present with the TDY set-up. It is working as slick as a whistle and the crews like it and so do we, and we will be unable to furnish any better service on a PCS basis than is done now.

9. (C) The acoustic sensing device could be of real value in locating gun-fire during our recovery operations. Often it is impossible for the helicopter crew to determine from where the gun fire is coming; consequently, it is impossible to plan the best approach to and departure from the recovery site. I suggest that some thought be given to tying this device in with the mini-gun to provide an automatic seek and fire capability. If the mini-gun is remoted to a position beneath the helicopter as we suggest and a tie-in made with the acoustic device, it would free all crew members to concentrate on the recovery. Of course, some limiter would have to be incorporated to prevent the gun from firing around the hoist cable. We do not, however, want this to become a major modification which would hold up delivery of the aircraft. This acoustic device would also be of benefit to our A1E rescert aircraft. I will bring this to the attention of 2nd Air Division if you can provide me with more details.

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
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~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

10. (U) There appears to be no great need for an anti-static device on our helicopters. We have thoroughly debriefed all recovered aircrew members and none have mentioned being shocked by the hoist cable. Normally, the cable comes in contact with branches as it is lowered thru the trees or else it hits the ground before the survivor reaches it. We cannot locate much information pertaining to anti-static devices. The Army uses their ARC-44 and ARC-54 FM radios to achieve a partial discharge. When the homing adapter of the FM set is placed in the "homing" mode a discharge is made through the FM antennas as the mike button is keyed. While we have the ARC-44 radios we do not have the special adapter required for homing. Consequently, we do not have the type antennas which seem to provide maximum discharge. The Navy does not use any anti-static device in this theater as far as we can ascertain.

11. (U) Rudy, I have a very bright young Capt by the name of High who works here in the headquarters as Flying Safety Officer but primarily as an HH-3 expert and advisor. He was previously down at Patrick and has been in the LER program also. He would like to come into Hq ARRS and would like to be in the plans shop. He has a good writing ability and was also an honor graduate when at Squadron Officers School. He rotates next October and I recommend him highly. He is forecasting now and is asking for Hq ARRS for his next assignment.

Sincerely,


ARTHUR W. BEALL, Colonel, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
Ltr, 38 OPS, Reliability of
Acft Machine Gun 7.62 GAU 2B/A

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PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

28 Nov 1966

FROM: Det 7, 38th ARRS APO 96337

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report 1-3-84 15 November 1966 (U) **ATALOGED**

TO: 3rd ARRGp APO 96307

No. 0003636

(U) Jolly Green 15

(U) Jolly Green 18

Major Youngblood RCC
 Major Hicks CP
 A1C Bettvey HM
 A2C Hackney RS

Capt Dickey RCC
 Maj Trochak CP
 TSgt Tindal HM
 SSgt Souza RS

(C) (Gp-4) Jolly Green 15 and 18 took off from DaNang at 0625 on 15 November 1966 to proceed to Quang Tri for the purpose of pulling strip alert. Approximately 10 minutes before arrival at Quang Tri, Water Boy (GCI) informed us that a small U.S. Navy fast-boat had overturned and sunk, but was unable to give a location of the distressed boat. We orbited awaiting further information to determine which direction to proceed. Contact was attempted with Crown to obtain more information, but could not be reached, even after numerous calls on different frequencies. Hillsboro was contacted also but he had no information. Again Water Boy was contacted, who in the meantime had obtained a tacan fix from an unknown aircraft source supposedly pinpointing the overturned boat. A direct course was flown at maximum speed to the tacan fix at low altitudes to remain clear of 200 foot ceilings. Upon arrival it was immediately determined that the fix, as reported, was erroneous. At least 15 minutes was lost because of this. Several Army helicopters were seen proceeding north, so having no better method of locating the overturned boat, we followed the helicopters to the area, arriving there approximately 30 minutes after initial notification. Two other fast-boats were in the area at the mouth of the Hue River, and numerous personnel were standing on the beach. A search pattern was begun and immediately an empty inflated life preserver was sighted. Continuing the search and approximately 6 minutes after arriving at the scene, a U. S. Navy sailor was located floating in his life preserver about one-half mile off the coast. He was in the surf with waves at least 12 feet high with gusty winds up to 35 knots, which made hovering exceedingly difficult. The sailor appeared lifeless, and it was decided he could only be recovered by lowering the pararescue specialist into the water. A2C Hackney was lowered on the hoist, attached the body to the "horse collar" and gave the signal to raise the cable. A few feet up, the body slipped from the harness and fell back into the waves. The body was again placed on the sling and this time the pararescue specialist affixed himself around the lifeless body to

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 Det 7 33rd ARRS
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prevent it from again falling out. Both were raised into the helicopter, where artificial respiration on the sailor was attempted until it was definitely determined that no life existed. To go into the extremely rough sea required much courage and heroism on the part of Airman Hackney, whose professional performance made the recovery operation successful. The cadaver was flown to the nearest military facility at Hue Phu Bai and delivered to U. S. medical authorities. The Jolly Green 15 and 18 continued on to Quang Tri for strip alert.

(C) (Gp-4) The mission was hampered by insufficient and erroneous information concerning the location of the overturned fast-boat. Apparently communication between the Navy and Air Force rescue network left much to be desired.

Arlian D. Youngblood
ARLIAN D. YOUNGBLOOD, Major, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

Gp-4, DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YEARS.

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 HEADQUARTERS
 AIR RESCUE SERVICE (ARS)
 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
 ORLANDO AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST**DO NOT DISSEMINATE**

10 August 1964

No

0003639REPLY TO
ATTN OF: ARODC

SUBJECT: (U) Operations in RVN

TO: ARXDC
ARCCO
IN TURN

(C) The following comments are submitted in reply to Colonel Derck's letter to General Williams, dated 30 July 1964.

a. The State Department has gone on record on several occasions indicating that operations in RVN will continue for an indefinite period since there is no immediate solution to the present situation. Since it is recognized that this will be a long term combat support operation, ARODC shares USAF's views that ARS OPLAN 510 does not apply in this case since it was designed for short term contingency requirements of a special nature and not for indefinite deployments. Informal information from Air Force indicates their opinion of "short term" should not exceed 30 to 60 days. LBR contingency forces as established by ARS OPLAN 510 were designed to provide the same support to tactical units operating from advanced bases, i.e., fire suppression, crew recovery, as provided at the home station and not to operate in direct support of STRIKE forces in forward areas. Range restrictions and other limiting factors preclude the HH-43B from performing extensive combat aircrew recovery missions.

b. We believe that Colonel Derck, as a means of expediency, has relied on the ARS OPLAN 510 rather than the ARS OPLAN 563 which is designed to provide a permanent rather than temporary aircrew recovery force in support of extended combat operations. It is our opinion that the term Local Base Rescue/Aircrew Recovery (LBR/ACR) as used by PARC has been misleading since it is a deviation from the accepted term LBR and concept of LBRCF as defined in ARS OPLAN 510.

c. PACAF Secret message PFODC 1-1332, 6 August, advises that two separate requirements exist for SAR in SEA. First, Local Base Rescue (LBR), Fire Suppression units, and second, Air Recovery units. This message further states that the LBR requirement can be filled by a short-range helicopter such as the HH-43B and that the aircrew recovery mission would require a long-range helicopter such as the HH3C to satisfy this need. The same message advises that the Aircrew Recovery unit presently at Nakhon Phanom is a permanent requirement.

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(17)

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We have been under a similar opinion that there are two separate and distinct requirements for SEA support. It appears that some of the confusion has been caused whenever a definition of these two separate requirements has not been stated clearly.

This letter is classified confidential as it reveals combat support capability.

Walter E. Thorne
WALTER E. THORNE
Colonel, USAF
DCS/Operations

1 Atch
Ltr Col Derck, 30 July 64

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CONFIDENTIAL**PROJECT CORONA HARVEST****DO NOT DESTROY****CATALOGED**No 0003644

ARRS OAFB FIA

3D ARRGF TAN SON NHUT AFID RVN

CONFIDENTIAL ARXDC 50107 Mar 1966.

Personal for Beall from Rudolph. This message in 3 parts. Part I:

Mar 14 issue of Aviation Week has short article stating Tactical Air Cmd is urging development of a greater rescue capability for pilots downed deep inside North Vietnam. In direct relation to this, we received a telephone call from Proj Off at TAWC who has been directed by B/G Putnam (apparently a recent returnee from SEA) to study problem. Gen Putnam stated that the HH3E cannot meet recovery requirements in terms of hover capability at altitude and range.

Part II: We have not been officially approached on this study nor are we aware of Gen Putnam's background and knowledge of the ACR mission. However, our records do not reveal any personnel recovery mission which we have been unable to meet because of lack of HH-3 performance. The article indicates that Boeing-Vertol recently briefed the CH-47A chinook to TAC for this mission. This briefing we have also had in hard sell terms and which we believe may be the crux of the problem. Part III: For discussion purposes, we would appreciate any information you have wherein the HH-3 could not perform a mission due to lack of performance, including full circumstances. Also requested is any info regarding Gen Putnam's functions related to SAR in SEA when assigned to area and any other background info you consider appropriate. GP 4.

PAUL E. LESKE, Colonel, USAF

CONFIDENTIALBESTOW R. RUDOLPH, Colonel, USAF
DCS/Plans

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3RD ARZCP TAN SON NHUT AB RVN

ARRS ORLANDO AFB FLA

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3378

JOHN M. HIGH, CAPTAIN, USAF
SAFETY OFFICER

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SIGNED

E. A. WILSON, JR., CWO U-4, USA
CHIEF, ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

GP-4.

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PRIORITY	E. A. WILSON, JR.	JOHN W. HIGH	3378

RECOVERED THE FOLLOWING DAY AFTER THE WINDS (ESTIMATED AT 70 KNOTS) HAD DECREASED AND THE SURVIVOR HAD CHANGED LOCATION.

GP-4. WHILE THESE INSTANCES POINT OUT OUR NEED FOR AN AIRCRAFT WITH INCREASED PERFORMANCE, WE SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT THE CH-47A CHINOOK WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PERFORM THE MISSIONS EITHER. WE STILL FEEL THE SOLUTION TO OUR NEEDS LIES IN AN ADVANCED CONCEPT AIRCRAFT AS OUTLINED IN SEOR 15-PY-66 (SEARCH AND RESCUE AIRCRAFT)

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PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

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CATALOGED

0003652

RCO

Reorganization of 3d ARRGp (U)

Colonel Allison C. Brooks
Commander
Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

Dear Colonel Brooks

(C) Although I had not intended to bring up this subject again, I thought I had better explain some of the rationale for attempting to have a different reorganization proposed than that which was made by MAC. Your message on this subject forwarded from Tachikawa was the first official notification that I had that the position of ARRS had changed from that which was forwarded by Det 7 MAC to MAC Headquarters.

(C) I had also had correspondence from Rudy substantiating the position of the headquarters on the four squadron proposal and with all LBR's coming directly under 3d Group Headquarters. I had gotten the word that MAC would only subscribe to three squadrons, rather than four squadrons, as they figured this would be all that Hq USAF would approve. I also got the word that MAC was strong on having a separate squadron (the 38th) to command the LBR's. The entire point of my proposition was to separate the fixed wing and the helicopters, rather than having them as an integrated unit.

(S) This mix has been the position of Rescue for years, and it has always been a sore point with the helicopter pilots. I would like to see the helicopter pilots come into their own and for one time at least have helicopter units at squadron level in ARS. We are the only USAF people who have the opportunity of doing this in the foreseeable future. My proposal under the three squadron concept would have been as follows:

Det 1 37 ARRSq would be the 39th Sq, consisting of the HC-130's only. *OK*

The 38th Sq would move to Udorn/Nakhon Phanom and be composed of HH-3/HH-53's and would have one detachment of HH-3's at Danang. *OK*

The 37th Sq would remain at Danang with HU-16's, and at such time as the HU-16's phased out, Det 1 of the 38th Sq (HH-3's) would be redesignated as the 37th Sq. However, the LBR's would come directly under 3d Group Headquarters. *MC*

I have on several occasions given the rationale for the LBR's coming under the Group Headquarters so will not take the time to repeat myself.

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
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(C) This above reorganization would make a clean cut functional setup both administratively and operationally if approved; however, I do not propose that any action be taken on this and am only forwarding it to kind of get it off my chest prior to my return to Orlando. It does seem a shame that the people at MAC Headquarters who are making these decisions would not concur with our proposal and send some of their experts over to study the situation, rather than try to make a decision from Scott with probably a very scant appreciation of the 7th Air Force and the 7AF/13AF operational and logistical concepts and the communications problems involved.

(U) Colonel Leske and Colonel Bridges should be arriving any day now and perhaps we can discuss the subject in more detail.

(U) Colonel Lovelady has arrived and is in the process of visiting subordinate units. I will be departing on 1 November with arrival at Orlando some time between the 20th and 25th. Looking forward to seeing you soon thereafter.

Sincerely


ARTHUR W. BEALL, Colonel, USAF
Commander

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

P-190447Z
FM CINCPACAF
TO RUMSBJ/2AD TSN RVN
INFO RUMSBJ/3ARRGP TAN SON NHUT AB RVN
BT

SECRET DO 31334 MAR 66. SUBJ: REVIEW OF AFR 55-7
1. CSAF MSG RETRANSMITTED FOR YOUR ACTION. PACAF INVISIONS EXTENSIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES TO AFR 55-7. YOUR INPUT REQUIRED NLT 25 MARCH 1966 TO MEET CSAF SUSPENSE. QUOTE.

SECRET AFXOFF 76744 MAR 66.

CINCPAC MSG, SUBJ: PERSONEL RECOVER/E&E CONFERENCE (U)
190344Z IS QUOTED IN PART FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

A. PROBLEM: INDEQUACY OF DIRECTION AND GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN TRI-SERVICE DIRECTIVE AFR JTTAUN AR NO. 525-90: NAVY SUPP, NWP 37(A); SUBJ: WARTIME SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) PROCEDURES.

(1) DISCUSSION: CURRENT SAR OPERATIONS IN SEA SIA ARE AT VARIANCE AS A MATTER OF NECESSITY OR EXPERIENCE WITH GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN THE ABOVE TRI-SERVICE DIRECTIVE. THE OPENING POLICY STATEMENT IS "WARTIME SAR PROCEDURES ARE ESSENTIALLY AN EXTENSION OF THE PEACETIME PROCEDURES DESCRIBED IN THE NATIONAL SEARCH AND RESCUE MANUAL." THIS STATEMENT IS CONTRARY TO ACTUAL EXPERIENCE GAINED IN SEASIA. IN ACTUALITY, WARTIME SAR HAS VERY LITTLE IN COMMON WITH PEACETIME PROCEDURES. THE POLICY STATEMENT, AS PUBLISHED HAS LED TO THE FALLACIOUS BELIEF THAT SAR FORCES EQUIPPED FOR PEACETIME OPERATIONS CAN SURVIVE IN A COMBAT ENVIRONMENT. EXPERIENCE IN SEASIA HAS PROVED OTHERWISE AND IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO ARM AND PROVIDE ARMOR FOR SAR AIRCRAFT ON A PRIORITY BASIS. ADDITIONALLY, OPERATING FORCES HAVE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO PUBLISH A DETAILED MANUAL SPELLING OUT COORDINATION PROCEDURES AND WARTIME SAR METHODOLOGY. SEVERAL HELD SECTIONS OF THE TRI-SERVICE DIRECTIVE ARE ALSO IN CONFLICT WITH EXISTING PROCEDURES, I. E., CALL SIGN INFORMATION AND AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURES.

AS A RESULT OF THE CINCPAC RECOMMENDATION, THE JOINT STAFF HAS TASKED THE AIR FORCE TO ACCOMPLISH A REVIEW OF AFR 55-7, WARTIME SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) PROCEDURES, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ARMY AND THE NAVY. YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING POLICY, COMMAND AND COORDINATION RESPONSIBILITIES, PROCEDURES, COMMUNICATIONS AND AUTHENTICATION ARE SOLICITED. RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED MUST BE IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL TO WARRANT INCLUSION IN A REVISED REGULATION SHOULD THE REVIEW SHOW THAT THIS COURSE OF ACTION IS NECESSARY. PLEASE FORWARD YOUR COMMENTS TO THIS HQS NO LATER THAN 1 APRIL 1966. GP-4

UNQUOTE: GP-FOUR

BT

A TRUE COPY:

E. A. WILSON, CWO N-4, USAF
Chief, Admin Services

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GROUP: 4
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No

0003654

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 2D AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

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REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DO

4 Dec 1965

SUBJECT: (U) SEAOR 77-FY-66 QOR (Foliage Penetrating Distress Signal System)

TO: USAF (AFHQQR)
TAC (DORR)
AFSC (SCS-6)

ASD (ASJ)
AFPC (MCPHM)
SAWC

PACAF (DORR)
TAWC
TATC

No
1ST CAT

0003657

1. (U) This SEA Operational Requirement (SEAOR) is submitted in accordance with the provisions of AFR 57-3 and procedures established at the Southeast Asia (SEA) Conference convened at Headquarters USAF on 2, 3, and 4 June 1965

2. (U) MISSION: The basis of successful aircrew recovery operations in SEA rests on being able to quickly locate and identify downed aircrew members in minimum time. Electronic and visual signals greatly assist in expediting recovery. A device is urgently required that will consistently launch visual signals through jungle foliage which forms a thick canopy 200 feet above the downed crew member.

3. (U) PRESENT CAPABILITY: The Mark 13 Mod 0 Day-Night flare is presently being used as a visual signal, principally for its smoke characteristic. Pen-gun flares are also carried by all aircrews for visual signaling. The 38 calibre revolver firing tracer ammunition is also used for this purpose.

4. (U) EXISTING DEFICIENCIES: The present signaling devices do not consistently penetrate the thick jungle canopy. Smoke from the Mark 13 Mod 0, Day-Night flare is suppressed and diffused to a degree that degrades its signaling capability and does not provide pinpoint location. The pen-gun flares usually cannot penetrate the jungle canopy and have insufficient illumination, even when they do penetrate, to insure attracting the rescue pilots' attention. The 38 calibre tracer ammunition, presently being used, will penetrate the canopy but has limited success in attracting rescue aircraft when used without the aid of two-way voice radio communications.

5. (C) CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT: A small hand launching device would be carried by each aircrew member. This launcher would be capable of consistently launching various types of payloads through the 200 foot high jungle canopy. A variety of signaling devices such as the standard red and green flares, dye dispersing charges, star burst flares and chaff would be utilized to provide the aircrew

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DORR 66-04009

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member a capability to be easily located in the environment in SEA.

6. (C) PERFORMANCE CAPABILITIES DESIRED:

a. The launcher and signal device must have a foliage penetrating and muffled or silenced launch detonating capability. The signals shall be designed for compatible launching by a pistol conforming to MIL-P38411, a newly developed pen-gun type launcher, and hand held pistol type weapon. A variety of signal displays shall be developed that are capable of being ejected to a minimum of 300 feet and a maximum of 500 feet through a 200 foot dense foliage of leaves and small twigs. Ignition of the signal display shall be delayed until the 200 foot foliage canopy has been penetrated and cleared. The acoustical report accompanying detonation of the propellant shall be muffled to the extent practical consistent with the requirements specified. The launcher and signal shall be compatible with existing survival gear. The intended use of this device is to signal the position of a downed aircrew member in jungle areas.

b. A variety of suitable signal displays such as smoke, flares (single or cluster in assorted colors), dyes, chaff, and any other attention attracting material should be evaluated for effectiveness. After penetrating the jungle, the use of such devices as parachutes and airfoils should be considered to prolong the visible display to prospective rescuers. The minimum desired visible time is 10 seconds but the maximum visibility within the state of the art should be engineered. An additional aspect to be considered and evaluated under this development is the launching of a display signal, an automatically inflated balloon, an airfoil, or other slowly descending mechanical devices attached to a tethered line at least 300 feet long.

7. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTION: Concurrent development of three approaches, a pistol conforming to MIL-P-38411, a pen-gun type launcher, and a hand pistol type weapon, is recommended. The most suitable being adapted.

8. (U) APPLICABILITY OF COMMERCIAL EQUIPMENT: MB Associates of San Ramon, Calif is currently testing a pilot production model of a 13mm Gyroject flare launcher in the form of a pistol. This pistol would possibly satisfy a portion of the launcher requirement. Payloads have yet to be developed.

9. (C) BACKGROUND: This is a 2nd Air Division proposal based on an immediate SEA operational requirement to improve the ability of rescue forces to quickly identify the location of downed aircrew members.

FOR THE COMMANDER

[Signature]
 MAJ G. B. SIMLER, Brig Gen, USAF
 Deputy for Operations

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 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE PROJECT CORRELATION HARVEST
 HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)
 APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

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REPLY TO
ATTN OF: C

7 March 1967

SUBJECT: SEAOR #75 (FY-67)(New Forest Penetrator Rescue Seat)(U)

CATALOGED

No

0003661

TO: USAF (AFRDQ-P)	AFLC (MCFPM)	AFSC (SCS 4)	TAWC
PACAF (DORQ)	USAFSS	ASD (ASJ)	SAWC
13AF	ATC (ATXRQ)	TAC (DORQ)	ARRS

1. (U) This SEAOR is submitted in accordance with the provisions of AFR 57-1 and procedures established at the Southeast Asia (SEA) conference held at Hq USAF on 2 - 4 June 1965.

2. (U) MISSION: The Seventh Air Force is responsible for the conduct of tactical air operations in Southeast Asia as directed. This mission includes the task of searching for and recovering downed airmen.

3. (C) REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY: During the conduct of the recovery sequence, the rescue helicopter must lower a device on which (or in which) the airman can ascend to the rescue aircraft. A requirement exists for an entirely new or vastly improved device upon which (or in which) a downed airman may safely ascend to the rescue helicopter.

4. (C) DETERMINATION OF DEFICIENCIES/NEEDS:

a. Deficiencies:

(1) The forest penetrator (Rescue Seat) presently in use tends to catch on limbs, branches and vines while being raised through the jungle canopy. Serious injuries have frequently been incurred by personnel riding the seat up through the thick cover. In at least one case, a downed airman was lost when the helicopter hoist failed after seat and cable became entangled in the trees.

(2) The present device is difficult for the downed crew member to see in thick foliage and/or ground cover.

(3) Aside from the possibility of injury, the current device is uncomfortable when ridden for more than a few minutes.

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(4) If the rider is not properly safety belted to the seat, there is risk of falling off, with attendant potential for injury or loss of life.

(5) Once in possession of the downed airman, the current penetrator seat is still, to a degree, difficult to rig. A nervous man, one who is already injured, wet or perhaps clinging to a tree with one hand has trouble opening the canvas case which contains the safety straps.

b. Needs:

(1) There is an urgent need for a device by which a downed airman can be conveyed safely upward to a hovering recovery aircraft.

(2) The device must incorporate the following characteristics:

(a) On descent, must easily penetrate a thick, tangled jungle canopy such as is typical in SEA.

(b) On ascent, must penetrate the jungle canopy with facility.

(c) Must be lightweight.

(d) Must be easy to find after having been lowered into vegetation, through its color and/or by means of an incorporated signal light.

(e) Must be easy to mount quickly, even for an injured person.

(f) Must incorporate a safety feature which will prevent accidental falls from it.

(g) Must give protection for the rider against injury during ascent by tree limbs, branches and vines.

(h) Must be corrosion proof.

(i) Must have capability to carry two men.

(j) Must be comfortable for rides up to 15 minutes in length.

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(k) Must be compatible with door sizes and shapes and hoist stop positions found on the HH-43, HH-53B, HH-3E, CH-3C and UH-1F helicopters.

(l) Must be easily storable inside the rescue aircraft.

(m) Must be easy to take on board after ascent with two persons.

5. (C) QUANTITIES INVOLVED: USAF rescue helicopters presently assigned or programmed for SEA number sixty (60), USAF support helicopters having a secondary rescue mission number twenty-eight (28). Total quantity, not including spares, is eighty-eight (88).

6. (C) HARMONIZATION: USN and USA helicopters deployed in SEA also provide rescue support and should be afforded an opportunity to obtain the requested capability.

7. (U) SPECIAL COMMENTS: Design proposals may address any feasible configurations, i.e., the rescued airman may ride either in the device or on the device.

William W. Momyer
WILLIAM W. MOMYER, Lt General, USAF
Commander

Copy to:
USAF (AFSME/AFXOP)
USAFE
MACV (J-342)
MAC (MAORD)
USAF Tac Ftr Wpns
Ctr
WRAMA (WRN)
7/13AF (Dep Cmdr)
5AF
1ST CAG
7AF (ARRG)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 2D AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
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0003655
No 9 SEP 1965

REPLY TO:
ATTN OF: DO **FFY66 90R**

SUBJECT: SEACOR ~~SECRET~~ (Airborne Ground Fire Warning Device) (U)

TO: USAF (AFRDCR) ASD (ASJ) PACAF (DORQ)
TAG (DORQ) AFLC (MOD) TAMC
AFPC (SCS-6) SANC

1. This SEA Operational Requirement (SEACOR) is submitted in accordance with the provisions of AFR 57-3 and procedures established in the South-east Asia (SEA) conference convened at Headquarters USAF on 2, 3, and 4 June 1965.
2. MISSION: The 2nd Air Division is responsible for the conduct of Air Operations in SEA falling within the jurisdiction of COMUSMACV and COMUSMACVIAI. Airborne Forward Air Controllers (FAC) play a great part in this role. It is the FAC's responsibility to locate and identify the target and direct fighter and strike aircraft against the enemy. The FAC is also capable of artillery fire adjustment, and may act as a substitute Airborne Command Post.
3. PRESENT CAPABILITY: The FAC is the prime means of locating targets. This is accomplished by visually surveying a suspected target area for troop concentration, supply build-ups, vehicle tracks, hardware, etc.
4. EXISTING LIMITATIONS AND DEFICIENCIES: At present the only means of target location by the FAC is visual. Quite often the FAC will hear ground fire but is unable to locate it or determine the number of weapons conducting the firing. The FAC himself may be the target.
5. CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT: An immediate requirement exists in SEA for FAC aircraft to be equipped with an Airborne Ground Fire Warning Device. This device would provide the following:
 - a. Upon detection of enemy ground fire immediate evasive action could be taken, and in conjunction, suppressive fire could be started by strike aircraft or by the aircraft being fired upon.
 - b. Hit-miss data would be collected for Intelligence purposes to study survivability in the present type situation in SEA.
 - c. Definite tactics could be developed as a result of (b) above.

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d. The type of weapons being fired would also be determined, i.e. automatic, semi-automatic, etc.

e. Areas of hostile fire not yet exposed could be detected.

f. Other aircraft such as the FC-47, C-123, Helicopters and possibly surface vehicles could utilize the device.

6. PERFORMANCE CAPABILITIES REQUIRED: The proposed detection device must be accurate and reliable. It must be light in weight and small in volume. It must require minimum maintenance to remain operational, and it must be immune to extreme dampness and other weather phenomenon. The following capabilities are required:

a. Desired accuracy in azimuth should be $\pm 5^\circ$. Acceptable accuracy $\pm 10^\circ$.

b. Desired maximum detection range should be 1000 meters with an accuracy of ± 50 meters.

c. Gun calibre detection should be .30 Cal up through .50 Cal.

d. Hit detection would not be required.

e. Near miss detection is needed.

f. Audio warning would be sufficient with a rounds counter that could be reset to zero (0).

g. Be capable of operating satisfactorily up to speeds of 250 KTS IAS.

7. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

a. This device should be added to the Performance Capabilities Desired as outlined in 2 AD QOR, Paragraph 5, dated 14 July 1965, Subject: SRA Qualitative Operational Requirement for a new FAC aircraft.

b. As an interim measure the Airborne Acoustic Ground Fire Detector developed by the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) would be acceptable.

8. APPLICABILITY OF COMMERCIAL EQUIPMENT: Tests were conducted by the SRI in July 1964 utilizing an acoustical type device. The test beds used were Army UH-1B helicopters. The results of these tests are contained in ACTIV-AD report dated 20 January 1965. The following limitations were recorded:

a. The device would record return fire from the helicopter.

b. The device was triggered during electrical surges in the aircraft electrical system.

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
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- e. The device was triggered at airspeeds of 120 KTS IAS and higher.
- d. The device would not record azimuth or range of the projectile fired.
- e. The device would detect projectile ranges from zero (0) to 200 feet maximum.
- f. The maximum number of rounds recorded per minute was 1500.

9. BACKGROUND: This is a 2nd Air Division proposal based upon a SEA Operational Requirement that is urgently needed for the detection and destruction of hidden hostile small arms concentrations.

FOR THE COMMANDER



G.B. SIMLER
Brig Gen, USAF
Deputy for Operations

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HEADQUARTERS
PACIFIC AIR FORCES
United States Air Force
APO 953, San Francisco, California 96553

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

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CATALOGED

15 December 1964

No. 0003684

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: VC
SUBJECT: (U) Southeast Asia SAR Requirements

TO: Hq Air Rescue Service

1. (S) As requested in Air Rescue Service (ARS) message ARWDS 50004, 5 October 1954, CINCPACAF and PARC have conducted a joint study to determine future search and rescue (SAR) requirements in Southeast Asia (SEA). The continuous and unpredictable fluctuation of the political and military situation in SEA makes it extremely difficult to determine firm future SAR requirements; however, the current and programmed activities in SEA (attachment 1), past performances of ARS forces presently TDY to SEA (attachment 2) and current contingency operations plans have been analyzed to determine the extent ARS support is required by the current situation. It is assumed that the present tactical force structure will remain in the Philippine/SEA area for an indefinite period and the tempo of operations will continue at the same rate or increase in intensity. Rescue forces are required to be in place for quick reaction and immediate operational support of requirements originated and promulgated at the DOD/JCS level requiring PACAF forces to react and respond within two to twelve hours after notification.

2. (S) Current activities and contingency operations plans require ARS rotary wing aircraft for combat aircrew recovery (ACR) and local base rescue (LBR) support of USAF tactical operations. The number of sorties and flying times shown in attachment 2 and the necessity for daily alert posture in Thailand and a continuous alert posture in RVN substantiates the rescue helicopter requirement. The HH-43B and F model helicopters presently assigned are only marginally suitable for the ACR mission and should be replaced without delay by a more suitable ACR vehicle such as the HH-3C helicopter. CINCPACAF message PRODC 1-1332, 6 August 1964, information to Headquarters ARS, is a recapitulation of considerable previous correspondence establishing the requirement for the HH-3C helicopter in the PACOM. The ACR capability should provide quick reaction coverage for all of the RVN land and coastal areas and should extend as far as possible into Laos and North Vietnam to support reconnaissance missions and known contingency plans. The Republic of Vietnam (RVN) is divided into four Corps areas, each of which should have its own responsive SAR support for quick and effective rescue/recovery actions. The LBR capability should cover the main operating bases of Korat, Takhli, DaNang, and the Bien Hoa/Tan Son Nhut complex since all tactical aircraft in SEA are combat configured, thus requiring maximum LBR fire suppression and crash rescue protection. The HH-43B and F model helicopters are capable of providing this support, however, the F model is recommended for Vietnam because of the combat environment and the specialized configuration of this aircraft. Also, three helicopters per LBR unit in RVN are recommended

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because of the off-base exposure rate and the close proximity of hostile forces which require the helicopters to operate in pairs and to get in and out of incident sites quickly before enemy forces can congregate and make the area insecure.

3. (S) Considering the above stated requirements, the following ARS helicopter force structure is recommended for SEA:

a. Bien Hoa, RVN:

(1) One ACR unit of three combat modified HH-3C helicopters to provide an aircrew recovery capability in the III Corps area. Three HH-43F helicopters are presently in place and can be retained to satisfy LBR requirements stated in paragraph 3a(2), below.

(2) One LBR unit of three HH-43F helicopters to provide local base crash/rescue coverage for the Bien Hoa/Tan Son Nhut complex which has a very high density of both tactical and normal air traffic.

b. DaNang, RVN:

(1) One ACR unit of three combat modified HH-3C helicopters to provide an aircrew recovery capability in the I Corps area. Three HH-43F helicopters are presently in place and can be retained to satisfy LBR requirements stated in paragraph 3b(2), below.

(2) One LBR detachment of three HH-43F helicopters to provide local base crash/rescue coverage for tactical forces consisting of numerous USAF jet fighter aircraft and various types of VNAF aircraft to include A1E and A1H aircraft. Current planning indicates the possibility of a large influx of USAF tactical aircraft at this base for interdiction, retaliatory and/or contingency operations.

c. Pleiku, RVN:

(1) One ACR unit of three combat modified HH-3C helicopters to provide an aircrew recovery capability in the II Corps area and the southern tip of Laos.

d. Can Tho, RVN:

(1) One ACR unit of three combat modified HH-3C helicopters to provide an aircrew recovery capability in the IV Corps area.

e. Nakhon Phanom, Thailand:

(1) One ACR unit of three HH-3C helicopters to provide an aircrew recovery capability for reconnaissance and tactical missions in the southern panhandle of Laos and for extension into the Plain des Jarres area is required. The present situation indicates this will be a continuing requirement. Although attachment 2 shows very little mission activity at this

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location, it is considered essential because of its strategic location near the Laos panhandle. The Nakhon Phanom helicopters provide the only immediate aircrew recovery capability in the event of an emergency SAR mission in this area.

f. Korat, Thailand:

(1) One LBR detachment of two HH-43B helicopters to provide local base/crash rescue coverage for tactical and training operations. Although the number of tactical aircraft operating from this location varies from day to day, the primary support is for TDY F-105 aircraft.

g. Takhli, Thailand:

(1) One LBR detachment of two HH-43B helicopters to provide local base/crash rescue coverage for tactical and training operations. Again, the number of aircraft varies from day to day as the mission dictates.

4. (S) The following actions by MATS (ARS) are recommended to provide required rescue helicopter support for SEA:

a. Provide fifteen HH-3C helicopters, required personnel and equipment on a PCS basis to comprise the ACR units as designated by paragraph 3 above. The HH-43F helicopters presently at DaNang and Bien Hoa and the HH-43B helicopters presently TDY to Nakhon Phanom are marginally acceptable as an interim ACR aircraft and should be replaced without delay by the more capable HH-3C.

b. Provide six HH-43F helicopters, required personnel and equipment, on a PCS basis to comprise the LBR detachments at Bien Hoa and DaNang. The HH-43F helicopters presently in place may be diverted to satisfy this requirement after the HH-3C helicopters are in place for the ACR mission.

c. Continue to provide from CONUS resources four HH-43B helicopters, required personnel and equipment, on a rotational TDY basis to comprise the LBR detachments at Takhli and Korat.

5. (S) The requirement for ARS fixed wing aircraft in SEA is well validated in attachment 2 which reveals that TDY HU-16 aircraft have averaged 313 mission flying hours per month for SAR support of tactical and reconnaissance missions into Laos, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and Gulf of Tonkin areas. This flying hour activity does not include the hours expended for redeployments to the respective home stations for maintenance and crew rotations and likewise does not include training hours accomplished at the deployment sites. During October alone, 408 HU-16 mission hours were flown necessitating deployment of five and sometimes six aircraft and crews on a continuous TDY basis. These aircraft are engaged in providing continuous SAR alert, daily strip alert, precautionary orbits, and on the scene SAR control for high priority tactical

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missions levied by JCS. It is essential that ARS continue to provide three HU-16 aircraft at DaNang, RVN and two HU-16 aircraft at Korat, Thailand to provide the above support. This requirement is established by CINCPACAF Operations Order 120-64 dated 5 August 1964.

6. (S) It is noted that the accumulative effect of current TDY rotations and a manning factor of 1.0 has caused a drastic degradation of training and maintenance programs and local SAR capability of both the 33d and 31st Air Rescue Squadrons. The problem caused by the loss of TDY aircraft and crews from the home station is compounded by the fact that each squadron presently has an aircraft in IRAN with one additional aircraft scheduled to the IRAN facility during the months of March and May 1965. The end result is that each squadron usually has two aircraft at the home station with one of these just returning from SEA requiring extensive maintenance and inspection. This leaves one aircraft for SAR alert and aircrew proficiency training. Augmentation from HC-54 squadrons alleviates the problem somewhat, but the dissimilar equipment compounds administrative, supply and maintenance problems.

7. (S) To alleviate this critical situation, it is recommended that ARS:

a. Assign four additional HU-16 UE aircraft to the 33d Air Rescue Squadron.

b. Increase the manning factor to allow a continuous TDY rotation of five HU-16 aircraft, aircrews, and support personnel to SEA while continuing effective maintenance and training programs and normal SAR coverage of the assigned area of responsibility. The manning should be based on a utilization rate of 50 flying hours per month per aircraft.

c. Augment the 33d ARS with TDY aircraft and personnel as an interim solution until PCS aircraft and personnel can be assigned.

d. Provide Mobile Spares Kits (MOSPAKs) to support the flying hour program of 50 hours per month per aircraft. These MOSPAKs will have a spares level capable of supporting the flying hour program resupplied through STAR procedures (Speed through Air Resupply) Volume I, Chapter 15, AFM 67-1.

8. (S) Upon acceptance of the recommendation contained in paragraph 7, the 33d ARS will assume the majority of the responsibility for HU-16 deployments to SEA. The 31st ARS will assume their normal SAR responsibilities to include the precautionary orbits required between Clark and SEA, and limited participation in SAR activities in SEA.

9. (U) This letter is classified secret to uphold the classification of Air Rescue Service requirements to support tactical operations in Southeast Asia.

THOMAS S. MOORMAN
Lieutenant General, USAF
Vice Commander in Chief

2 Atch

1. (S) Current & Programmed Activities in Southeast Asia
2. (C) Mission Activities of TDY ARS Forces

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Copy to: Hq MATS

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CURRENT AND PROGRAMMED ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

<u>NICK NAME</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>RESCUE REQUIREMENTS</u>
LIMA MIKE	Rotation of jet fighter aircraft from CONUS to Clark AB and/or SEA and return. Three squadrons plus one augmented squadron are scheduled to rotate in Feb 1965. These aircraft are normally stationed at Clark AB and periodically rotate in and out of SEA as the mission dictates.	Semi-annually CONUS to Clark. Three to five flights weekly between Clark AB and SEA.	Precautionary orbits Zebra Bravo and Zebra Delta on the semi-annual rotation; Zebra Delta or Zebra Charlie on the weekly flights between Clark and SEA.
CANDY MACHINE	Jet fighter movements between Clark AB and SEA for Air Defense reasons. Usually there is little if any advance notice of these flights.	As the mission dictates. Usually one per week.	Precautionary orbit Zebra Delta or Zebra Charlie with little advance notice.
YANKEE TEAM	Reconnaissance missions over the central (Plaines des Jarres) and panhandle regions of Laos.	2 USN/USAF Recce missions per day during daylight hours. Proposed 1.5/RB-66 missions per night.	Average of three HU-16 precautionary orbits per day and continuous helicopter alert at DaNang and Nakhon Phanom. Helicopter strip alert at a forward operating base (usually Quang Tri) is presently being provided by Marine H-34 helicopters.
LUCKY DRAGON	Reconnaissance	Ten per month.	HU-16 strip alert at DaNang. Helicopter strip alert at Da Nang, Nakhon Phanom and Bien Hoa.
QUEEN BEE	Reconnaissance	Daily	One HU-16 precautionary orbit daily.

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<u>NICK NAME</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>RESCUE REQUIREMENTS</u>
COPPER COIN	Reconnaissance	Daily	One HU-16 precautionary orbit. Helicopter strip alert at a forward operating base presently being provided by Marine H-34 helicopters from DaNang.
BOX TOP AND OTHERS	Tactical and reconnaissance type missions in the general area of the Gulf of Tonkin that are generated on a day to day basis as the mission dictates.	Three per day in the past. Predicted one per day in the future.	One and sometimes two HU-16 precautionary orbits per day and eight to twelve hours of helicopter strip alert per day at DaNang and a forward operating base, usually Quang Tri.
VIETNAM-GENERAL	Tactical, reconnaissance, and training missions operating from all four Corps areas on a day to day basis as the mission dictates.	Continuously during the day and often at night as a result of Viet Cong activity.	Continuous aircrew recovery capability to cover the RVN land and coastal areas. Local base crash rescue coverage for the main operating bases of DaNang, and Bien Hoa/Tan Son Nhut complex.
THAILAND-GENERAL	Reconnaissance and training missions operating from Korat, Takhli, Don Muang, and Udorn. The actual number of aircraft operating from these bases fluctuates frequently as the mission dictates, however the primary support is for TDY F-100 and F-105 aircraft.	Daily during daylight hours and occasional night reconnaissance missions.	Local base crash rescue coverage for the main operating bases of Korat and Takhli. Precautionary orbits for reconnaissance missions and normal SAR for activities concerning USAF forces in Thailand.

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

0242

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MISSION ACTIVITIES OF TDY ARS FORCES

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>June</u> <u>Sorties/Time</u>	<u>Jul</u> <u>Sorties/Time</u>	<u>Aug</u> <u>Sorties/Time</u>	<u>Sep</u> <u>Sorties/Time</u>	<u>Oct</u> <u>Sorties/Time</u>
Bien Hoa	HH-43B	-	-	62/24	132/61	94/44
DaNang	HH-43B	-	-	50/20	100/50	79/34
Korat	HH-43B	-	-	32/10	64/23	50/30
Takhli	HH-43B	-	-	4/3	8/6	32/13
Nakhon Phanom	HH-43B	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	2/1
DaNang	HU-16	9/33	43/211	53/294	27/116	45/223
Korat	HU-16	-	-	20/57	30/112	49/185

The above figures do not include flying time expended for training and maintenance.

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

CATALOGED

18 November 1968

No 0003573

ERCCO

Corona Harvest Study

ARRS (ARXDC)

1. This report is submitted late due to late receipt of your letter dated 8 November 1968, subject as above. Your letter requiring the report not later than 1 November 1968 was received in this office on 13 November 1968.

2. First, I should make it clear that I have not served a tour in Southeast Asia. During the period June 1962 through June 1965 I served as the Commander, Pacific Air Rescue Center and was completely involved in the establishment of ARRS in SEA. Based on the three year tour of duty in PARC, I may be able to contribute something to the validity of the Corona Harvest Study.

3. The following are details, as I remember them, pertaining to establishment of Detachment 3, PARC (SEA JSARC) and the introduction of ARRS aircraft into the combat environment.

a. SEA JSARC.

(1) The Tan Son Nhut JSARC was organized in March 1962 as Detachment 3, PARC and operated as an integral part of the 2d Air Division Combat Operations Center. Since the 13th Air Force was responsible for all operations in SEA, Detachment 3, PARC reported operationally to 13th Air Force (Detachment 2, PARC) and administratively to Hq PARC. (Lt Colonel Ernest J. Trexler, now stationed with Hq ARRS, was the first commander of Detachment 3, PARC and will be able to add more detail.) Detachment 3, PARC was responsible for all search and rescue in RVN involving U.S. aircraft in a coordinating/controlling role only since, at that time, no primary rescue forces were assigned to SEA.

(2) At the time Detachment 3, PARC was organized we were also supporting, on a TDY basis from Hq PARC, an RCC with 2d Air Division (ADVON) located at Don Muang Airport, Bangkok, Thailand. This RCC operated from tents on the airfield at Bangkok and was supported for 90-120 days. The Bangkok RCC operated as a sub-RCC of Tan Son Nhut and was responsible for search and rescue in Thailand involving U.S. aircraft. Again, this was a coordinating/controlling role due to the absence of primary SAR forces. (Lt Colonel Trexler may be a possible source of additional information on this operation. Lt Colonel Albert J. McNamee, presently at MAC Headquarters, spent a period of TDY with the Bangkok RCC and may be an additional source of information.)

(2)

b. ARRS Helicopters in SEA.

(1) The introduction of ARRS helicopters into SEA was prompted by the deployment of an F-100 squadron to Takhli Air Base, Thailand in mid-1962. Helicopter support of the F-100 squadron was obtained through the deployment of Detachment 47, EARC, Langley AFB, Virginia. To the best of my recollection the HH-19 aircraft of Detachment 47, EARC remained at Takhli AB until relieved by deployment of the Osan LBR in April-May 1964. (Major Jim E. Hartley was the first commander of the Takhli detachment and may shed more light on the Takhli operation.)

(2) Quickly following the deployment of the Osan LBR to Takhli was the deployment of the LBR element of the 33d ARRS from Naha to Nakhon Phanom AB, Thailand. This was a deployment accomplished in June 1964 to a completely bare base, without sleeping quarters, a dining hall, POL or a semblance of base support. The Naha LBR remained at NKP until relieved by re-deployment of a CONUS TDY LBR unit in November 1964.

(3) Simultaneously, CONUS LBR units arrived at Da Nang AB and Bien Hoa to initiate the first aircrew recovery operation of the Vietnam war. Equipped with the HH-43B aircraft these units performed in a superior manner in developing the procedures and practices which formed the nucleus of the follow-on aircrew recovery mission.

(4) In October 1964 the first combat configured HH-43F arrived in RVN, were located at Da Nang and Bien Hoa and formed the first true aircrew recovery units. The B models at these two locations were deployed to Takhli AB and Nakhon Phanom AB to replace the Osan and Naha LBR units which were returned to home stations.

(5) During mid-1964 to mid-1965 additional CONUS LBR units were made available for RVN duty. By the end of the deployment period in mid-1965, CONUS LBR units were located at Takhli, Nakhon Phanom, Udorn, Ubon, Korat, all in SEA, and at Kuan Kwang in Taiwan. Additionally, two PCS ACR units were located at Da Nang and Bien Hoa.

c. ARRS Fixed Wing Aircraft in SEA. With the intensification of jet fighter activity in SEA in 1964, it became evident that ARRS fixed wing aircraft would be required for SAR support. Initially, HU-16 aircraft were deployed to Da Nang in May 1964 from the 31st ARRS, Clark AB to provide such support. It then became necessary to cover the Clark AB area of responsibility with HC-54 aircraft from Tachikawa and Guam. Due to over commitment of the HU-16 in SEA and the obvious popularity of the HU-16 orbit missions, additional aircraft were deployed to SEA from the 33d ARRS, Naha AB, Okinawa and positioned first at Da Nang and later at Udorn. It later became necessary, as fighter operations further intensified, to commit the HC-54 aircraft of the 36th ARRS and 79th ARRS to TDY duty in SEA. Under this concept the HC-54 was stationed at Udorn for

inland orbit missions and the HU-16 at Da Nang for a combination of inland and water orbit missions. With the commitment to SEA of four of the five Pacific based squadrons it became necessary to deploy the HC-97 aircraft of the 76th ARRS to Clark AB to cover required SAR activities in the Philippine area. This procedure continued until my departure from PARRC in June 1965 and, to the best of my knowledge, continued until replacement HC-130 aircraft were made available.

3. Without adequate records, it is extremely difficult to reconstruct the exact sequence of events as they transpired three to six years back. I am hopeful that the information contained herein, which is strictly from memory, will in some small way contribute to the ARRS documentation of SEA activities so that we may never again see ARRS in the degrading position we found ourselves in following the Korean War.

SIGNED

WALTER F. DERCK, Colonel, USAF
Commander

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

21 Nov 1968

No 0003574

FROM: Capt Gordon L. Hall
Det 8 AARRC

SUBJECT: Corona Harvest Study

TO: ARXDC

1. In reply to your letter dated 5 Nov 68, I am enclosing my only copy of S.O.#197.
2. There were no H16's at Takhli during the period 2 Jul 62 - 18 Sep 62. Some were deployed from 33rd ARSq later, but as I recall their mission was classified and we were not provided any information on it.
3. There is no data in my personal files other than S.O.#197 which would substantiate our mission requirement. Most of our flying was in support of a bombing range located roughly 45 nm SE of Takhli and 30 nm east of Koke Kathiem AB. This was an old Thai range which was reactivated by the 6010th TAC Gp to keep their F-100 crews current. We hauled personnel and material for this range, however, our mission was rescue coverage for the 6010th TAC Gp, and our range missions would be classified as base support. When we deployed to Takhli under SFF Oplan 5-61 our Naha mission was covered by base flight H19's. We were recalled to Naha when the base flight H19's were deployed to New Guinea on a United Nations project. It was our understanding at the time that Takhli still had a valid requirement which was filled later in 1962 or early 1963 by deployment of one of the EARRC detachments. I suppose substantiation of mission requirements for that deployment would be roughly equivalent with ours. I regret that all I can do is recall events as I believe they happened for I have no documentation of the above.
4. My recall of the Command and Control of our operation is less than complete. There was a Rescue Coordinator at Don Muang that was very helpful on our missions. Major Gunter could give a much better idea of the set up as he went to Don Muang to clarify our mission, and alerting procedures etc. As the lowest ranking pilot in the organization I didn't do much of the coordinating but as I recall the Rescue Coordinator had a desk in the COC at Don Muang. I am not sure whether this was the 6010th CP or a higher echelon.
5. A typical mission at Takhli started with a call for medical help through the local Thai radio net. The Takhli Base Commander(Thai) informed us that he had received a radio message indicating one of our men at the bombing range had been bitten by a venomous snake. Major Davis and I immediately departed for the range with a Thai doctor and a flight surgeon on board. While we were enroute to the range Capt Gunter at Takhli requested assistance through the coordinator at Don Muang. We were informed that snake bite serum and experienced personnel were being dispatched via Army Caribou to Koke Kathiem AB. We arrived at Koke Kathiem about an hour and ten minutes after notification and the Caribou waiting to take the seriously ill airman to Bangkok.

(3)

Major Robert W. Davis and I flew the mission and Major Lucian A. Gunter arranged the details and then followed with the second H19 to provide communications and back up our bird. We received word that the victim later recovered.

Gordon L. Hall
GORDON L. HALL, Captain, USAF
FR55283

REQUEST AND AUTHORIZATION. OR TEMPORARY DUTY TRAVEL OF MILITARY PERSONNEL (If more space is required, continue on reverse, identifying items by number.)		DATE 27 June 1962	
I. REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION			
TO: Chief of Administration, 33d Air Rescue Sq, APO 235		1. REQUEST TO BE AUTHORIZED AS INDICATED IN ITEMS 5 THROUGH 12	
FROM: (Requesting authority) Operations Officer, 33d Air Rescue Sq, APO 235			
2. TYPED NAME, GRADE AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZED OFFICIAL THOMAS J. LUNN, Major, USAF Operations Officer	3. SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED OFFICIAL <i>James E Reineke 1st Lt</i>	4. PHONE NR. WA 1222	
II. TEMPORARY DUTY TRAVEL ORDERS			
5. THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUAL(S) WILL PROCEED AS INDICATED. UPON COMPLETION WILL RETURN TO PROPER STATION.			
GRADE	NAME (First name, middle initial, last name, AFN)	ORGANIZATION	SECURITY CLEARANCE FOR PERIOD OF TDY
CAPT	LUCIAN A. GUNTER III, AO3036686	33d Air Rescue Sq	TOP SECRET
CAPT	ROBERT W. DAVIS, AO3057214	33d Air Rescue Sq	SECRET
1/LT	GORDON L. HALL, 55283A	33d Air Rescue Sq	SECRET
SMSGT	STEVEN G. HICKS, AF18002096	33d Air Rescue Sq	SECRET
TSGT	JAMIE S. SPEERS, AF20366478	33d Air Rescue Sq	SECRET
SSGT	CHESTER E. RAINEY, AF16452066	33d Air Rescue Sq	SECRET
SSGT	AHART R. REED, AF17389861	33d Air Rescue Sq	SECRET
A2C	JEFFREY P. HENDERSON, AF12595433	33d Air Rescue Sq	SECRET
A1C	FLOYD A. BURRIS, AF13598337	33d Air Rescue Sq	SECRET
A2C	NORMAN L. J. ROY, AF11384645	33d Air Rescue Sq	SECRET
6. DEPART ON OR ABOUT 1 Jul 62		7. APPROXIMATE NR. OF DAYS (Include travel time) 90	8. N/A SDALY
9. SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF TDY To perform an operational mission (not a training encampment, maneuver, or a special air operation) in support of SFF OPLAN 5-61.		10. ITINERARY: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VARIATIONS IN ITINERARY AUTHORIZED FROM: Naha AB, Okinawa TO: 3ARTF, 6010th Tactical Gp, APO 146, San Francisco, Calif RETURN TO: Naha AB, Okinawa	
11. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Necessary immunization per AFM 160-102 will be accomplished immediately. Passports will be procured (if applicable). Personal field equipment and mess gear will be in the possession of the individuals upon departure from home station. Individuals will have in their possession a copy of immunization records, medical clearance, personal copy of AF Form 246, DD Form 528, thermofax copy of AF Form 7 or 11, and ID tags. Individuals will handcarry weapons as required.			
12. MODES OF TRAVEL A. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TRAVEL BY Military Aircraft DIRECTED WHEN AVAILABLE. B. <input type="checkbox"/> TPA. TRAVEL TIME BY COMMON CARRIER (rail or bus) is _____ DAYS. TRAVEL TIME IN EXCESS IS CHARGEABLE TO DELAY ENROUTE. AUTHORIZED IN ITEM 6: C. <input type="checkbox"/> TPA. THIS MODE OF TRANSPORTATION HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO BE MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT. D. <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER. TBGAA. Commercial aircraft (including foreign registry when US registry is not avail) is authorized for travel in overseas area of TDY if military aircraft is not available for the accomplishment of the mission. (see reverse)			
III. AUTHORIZATION			
13. AUTHORITY SFF OPLAN 5-61; 5AF Msg 5FOOT-0019; PARC Msg 184-F; AFM 35-11		14. DATE 30 June 1962	15. SPECIAL ORDER NR. 197
16. DESIGNATION AND LOCATION OF APPROVING HEAD-QUARTERS ON UNIT 33rd AIR RESCUE SQUADRON (MATS) UNITED STATES AIR FORCE APO 235, San Francisco, Calif.		17. APPROPRIATION ACCOUNTING SYMBOL 5733400 30 365-33 P458 2114 S677500 (CIC) 4 4 374 4880 677500 <i>Palma</i>	
18. DISTRIBUTION (If required) A		19. REQUEST FOR TDY IS APPROVED AND WILL BE PERFORMED. TON. FOR THE COMMANDER:	
		20. SIGNATURE ELEMENT OF ORDERS ISSUING OFFICIAL (Seal or signature) <i>James E Reineke</i> JAMES E. REINEKE 1st Lt, USAF Asst Chief of Administration	

Special Order 197, 33d Air Rescue Sq, 28 Jun 62, continued.

Item 12 (cont'd)

When traveling by military aircraft, a total of 166 pounds baggage, including excess, is authorized each individual. When traveling by commercial aircraft, excess baggage not exceeding 100 pounds is authorized each individual.

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

16 JAN 1969

No. 0003575

PROAS (SMSgt Hawkins/445410)

Corona Harvest Study (ARCOPP Ltr, 15 Nov 68)

AKRS (ARCOPP)

1. The nature of this reply must be of necessity be presented in a generalization from personal experiences during periods spent in SEA.
2. Time period 1961 through 1964.

a. During this period pararescuemen were deployed TDY to SEA in support of orbit or duckbutt missions as crewmembers on HU-16 aircraft. The concept of operations was identical to operations in any rescue effort in tropical areas with the additional tasks of providing survivor protection in a hostile environment and conducting escape and evasion survivor assistance to a secure area.

b. Conventional pararescue deployment methods, i.e., parachuting to the survivor was not accomplished during this period although in one instance an attempt was to be made but approximately 5 minutes prior to arrival on scene the survivor was taken into custody by unfriendly forces.

c. During the summer of 1964 pararescuemen were assigned as medical technicians on HH-43 aircraft deployed to SEA. The tasks remained the same as for the HU-16 assigned pararescuemen except penetration and extraction was to be made by helicopter.

3. Time period 1965 through 1966.

a. Pararescuemen were assigned to HH-43 units in RVN and tasked to perform duties as Medical Tech and Firefighter in selected units tasked with Aircraf Recovery and Local Base Rescue missions. They were employed extensively in this capacity with great success. During this period in addition to ACR and LBR missions these HH-43 units were active in medical evacuation missions involving wounded and/or injured ground forces personnel. It was evident at this time at the operating level that the pararescueman who was firefighter qualified in addition to his many other skills was extremely well suited to this type operation.

b. Pararescuemen continued to be utilized as crewmembers on HU-16 aircraft. As the level of conflict increased it became apparent that conventional parachute deployment methods presented little if any chance of success. The decision was made to utilize

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pararescuemen as a water retrieval expert and to provide survivor care and medical treatment. The pararescueman's water operating capability effectively reduced the exposure time to enemy fire during water landings and survivor pickup. This concept continued until the HU-16 was phased out of the theater of operations.

c. During the latter part of 1965 the HH-3E was placed in the theater as a long range ACR vehicle. This was to augment and eventually replace the HH-43 with the Range Extension Tanks as the primary long range ACR vehicle. The HH-3 utilized a pararescueman as a basic crew member and he was tasked to perform survivor retrieval by hoist when required, provide medical treatment, and provide defensive measures during long range ACR missions over hostile territory. This aircraft and crew with RESCAP support proved to be an effective means of accomplishing long range ACR.

4. Time period 1967 through 1968.

a. Pararescuemen were utilized as crew members on HH-43, HH-3E, HU-16 and HH-53 aircraft. Several significant events occurred during this period.

(1) The HH-3E aircraft were equipped with air to air refueling capability and assumed the long range orbit missions previously performed by the HU-16. The HU-16 was phased out of the SEA theater of operations.

(2) The HH-3E was equipped with the M-60 machine gun for defensive purposes.

(3) The HH-53 arrived in the theater of operations and was capable of air to air refueling and mounted Mini guns for defensive purposes. With a two man pararescue team on the crew and increased performance capability over the HH-3 the long range ACR capability was considerably improved.

(4) The requirement for pararescuemen to perform fire fighter duties in HH-43 units was terminated upon assignment of fire fighter personnel to these units.

(5) Pararescue manning became adequate to fulfill all authorizations. No further TDY of personnel from outside SEA was necessary to augment SEA units.

(6) An in-country medical training program was established whereby all pararescuemen assigned to SEA were placed TDY to a battle casualty receiving station to gain practical medical treatment experience. This proved to be an invaluable addition to their previous medical training.

(7) During 1967 3rd ARRGp began scheduling selected pararescuemen to attend the US Army 'RECONDO' school. Completion of this school

greatly enhanced their ability to operate and survive in hostile territory. While it is not at this time practical for all SEA assigned PJ's to attend this school the transfer of information from those who have completed this training to other unit pararescuemen is very beneficial. I strongly recommend continuation of this program.

5. Problem areas.

a. Communications has continued to be a problem throughout the entire period of operation in SEA. Of primary concern is the communications between the survivor and the rescue/search aircraft. With the single channel survival radio the frequency is cluttered and often disrupted by the homing signal or 'beeper'. Without positive communications between the survivor and the rescue aircraft the recovery effort becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, in an area contested by unfriendly forces. The same problem occurs when the pararescueman departs the confines of the aircraft during a recovery effort and the radio becomes the only means of communication between the pararescueman and the rescue aircraft pilot. The RT/60P, two channel radio provided to pararescuemen during 1968 has relieved the problem to some extent. A 'quiet talk/receive' multi channel, with hands off operation radio is still an urgent requirement.

b. Crew composition. At present only one pararescueman is on the HH-3 and HH-43 crew. All rescue aircraft should be manned with a crew to include at least two pararescuemen. The following rational is provided:

(1) During recovery of multiple survivors there exists a requirement for recovery actions and medical examination/treatment simultaneously. This is beyond the scope of a single individual.

(2) When the survivor requires surface assistance and the pararescueman must depart the aircraft he is not available for proper patient/survivor handling during the actual recovery of the individual into the aircraft.

(3) When the survivor requires two individuals to prepare him for recovery i.e. when critically injured, and only one PJ is available he must rely on assistance by personnel who are not medically trained.

(4) In a hostile environment all of the above is compounded since the aircraft is depleted of the personnel who must observe for obstacle clearance, hostile action, and counter hostile action.

(5) The decision was made during the latter part of 1967 to no longer utilize two pararescuemen on the HH-3E in SEA due to the critical weight factor affecting the hover capability of the aircraft. This decision has been very difficult for me to support since on many occasions a photographer was placed on the same aircraft. Pararescuemen in SEA, and I might add myself, fail to understand how this action enhanced the rescue

capability of the aircraft and crew. (Note: Operating M-3 units took exception to the photographer because of weight)

c. Rescue Hoist. The rescue hoist has continued to be a problem area since the beginning of operations in SEA. Survivor spinning, cable 'birdcaging', cable breakage, slow speed of operation, and the inability to recovery the survivor into the aircraft in other than the hover mode has plagued us throughout the period of operations. In an effort to provide a safety factor a hoisting weight limitation has been imposed which detracts from mission prosecution at the most critical time, i.e., when it is necessary to pick up both the survivor and the PJ. These problems have not as yet been resolved.

SUMMARY

Throughout the entire period of operation in SEA the caliber and capabilities of pararescuemen assigned to SEA has continued to improve. This indicates an improvement in training received prior to assignment to this area. The assignment of a pararescue representative to 3rd AARGP has greatly enhanced the flow of information from the area of operation to higher echelons of command and has permitted rapid adjustments in training areas where additional emphasis were needed. An improved balance of experienced to non-experienced personnel within SEA units has resulted from manning this position. Pararescue operations in SEA during the period 1961 through 1968 has been the most productive of any period since pararescue has been in existence. All pararescuemen can take great pride in those assigned to this area during this period.

FOR THE COMMANDER

SIGNED

JOHN O. SCHULLER, Major, USAF
Actg Chief, Aircrew Standardisation


PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
DO NOT DESTROY
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 3RD AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY GROUP (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

REPLY TO: 3C
ATTN OF: 3C

SUBJECT: Monthly Commander's Letter No. 0003585

6 MAR 1968

TO: Brigadier General Allison C. Brooks
Commander
Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

cub/47

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1. My letter this month will be more in the form of a battle report since Hq 3ARRGp has been in the middle of the action at Tan Son Nhut and Saigon since the beginning of the TET offensive. Last month I briefly sketched the initial attack on TSN and will pick up from that point to try to impart a feel for some of the actions as we lived and viewed them. The period 6 through 17 February was characterized by efforts to resume a degree of normalcy. The VC remained holed up in Cholon and large areas of that portion of Saigon were destroyed by house-to-house fighting. A tight curfew was imposed from 1400 to 0800 for the Vietnamese and from 1700 to 0800 for US Military. This was gradually relaxed over the month until it is presently pretty much a dusk to dawn situation. After sunset, the streets of Saigon are completely silent and deserted except for an occasional Vietnamese Police or US Military patrol jeep slowly cruising with lights off. Any Vietnamese civilian seen on the streets during curfew is subject to being shot on sight. US Military are allowed off base for official business only in military vehicles or to proceed directly between quarters and assigned place of duty between 0730 and 1900. Armed escorts were required for any travel off base for half the month but are no longer necessary. Some pretty simple truths also became evident, such as the fact that we, trained military people, could not defend ourselves off base and, in fact, were not permitted to possess weapons, except for security personnel and aircrew members. This made many personnel very unhappy and I am advised that an abundance of letters were written to congressmen by both officers and NCO's assigned to TSN. I don't know of any letters on this subject written by 3ARRGp personnel.

2. Saturday night the 17th of February was the wildest night in the week. At 0100 Sunday morning Charlie let go at TSN for a 15 minute period with an estimated 100 rounds of 122 MM rockets. Later

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analysis scaled this down to about 60 rounds, which is not an unsubstantial quantity. This attack resulted in 33 aircraft damaged and 6 aircraft destroyed. A C-130 transport directly across the ramp from Det 14 took a direct hit which removed everything solid forward of the wing. Det 14 was very fortunate since only one small piece of shrapnel hit a Pedro, punching a hole in the plexiglass canopy. Besides the aircraft, several buildings were badly damaged and the Base Chapel was destroyed. Of interest is that several of our officers are billeted in the BOQ's flanking the Chapel. Total casualties from this attack were 1 KIA (US), 72 WIA (US) and 8 VNAF WIA.

3. During the following week Charlie started to hit us during daylight hours. On Sunday 24 February, I had just returned from lunch at 1220, sat down at my desk and was further assisted in attaining a prone position on the floor by a rocket impacting across the street on the old BX. Luckily, this building was in the process of being converted to offices. However, the rocket killed two and wounded four as well as making Charlie's attack just a little more personal. Later that day, 21 more rounds poured into the base for a confirmed total to end February of 89 rocket rounds on base with 6 just off base. Total casualties were 9 KIA (USAF) and 203 WIA (US) of which 153 were Air Force, 26 Army, 18 Navy and 4 civilians.

4. Defense-wise, General Momyer issued a policy letter on 21 February providing guide lines to arm personnel living off base for defending billets if attacked. Weapons were issued to all 3ARRGp personnel living off base. On 25 February another policy change directed the bunkering of all barracks on base (ours already were) and the construction of personnel bunkers. Every month we have reported the lack of a bunker to the 377 CSG as a defense deficiency. Until this program is completed, 10% of our personnel are committed to sandbag and construction details around the clock. Meanwhile, we got on with our own bunker program and built one in between the two buildings in which the headquarters is housed. There was no scarcity of both officer and airmen volunteers for this job and we have used it several times. As a matter of fact, while I was writing this, two heavy explosions occurred nearby and I held an impromptu but instant Commander's Call in the bunker with an enthusiastic 100% attendance. Many personnel are pretty jumpy and our enlisted personnel are all sleeping on the ground floor of the barracks behind the sandbags. Those officers unfortunate enough to have rooms on the second floor of the BOQ are sleeping in the headquarters bunker at night. We all feel very fortunate that there have been no 3ARRGp casualties at TSN thus far. In the midst of the confusion two new members of the Group reported in for duty and quickly adjusted to the routine. On 4 February, 2d Lt Lynn Gormley, our first WAF officer, joined the headquarters as Administrative Officer for the 38ARRS. On 10 February I had the pleasure of pinning on her First Lieutenant silver bars. Lt Gormley

came to us from the 443 MAW at Tinker AFB where she was the Chief of Administrative Services. On 8 February, Mrs. Delores Alexander arrived from Korea to fill the position of secretary to the Commander. Mrs. Alexander has worked for the Air Force in Japan and Korea since 1951 in various secretarial capacities in 5AF and 314AD, and we feel fortunate to acquire her services. Both ladies were billeted in the Auriga Hotel only two blocks outside the main gate at TSN. They considered themselves fortunate not to be billeted on TSN, however, during the week of 18 February, two 122 MM rockets impacted within a block of the Auriga, the latter of which killed 12 Vietnamese. Hq. 3ARRGp now boasts two seasoned combat veterans on the distaff side.

5. Since much of the hand-to-hand fighting continued in the Cholon area, many of us were concerned about the nuns and children at the Viet Hoa orphanage, which is in Cholon. We were able to establish telephone contact with the nuns and found that they came through unscathed with no real problems. A TET party had been planned for the children on 3 February. This, of course, was out of the question and still is, since the VC have been particularly vindictive against any Vietnamese employed by, or associated with, Americans. The party was planned as a hot dog and hamburger cook-out, complete with potato chips, pickles, candy and all the things that cause stomach aches in the little ones. Perhaps the delay in having the party will benefit them in more ways than one.

6. I know that you are familiar with the medical evacuation missions of the 37ARRS and Det 7, 38ARRS early in the TET offensive, but would like to recap the astounding totals accomplished by them through the end of February. In the past, Pedro has been handling these missions fairly routinely, averaging about 50 litter patients per month. On 30 January, the 903rd AES advised that large numbers of critically wounded personnel could be expected and that more helicopters were needed. The 37th was requested to help and everyone dug in to get the job done. Patients were evacuated to the Naval Support Activity Hospital, the Hospital ships Repose and Sanctuary, and to the 1st MAW Field Hospital. During this period, Det 7 also covered 31 airborne emergencies and flew 14 miscellaneous support missions as well as changing an engine and completing three phase inspections. The 37th also maintained their fringed commitments. Due to the engine change and NORS-G, 90% of the HH-43 flying was performed by a single aircraft. Between 29 January and 15 February, 83 HH-43 hours were flown, of which 66 hours were flown on medical evacuation missions. By the end of February, 1796 personnel had been airlifted by ARRS on medical evacuation missions.

from Danang, 943 by Jolly Green and 853 by Pedro. Although these are not counted as saves and, in fact, this mission is not rightfully ours, I have directed careful documentation of the effort for inclusion in the Group history for possible future references. This also looked like a natural for a publicity release but MACV would not let it go, probably because of the obvious magnitude of casualties.

7. The JSARC has now been operating in the 7AF Command Center for two months and is running smoothly. The direct coordination on-the-spot with 7AF has ironed out some of the difficulties we previously had with coordinating immediate MIGCAP support, tanker support, and border clearances. An up-to-the-minute visual display of the mission, in conjunction with the intelligence and weather displays which flank the SAR boards, permits rapid decisions which previously had to be piece-mealed using telephone inputs. I believe the greatest significance in integrating the SAR control system into the Command Center is the exposure of SAR to the hundreds of officers who visit the center. Inevitably, in future wars or exercises, some of these officers will be commanders or Senior Staff who will look for SAR in their own Command Centers since SAR is a responsibility of the Air Component Commander. The RCC at Monkey Mountain has moved into the new computerized command and control facility and we expect the Udorn RCC to follow suit this month. We have been fortunate to have gained Major Ed Weissler as a replacement for Major McLeaish since he is an electronics engineer and quite familiar with the Seek Dawn Control system. We've given him a fairly sound indoctrination on the rescue business and he is currently working on a series of SAR inputs designed to interface the SAR force with the computerized command and control system. By utilizing tape storage and computer displays, it will be possible to give real time azimuth, distance, and time information about the potential rescue directly to the SAR task force. Intelligence information, vectors around known hostile areas, Hostile aircraft warnings, and egress data should also be made immediately available to our forces. A meeting is to be held at Udorn on 10 March for a final review of Project Seek Dawn. Major Weissler will attend to insure that rescue gains maximum benefit from the implementation of the system. More information will follow as it becomes available.

8. The outlook of many of our helicopter pilots will certainly improve now that we have the long sought reduction in the helicopter time required for those with 1000 hours flying time to qualify as RCC. This reduction to 150 hours is a major concession by MAC, and one that has long been needed. Colonel Smith furnished us with a copy of your letter to MAC which apparently was the catalyst required. Since the Group does not have an HH-3 flight examiner aboard at the present time, the Aircrew Standardization

Pilots from the 37ARRS and Det 1, 37ARRS will be utilized on a reciprocal basis to conduct initial flight evaluations of pilots who qualify under the new criteria and are recommended by their respective commanders. The Standardization Pilots from the 37ARRS and Det 1, 37ARRS met with the Group Standardization Board on 27 February 1968 for briefings and instructions concerning the administration of initial qualification flight evaluations. The HH-53 Standardization Pilot will be designated Group Standardization Pilot for the purpose of administering the initial upgrade program. A member of the Group Standardization Section will check the candidates' paper work and accompany the unit Standardization Pilot as Group monitor on initial qualification upgrade flights. These procedures will insure that we achieve complete objectivity in Standardization and continue to maintain a strong program within the Group. This method of operation for HH-3 units will continue only until we have a qualified HH-3E Pilot Flight Examiner assigned to the Standardization Section.

9. Colonel Godbey and his AFLC Materiel Assistance Team visited our HH-53 and HH-3E units during the period 4-11 February. They were tasked by General Gerrity to visit every H-3 and H-53 unit world-wide in order to determine, first hand, why these airframes have such a high NORS rate. Their visit was billed as strictly fact finding and not as an IG inspection. I'm happy to report that even though many of their "action items" were materiel deficiencies we have complained about in the past (via EUR action) their expert materiel assistance was most beneficial in identifying and recommending solutions to some of our local in-house materiel problems. I feel the greatest benefit to be derived from their visit will be the added emphasis placed on obtaining fixes to our materiel deficiencies due to the personal interest given the problems by General Gerrity. I'm sure we will be getting expedited action by all agencies concerned in providing the required fixes. We were very sorrowed to hear of General Gerrity's death. I know you'll agree that rescue lost a good friend, but I feel that the impetus he provided for several of our programs will be felt for some time to come.

10. The long awaited 7th Air Force SAR Manual was published 1 March 1968. Distribution to the field and interested agencies will be accomplished this week. The manual was published with a 64-1 designation to bring it into the SAR series of regulations. The new manual reflects an increased participation by the Operational Control Commander in assembling and controlling SAR task forces, particularly for out-of-country missions. In addition, it updates the SAR procedure and concepts used in this area. This should result in increased effectiveness since both the participating and recipient organization and personnel will have the latest information essential to support the SAR force.

11. We had excellent exposure and coverage on our 1000th combat save. As usual with some of these stories, we had to stretch a couple of points to have everything line up properly, however, all the necessary ingredients were obviously there: an F-105 pilot with 79 missions; two broken legs; a SAR Task Force; scramble; pararescue descent; ground fire; a first save for the RCC; the 21st save for the PJ; and an Air Force Academy graduate for the co-pilot. We brought the crew to TSN from NKP, went through their story a couple of times and then did a TV panel type discussion at the AFVN studios. Cameras were present from NBC, ABC, CBS, BBC, and AFN. Without even a note we plugged away at that for a half hour after which we went down to JUSPAO for a "Show and Tell" before 60 to 70 press representatives from all over the world. Although the recovery film was not of the best quality, it was fresh and new and well received. Following that, we did essentially a repeat of the TV show with each man telling of his part in the mission followed by a question and answer session. According to the 7AF Director of Information, it was a good show all the way through and I believe we got as much mileage out of number 1000 as we possibly could. The crew said they'd much rather make a few more flights to North Vietnam rather than go through that again.

12. For your information, the following awards have been received by 3rd Group personnel since 1 January 1968:

Silver Star	9
Distinguished Flying Cross	63
Airman's Medal	2
Bronze Star	16
Air Medal	146
AFCM	23

13. Save summary for February 1968:

	Combat	Non-Combat	USAF	USN	USMC	USA	ARVN
HH-53	4	0	4	0	0	0	0
HH-3E	11	34	4	7	33	0	1
HH-43	10	24	20	2	0	12	0
Total	25	58	28	9	33	12	1

Paul E. Leske
PAUL E. LESKE, Colonel, USAF
Commander

cy: PAC ARRC

To CVE
GHS

ANFEC

Commander's Monthly Letter

Colonel Paul E. Locke
Commander, 3 ANFEC
APO San Francisco 96377

Dear Paul

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

13 August 1960 T DESTROY

No. 0003586

1. Reference your 4 July 1960 Monthly Commander's Letter concerning personnel problems. My staff has been working with our USA personnel counterparts in trying to correct your manning situation. We obtained a computer inquiry covering the AFMIL career field which showed seven assigned to your USA units that we believe related to the CHNS or other overseas areas some time ago. This inquiry was forwarded to the 3d Group by ANFEC letter, 23 July 1960, subject: Audit, requesting an audit be made, consultation with corrected data and authority (special orders or AF Forms 1090). The corrected package was to be forwarded to SAC ANFEC to assure input into the Personnel Data System (PDS) by the 61st CHPO. I know this is an awful amount of work for your personnel, but the erroneous data has to be corrected and the only place it can be done is at your units. If the PDS can be made to show the proper personnel (Grade, Name, and AFSC by Unit) then adequate replacements can be obtained. Air Force, MAC, and this headquarters is dependent upon the PDS for all manning actions with the exceptions in paragraph 2, below.

2. Thanks to the AFMIL T-6 Report and our Student Qualification Reports from the 40th, we still have a means of manually cross-checking our EC-130, EC-93, and EC-3 Aircrow manning in USA and taking corrective actions. Even here, by the time we know some aircrow numbers did not show up at the 40th MACS it is after the fact and shortages do occur in your units until we can obtain replacements, get them reexamined qualified, and physically to their USA unit.

3. Although at times it may appear that my staff is doing very little to rectify your manning problems this is not the case. I can assure you that all personnel problems which you present to us are relayed to MAC and followed up. You can help yourself and us by reviewing the CHPO products furnished your units and taking necessary action to correct errors which appear. This is especially important where an individual is shown assigned to a unit although he has actually departed or never reported into the unit.

Sincerely

SIGNED
GERALD E. McALLISTER, Colonel, USAF
RCS/Personnel

Copy to: Cdr, Pacific ARRC

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington, D.C.

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

23 Feb 1967

No. 0003587

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: AFRDQRA

SUBJECT: Combat Aircrew Recovery Analysis

TO: HQ MAC

1. The Qualitative Operational Requirement (QOR) submitted by Military Airlift Command for an advanced Combat Aircrew Recovery vehicle was validated as a Requirements Action Directive (RAD) on 31 January 1967. AFSC has initiated action toward developing a Concept Formulation Package for this mission and is expected to have this package completed for Air Staff review in late summer 1967. AFSC has requested, and efforts are underway, to obtain \$600,000 to fund a contract study evaluation of several potential propulsion concepts for the Combat Aircrew Recovery vehicle. These studies will be used to perform a trade-off analysis of the potential propulsion/airframe configurations such as folded and stowed rotors, tilt wing, fan in wing, diverted jet thrust and other advanced concepts. After evaluation of these concepts has been completed and a Concept Formulation Package prepared, Air Staff actions will proceed to obtain FY 69 funding to support the required development effort.

2. To insure success in obtaining program approval, it is apparent that detailed justification for the improved performance characteristics of an advanced design vehicle will be required. It is considered that one of the most important criteria to satisfy review authorities on the necessity for this proposed new vehicle will be an assessment of SEA experiences to illustrate how improved performance would have resulted in "more" saves of downed airmen than have been accomplished with existing equipment. To achieve this, it is requested that your headquarters undertake an operational analysis of the records of aircrew recoveries in SEA. To the extent possible, all incidents of downed USAF and VNAF flyers should be analyzed to determine the most probable factors that precluded their return. It is hoped that such an analysis will demonstrate the need for improved response in terms of speed, range, additional armor or armament, new concepts for retrieving downed airmen, or other factors which would serve to indicate the necessity for improved performance characteristics. It might also be valuable to review incidents where "saves" were accomplished in order to determine if they could have been accomplished more effectively with aircraft having improved performance characteristics. The difficulty of obtaining meaningful data from this proposed analytical effort is well understood; however, the importance of having such data during the FY 69 Budget Review process cannot be over-emphasized.

3. The information being requested will also be used as a data base for responding to questions raised by the Military Airlift Board of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). During recent hearings by the PSAC, the chairman addressed the following typical questions: What percent of rescue opportunities could we have taken advantage of had we had better equipment? Has anyone made an analysis of this? Is speed the primary criteria in the success of rescue missions? Does communications play an important part in the failure rate? Is it feasible to operate rescue vehicles behind enemy lines in general war? Although answers to these questions were provided by the Navy and Air Force witnesses, they were based mostly on intuition as opposed to available factual data. Because of this and the requirement to defend in detail the establishment of the multi million dollar program for development of the advanced Combat Aircrew Recovery vehicle, it is important that this analysis be performed in depth. It is also important that the results of this analysis be available to this headquarters before 15 June 1967 to allow time to prepare for negotiations with reviewing authorities. If it becomes necessary, direct contact should be established with PACAF for assistance. The HQ USAF contact for this effort is Lt Colonel E. L. Mac Quarrie/76528.

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

(signed)

cc: PACAF

KENNETH C. DEMPSTER, Maj Gen, USAF
Director of Operational Requirements
& Development Plans, DCS/R&D

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
AIR RESCUE SERVICE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
ORLANDO AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA

PROJECT CORC HARVEST

DO NOT

20 Aug 64

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: ARXDC

SUBJECT: Colonel Derck's Letter to General Williams dtd 30 Jul 64

TO: ARCCO (Colonel Winchester)

No. 0003589

1. Following comments on Colonel Derck's letter to General Williams, 30 Jul 64 are submitted.

a. Reference para 1: I agree that the IG team must have been making reference to squadrons that operate with their parent wing rather than independently operating squadrons as we have. All of our squadrons have supply officers authorized.

b. Reference para 3: I believe that Lt Colonel Hartley's remarks were either not clear or misunderstood by PARC personnel. I know for a fact that Col Hartley agreed with our concept of supporting Pacific Command to the utmost with ZI resources. In a letter to Col Derck we have pointed out however that in war planning, the ZI capability must be programmed in the proper manner. It "appears" as though Pacific Air Forces have been failing to follow the JCS procedures, i.e., the ZI based SAR requirements must be placed in the CINCPAC plan and forwarded to JCS for approval. When, and if these plans (or changes to an approved plan) are approved, it is our responsibility to see that resources are made available when a contingency plan is implemented. Unilateral PACAF plans can do nothing but create confusion when there are forces to be moved, and as far as MATS Hqs is concerned, they will not take action on a unilateral plan. In this case I refer to unilateral as Hq PACAF, Hq MATS and below (not Hq USAF). If the CINCPAC plans do not include a sufficient SAR capability I would recommend to Pacific AF that they see to it that this capability is added. It is the responsibility of the reviewing agency(s) as well as the originating agency to ascertain that each plan is as complete as possible.

c. Reference para 4: Although it was our original opinion that ARS OPLAN 510 could be used for any contingency such as the one noted in the referenced letter, we now have the clarification that USAF only means to implement this plan on a non-tactical short term basis. If the contingency involves a lost aircraft in the wilds of New Zealand, the plan would be appropriate, but if the contingency involves a limited war in Korea, then the plan would not be used. Contingencies involving short tactical situations such as a limited war in Korea, should come through normal JCS directed actions. This would include the proper programming of ARS resources through the approved planning cycle, i.e. PACAF to CINCPAC to JCS to Hq USAF. I do not agree with Colonel Derck's


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statement that, "We have always assumed that any contingency operation exceeding the Pacific resources would be supported from CONUS resources, on request. This assumption is evidently false."

2. I would recommend a further paragraph to Colonel Derck that would indicate that although utilization of Continental US capabilities has been rather confusing in the past, we believe that it is gradually straightening out; also we should indicate that it has only been in recent months that efforts have been made to program state-side ARS LEX capabilities in PACAF war plans.


BASIL R. RUDOLPH
Colonel, USAF
DCS/Plans

UNCLASSIFIED

Detachment 12
38th Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Squadron
APO San Francisco 96205

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: Major Bush/3373

SUBJECT: Flying Safety Hazards

TO: 38CCO

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

31 DEC 1966

No 0003593

1. Reference message RMOS 02349 Dec 66. The most obvious safety hazard at this base and throughout most of this country is the operational environment. The combat conditions, the rugged terrain and the number of aircraft operating around the bases under different controlling agencies all present more hazards than in most parts of the world. To avoid the possibility of ground fire, inland flights are flown at higher altitudes, and along the coast they are flown over water; however, this is still a safety hazard because an engine failure would probably result in a badly damaged or destroyed aircraft. These operating conditions are being experienced by most rescue units in this country and can be combated by professional, highly qualified aircrews.

2. The major problem experienced by this unit which could develop into a flying safety hazard is the constant shortage of personnel, particularly well qualified mechanics and pilots. We have operated for the seven months since being activated with 80 to 85 percent overall strength. It has not been too difficult for the airmen because they do not have the additional duties or the consistent heavy workload the officers experience, and they usually receive a day off each week; however, most of the heavy maintenance has had to be accomplished by two men as they were the only fully qualified helicopter mechanics.

3. There has been an average of four out of the authorized six pilots present for duty for this entire period. With two pilots on immediate alert and two on secondary alert, everyone is working or on call most of the time. In some respects we were very lucky because the officers that were assigned were all experienced in the rescue mission and were very competent; however, it has been and is continuing to be a very demanding workload. If all that was required of a pilot would be for him to be at his duty station during the time he was on immediate alert, it would not be such an excessive workload; however, the seven day per week alert schedule, as many as five additional duties per man, plus the additional work required in establishing a new unit has been a strain on each man. Obviously, something has had to give and at times, this has been some of the less important additional duties. Except for the five day R & R, it has been impossible for a pilot to have a complete day off for the majority of this seven month period and I believe this will reduce a man's effectiveness. If it were possible for a man to be completely away from the job for 24 hours each week, he would be much more efficient and a much safer pilot

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than he is on the continuous work schedule. It becomes very frustrating when there is insufficient time to complete all assigned duties and this can cause a man to lose his motivation and become indifferent to his job. This has not been the case with any of the pilots currently assigned, but I believe these men are far above average.

4. The obvious solution to this problem is to improve personnel planning and to insure the timely assignment of replacements. The current shortage of helicopter pilots seems to be world-wide and it appears that replacing pilots, particularly well-qualified in the rescue role as soon as they are needed is almost an impossible task.

5. The correspondence load in a detachment is very heavy and probably over half of each pilot's time is devoted to administrative matters. A partial solution which would reduce the pilot's workload would be the assignment of a nonrated Administrative Officer to each unit. He could accomplish as many as 12 out of the 20 additional duties currently being divided between the pilots. This would allow the pilots to devote more attention to their primary job and to the major additional duties, i.e. Operations, Safety, Maintenance, Training and Supply.

6. Another partial solution would be the selective assignment of key personnel. The Commander, Aircraft Maintenance Supervisor and the Administrative Specialist are the three key men in a rescue detachment. If one of these three men is weak, it places a very heavy burden on the entire unit. Of course, other well-qualified personnel, particularly some pilots and maintenance men are needed but a detachment without highly qualified men in the three key jobs is operating under a handicap.

7. The overall solution is long range because more helicopter pilots are needed throughout the Air Force. An increase in the stateside UMDs for the rescue detachments would create a larger number of qualified men prepared for the job when a mission such as the one here in SEA arises. The UMDs usually authorize four or five pilots which is barely adequate when all are present for duty; however, frequently the detachments have been under strength. This is understandable during the present, rapid increase of rescue forces in SEA; however, the pilot shortage existed long before the war escalated in Vietnam. The lack of time for off-duty education, the frequent lack of opportunity to attend Squadron Officer's School, the frequent refusal's of applications for Operation Bootstrap, the frequency of leave time being lost and the many short notice extended TDY and PCS assignments have created an "anti-rescue" attitude for many helicopter pilots. In addition, it has also been directly responsible for many good men deciding to get out of the Air Force. I feel that the expansion of the rescue detachments in the states would help to solve many of the difficulties that a helicopter pilot has while assigned to Rescue. It would create a better working

atmosphere throughout Rescue and increase the motivation and effectiveness of each pilot. Above all, it would have a direct effect on the overall safe operation of Rescue helicopters.

Ralph H. Bush

RALPH H. BUSH, Major, USAF
Commander

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REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
JOINT GENERAL STAFF

HEADQUARTERS
US MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO 143 San Francisco, California

MACJ5

SUBJECT: Joint Vietnamese/U.S. Search and Rescue Agreement

TO: See Distribution

1. PURPOSE: This agreement establishes the policies for mutual coordination and control of the search and rescue effort within the Republic of Vietnam.

2. DEFINITIONS:

- a. INLAND REGIONS: The inland areas of the Republic of Vietnam.
- b. MARITIME REGIONS: The waters subject to jurisdiction of the Republic of Vietnam and the high seas within the Saigon Flight Information Region.
- c. SAIGON, SEARCH AND RESCUE CENTER: The agency operated by the VNAF Air Tactical Control Center (ATCC) and located within the AOC, for the collection and dissemination of SAR information, for the coordination of any search and rescue efforts involved in all SAR incidents other than US military, and for the coordination of all search and rescue efforts of Vietnam agencies participating in US military SAR incidents.

d. AIR OPERATIONS CENTER, SEARCH AND RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER:

The agency designated by the Commander, 2D ADIV for the collection and dissemination of all information pertaining to US military incidents, for the coordination of all search and rescue efforts involved in such incidents, and for the coordination of all search and rescue efforts of US forces participating in other SAR incidents.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES: Signatories agree:

- a. That the responsibility for search and rescue will remain with the agencies specified in paragraph 2c and 2d above.
- b. To actively support and enforce Joint Vietnam - United States Plan for SAR operations.
- c. That provisions of the Republic of Vietnam Department of National Defense General Staff Air Force Regulation 64-1; Vietnamese Navy publication KBC 4.222; Post Office Publication KTFK/TK/125; Civilian Director, Air Traffic Section publication 1.674; US National SAR Plan (AFM 64-2) Army FM 20-150; NWP 37(A); ICAO Doc 7333 - AN/859 and the Joint Vietnam - United States Search and Rescue Plan are considered part of this agreement.

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MACJ5

SUBJECT: Joint Vietnamese/U.S. Search and Rescue Agreement

d. That any agency assuming coordination responsibility for a SAR mission will retain that responsibility until appropriately relieved or until the mission has been closed; provided, that in committing facilities for SAR coordination purposes, commanders retain the prerogative to assume complete control over their units, including the right to withdraw units committed to a SAR mission in progress.


e. That the successful accomplishment of a SAR mission is more important than technicalities as to location of incident or agency jurisdiction.

f. That this agreement shall not be construed as an obstruction to prompt action by any agency or individual to relieve distress whenever and wherever found, and that in SAR operations there shall be a free and unrestricted flow of information, action and close cooperation established and maintained between representatives of the agencies signatory hereto.

g. That release of information to news media will be in accordance with the individual agency directive and through the responsible Rescue Coordination Center and/or the specific control agency.

4. This agreement is effective upon date of final signature and will remain in effect unless modified by mutual agreement. Withdrawal by either signatory may only be made by advance notice to the SAR center.

LE VAN TY
Lieutenant General
Chief of General Staff
Army of Vietnam


PAUL D. HARKINS
General, United States Army
Commander, MACV

4 Inclosures:

1. ANNEX A, Joint Vietnamese/U.S. SAR Plan
2. ANNEX B, Additional procedures to be effective during periods of hostility within the Republic of Vietnam
3. ANNEX C, Explanation of terms
4. ANNEX D, Distribution list

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ANNEX A (Joint Vietnamese/U.S. SAR Plan) to VN/US SAR Agreement

JOINT VIETNAM - UNITED STATES SEARCH AND RESCUE PLAN

SAIGON FLIGHT INFORMATION REGION

1. AUTHORITY: The Government of the Republic of Vietnam, as a signatory state to the convention of international civil aviation, has an obligation to provide such measures of assistance to aircraft in distress in its territory, regardless of nationality, as it may find practicable, and to permit, subject to control by its authorities, the state in which the aircraft is registered to provide such means of assistance as may be necessitated by the circumstances. In order to implement this obligation and for purposes of economy and efficiency, a Joint SAR Agreement was made among the U.S. Military Agencies and Republic of Vietnam Government Agencies with Search and Rescue potentialities. This plan is established on the basis of the Joint Agreement.

2. PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAR: The primary responsibility for SAR within the Saigon FIR has been assumed by the Saigon Rescue Coordination Center, ATCC, for all SAR incidents other than U.S. military, and is delegated to the SARCC by the Commander, 2nd ADIV for U.S. military incidents. It is defined as the duty of insuring that the following steps are taken:

- a. Prompt dissemination to the interested agencies of information about a distress incident requiring SAR assistance.
- b. Prompt dispatch of appropriate and adequate rescue facilities.
- c. Thorough prosecution of SAR operation until rescue has been effected or until it is apparent that further efforts would prove to no avail.

3. ORGANIZATION:

a. SAIGON RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER: The Saigon Rescue Coordination Center of the ATCC has been established to coordinate all participating search and rescue units and facilities within Saigon FIR. It is staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped in accordance with ICAO requirements.

b. SEARCH AND RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER (SARCC): The agency designated by the Commander, 2nd ADIV, for the collection and dissemination of all information pertaining to SAR incidents and activities within the Saigon FIR and for the coordination of SAR activities involving U.S. military forces or SAR activities undertaken as a result of U.S. military incidents.

c. DUTIES OF THE RCC CONTROLLER: For the purpose of this plan and in addition to his routine duties, the following are the duties of the RCC controller:

- (1) Insure prompt receipt and recording of all incident data.
- (2) Determine mission responsibility and initial classification of urgency. (Uncertainty, alert, or distress phase).

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ANNEX A (Joint Vietnamese/U.S. SAR Plan) to VN/US SAR Agreement

- (3) Conduct preliminary and extended communications search.
- (4) Evaluate data obtained from communication searches and other sources to identify the incident as false, not requiring rescue service, or requiring that the incident be placed in a more urgent phase.
- (5) Alert appropriate agencies, facilities and personnel.
- (6) Delegate or assume mission control (refer to paragraph d. below).
- (7) De-alert all agencies upon termination of the incident.

d. CONTROLLING AGENCIES: Control of a specific SAR mission may be delegated by Saigon RCC/JOC SARCC to any agency which possesses the capability to effectively prosecute such a mission. (See attached diagram of "Joint Coordinating Activities," Appendix 1.):

(1) PRIMARY MISSION CONTROL AGENCIES FOR MISSION COORDINATION INVOLVING ALL SAR INCIDENTS OTHER THAN U.S. MILITARY:

(a) EXTENDED AIR SEARCH: Saigon RCC through such agencies made available for its use under existing agreements.

(b) MARITIME: Saigon RCC through the Vietnamese Navy.

(c) LAND: Field Command for all ground search and interrogation parties.

(d) MEDICAL EVACUATION: Airlift Chief JOC who may possess a capability to accomplish the mission.

(2) INVOLVING U.S. FORCES:

(a) EXTENDED AIR SEARCH: JOC SARCC through U.S. military agencies and such other agencies as may be made available for use under existing agreements.

(b) LOCAL CRASH: JOC SARCC through the nearest military base or station equipped to render assistance or alleviate distress.

(3) CLOSE LIAISON:

(a) JOC SARCC and Saigon RCC will establish close liaison in requesting assistance from and passing information on all incidents to each other.

(b) Nothing contained within this plan shall be construed as an obstruction to prompt action by any agency in requesting assistance or passing control to any other agency better equipped to execute the mission.

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ANNEX A (Joint Vietnamese/U.S. SAR Plan) to VN/US SAR Agreement

(4) DUTIES OF THE SAR MISSION CONTROL AGENCY:

- (a) Obtain from the RCC controller all pertinent information on the SAR incident. RCC controllers should record all available information on an appropriate SAR incident form and brief the mission control agency accordingly. (See Appendix II for sample of incident processing forms).
- (b) Dispatch initial SAR facilities.
- (c) Initiate request for radar search/surveillance as appropriate.
- (d) Obtain and plot fixes or bearings from direction finding stations.
- (e) Initiate "all ships" broadcast, if warranted.
- (f) Direct ground radio station to maintain communications and, if necessary, establish a communication schedule. Designate communication control and frequencies to be used.
- (g) Plot bearings and vector of distressed aircraft to nearest suitable airport.
- (h) Determine weather and sea conditions.
- (i) Ascertain emergency equipment carried by distressed aircraft.
- (j) Determine search areas, select search patterns and dispatch an organized SAR force.
- (k) Designate an On-Scene-Commander.
- (l) Specify primary and secondary SAR frequencies.
- (m) Request additional SAR facilities.
- (n) Exercise SAR operational control over forces assigned.
- (o) Keep RCC fully advised of SAR operations.
- (p) Insure briefing of SAR crews on search objective, search areas, call signs, OSC, primary and secondary frequencies.
- (q) Maintain a daily plot showing areas searched, percent of effective coverage, sightings and leads.
- (r) Alert vessels in area, requesting lookouts and listening watch on distress frequencies. Alert local law enforcement agencies, if warranted.
- (s) Notify agency or command of the distressed craft of action taken and keep him informed of developments.

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ANNEX A (Joint Vietnamese/U.S. SAR Plan) to VN/US SAR Agreement

- dictate.
- (t) Change search plans and radio frequencies as conditions dictate.
 - (u) Obtain and evaluate all information on the SAR operation.
 - (v) Notify appropriate accident investigation authorities.
 - (w) Insure debriefing of SAR crews and send situation reports to RCC at the end of each day's operation.
 - (x) When assistance is no longer necessary, de-alert and release SAR units and other activities involved.
 - (y) Notify agency or command of the distressed craft of final mission results. Upon request, submit a brief report of the SAR effort to the agency or command concerned.
- (5) DESIGNATION OF THE ON SCENE COMMANDER (OSC): The SAR mission control agency shall designate an OSC when coordination at the scene is indicated. The following are the duties of the OSC:
- (a) Assume SAR operational control of all SAR facilities assigned to his search area and coordinate their efforts within his area.
 - (b) Establish communications with all SAR facilities within his area. Receive position and other reports. Be responsible for communications and performance of SAR facilities. Upon request, submit regular position and other reports to the SAR mission control agency via the established communications link.
 - (c) Report weather and search conditions to the SAR Mission Control Agency as soon as possible upon arrival at the scene.
 - (d) Ascertain capabilities and endurance of SAR facilities within his area.
 - (e) Provide details of the mission as necessary to participating facilities.
 - (f) Assign, when required, specific search areas within his assigned area and specify search patterns to participating SAR facilities considering limitations and capabilities, sea conditions, wind, visibility, etc.
 - (g) Notify the SAR Mission Control Agency when each unit arrives or departs the search area.
 - (h) When necessary for the OSC to depart his assigned search area, delegate OSC duties to the senior qualified officer present on-scene, and notify the SAR Mission Control Agency accordingly.

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ANNEX A (Joint Vietnamese/U.S. SAR Plan) to VN/US SAR Agreement

(6) SAR FACILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS: The effective utilization of all available facilities will insure greater efficiency and economy in SAR operations. This is the purpose of the Joint Search and Rescue Plan. Agencies with SAR potential are:

- (a) Merchant vessels
- (b) Fishing fleets
- (c) Aircraft operating agencies
- (d) Company planes and helicopters
- (e) Private planes
- (f) Towing and salvage companies
- (g) Commercial broadcasting stations
- (h) Marine radio stations
- (i) News media.

4. THE SAR INCIDENT: The probability of finding survivors and their chances of survival diminish with each minute that passes after an incident occurs. All SAR activities shall therefore take prompt and positive action so that no life will be lost or jeopardized through wasted or misdirected effort. It must be presumed that there are survivors in each incident who need medical or other assistance. It must be assumed that there is not even one able-bodied, logical-thinking survivor at the scene. All reasonable action shall be taken to locate distressed personnel, determine their status, and effect rescue of survivors.

a. CONDITIONS WHICH MAKE A SAR INCIDENT:

(1) AIRCRAFT INCIDENT: A SAR incident involving aircraft is considered imminent or actual when any of the following conditions exists:

- (a) The position of an aircraft raises doubt as to its safety.
- (b) Reports indicate that the operating efficiency of an aircraft is so impaired that a forced landing may be necessary.
- (c) An aircraft is overdue or unreported. Normally it is considered overdue when its position report is thirty (30) minutes late or when it fails to arrive within thirty (30) minutes of its estimated time of arrival and no communications can be established with it.

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ANNEX A (Joint Vietnamese/U.S. SAR Plan) to VN/US SAR Agreement

(d) An aircraft is reported to have made a forced landing or is about to do so.

(e) Emergency IFF/Selection identification feature (SIF) is received at any station.

(f) A request for assistance has been received or distress is apparent.

(g) A radar station is painting a left or right-triangular pattern.

(2) RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR INTERCEPT AND ESCORT: The necessity for responding to requests for intercept and escort will be determined by the cognizant coordinating activity.

(3) SURFACE VESSEL INCIDENT: A SAR incident involving surface vessels is considered imminent or actual when any of the following conditions exists:

(a) It is apparent that a vessel is in distress or has sent a request for assistance.

(b) A vessel is considered overdue at its destination or a position report is overdue.

(4) OTHER INCIDENTS: A SAR incident other than those mentioned in the preceding paragraphs is considered imminent or actual when it is apparent that personnel are in distress or when a request for assistance has been received.

b. REQUESTS FOR MEDICAL AIRLIFT: Requests for airlift are often received from outlying localities where medical and communications facilities are inadequate or non-existent. To insure that all data required by SAR agencies are made available RCC shall prepare and distribute a standard check list to all alerting posts for their guidance. Rescue aircraft responding to requests for airlift shall "airdrop" any instructions necessary to facilitate evacuation of personnel, when it is known that communication facilities are difficult or non-existent.

c. PHASES OF EMERGENCY: When a SAR incident has been determined to exist, an emergency phase shall be assigned to the incident by the operating agency, air traffic service units, or RCC. The emergency phases are as follows:

(1) UNCERTAINTY PHASE: Doubt exists as to the safety of a craft or its personnel because of lack of information concerning its progress, position or because of a knowledge of possible difficulties.

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(2) ALERT PHASE: Apprehension exists for the safety of a craft or its personnel because of a continued lack of information concerning its position or progress or because of definite information that serious difficulty would be unavoidable.

(3) DISTRESS PHASE: Immediate assistance is required because of continued lack of information concerning the position or progress of the craft or because definite information has been received that the craft or its personnel are threatened by grave or imminent danger.


5. PUBLIC INFORMATION: Release of information to news media will be in accordance with individual service directives through the appropriate rescue coordination center and/or the mission controlling agency. General information will be released during the actual mission to keep the public informed of search and rescue progress and to invite public assistance in reporting data that might aid in mission execution. Control of such releases by responsible agencies will be in good taste. No derogatory statements about the craft, personnel involved in the incident, or assisting agencies will be made. No personal opinions or excuses will be offered. Saigon rescue coordination center, and/or the mission controlling agency through their designated representatives, will be the responsible agency for news releases involving missions under paragraph 3c.(1) through 3d.(1)(d).

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 APPENDIX I (Joint Coordinating Activities) to ANNEX A (Joint Vietnamese/U.S.
 SAR Plan) to VN/US SAR Agreement



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APPENDIX II TO ANNEX A
SAMPLE INCIDENT PROCESSING FORMS

3 Attachments

1. Check List of Information Required for Medical Evacuation.
2. Surface SAR Incident.
3. Aircraft SAR Incident.

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APPENDIX II (Sample Incident Processing Forms) to ANNEX A (Joint Vietnamese/U.S. SAR Plan) to VN/US SAR Agreement

CHECK LIST OF INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR MEDICAL EVACUATION

1. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL AND/OR ORGANIZATION INITIATING THE REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE: _____
2. DATE AND TIME OF REQUEST: _____
3. NAME OF PATIENT: _____
4. AGE AND SEX OF PATIENT: _____
5. LOCATION OF PATIENT: _____
6. DESIRED POINT OF PICK UP: _____
7. PATIENT'S SYMPTOMS AND/OR INJURIES: _____
8. DOCTOR'S DIAGNOSIS: _____
9. PATIENT'S BLOOD PRESSURE: _____ TEMPERATURE: _____
PULSE RATE: _____ RESPIRATION: _____
10. WILL AN AERIAL DROP OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES SUFFICE?: _____
11. WHAT SUPPLIES ARE DESIRED? _____
12. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: _____

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A-II-2

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APPENDIX II (Sample Incident Processing Forms) to ANNEX A (Joint Vietnamese/U.S. SAR Plan) to VN/US SAR Agreement

SURFACE SAR INCIDENT

(COMPLETE IN EACH CASE OF ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL DISTRESS)

CONTROLLER

CASE NO.

DATE/TIME

EMERGENCY PHASE ASSIGNED:

1. NAME, ADDRESS, TELEPHONE NO.
OF PERSON REPORTING INCIDENT

2. NATURE OF DISTRESS (GROUND,
OVERDUE, FIRE, DISABLED,
COLLISION, ETC.)

3. LOCATION OF INCIDENT (GIVE
LATITUDE & LONGITUDE OR
DISTANCE & BEARING FROM
REFERENCE POINT)

4. TIME AND DATE OF INCIDENT

5. DESCRIPTION OF DISTRESSED UNIT
(HAVE NUMBER, COLOR, SIZE,
TYPE OF VESSEL OR PLANE)

6. POINT OF DEPARTURE, SPEED,
DESTINATION, ROUTING

7. RADIO FREQUENCY AVAILABLE

8. NATURE OF ASSISTANCE NOW
BEING RENDERED, IF ANY

9. OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION

10. ACTION TAKEN

11. DATE AND TIME AND BY WHOM
DISTRESS REPORT RECEIVED

12. CASE CLOSED (DATE AND TIME)

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APPENDIX II (Sample Incident Processing Forms) to ANNEX A (Joint Vietnamese/U.S. SAR Plan) to VN/US SAR Agreement

AIRCRAFT SAR INCIDENT

DATE/TIME _____

CONTROLLER _____ EMERGENCY PHASE _____

ESSENTIAL INFORMATION: (FOR RESCUE ACTION)

ALERTING STATION _____

IDENTIFICATION AND TYPE: _____ (FOR DF & RADAR)

FREQUENCY: _____ (FOR DF & RADAR)

MODE OF IFF: _____ (FOR RADAR)

BEST POSITION: _____ (FOR RADAR)

COURSE: _____ (FOR RADAR) VFR OR IFR PLAN: _____

ALTITUDE _____ (FOR RADAR) SPEED: _____ (FOR RADAR)

FUEL REMAINING: _____

NATURE OF DISTRESS: _____

PILOT'S REQUEST: _____

PILOT'S INTENTION: _____

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: (TO COMPLETE THE CASE)

PILOT'S NAME AND RANK: _____

PERSONS ON BOARD: _____

OPERATING SQUADRON OR AIRCRAFT (IF APPLICABLE) _____

HOME STATION OF AIRCRAFT: _____

FLIGHT PLAN DATA: _____

TIME LAST CONTACT AND FREQUENCY: _____

CHECK ATC CLEARANCE: _____

ALERT GCA: _____

REQUEST ESCORT AT _____ FROM: _____

ALERT LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES: _____

OTHER AGENCIES ALERTED: _____

FINAL RESULTS: _____

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APPENDIX III (Search Pattern Considerations) to ANNEX A (Joint Vietnamese/U.S. SAR Plan) to VN/US SAR Agreement

SEARCH PATTERN CONSIDERATIONS

1. Planning for search involves determination of the most probable position of a distress incident or its survivors, the means to be used for search, and the selection of search patterns.
2. When information vital to determining the most probable position of the incident or survivors is not available, search planning becomes a more difficult matter. Because it may be impractical and time-consuming to search the entire area in which the incident may have occurred, or in which survivors might be located, the SAR Commander must reconstruct the incident with whatever information is available. The search pattern, in such cases, is usually based on the presumption that the craft met with an accident, became lost, or was forced down on its intended track. The initial phase of search is confined primarily to the intended track and its immediate surrounding area. If no results are obtained, the SAR Commander (or coordinator, as applicable), must either extend this search area or determine other areas based on hypothesis.
3. The attached search patterns are for ready reference and applicable for on - scene commanders pending receipt of more detailed instructions.

3 Attachments

1. Track Crawl Search
2. Creeping Line Search
3. Expanding Area Search

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A-III-1


0774

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APPENDIX III (Search Pattern Considerations) to ANNEX A (Joint Vietnamese/U.S. SAR Plan) to VN/US SAR Agreement

TRACK CRAWL SEARCH

For use when a craft has disappeared along a track without a trace, or when a single radio bearing or line of position has been obtained.



COMMENTS:

1. Specify departure point and intended track to destination.
2. Track spacing or distance between legs will depend on the terrain to be searched and effective visibility.
3. If this pattern does not produce results, then substitute it with a line search.
4. Use knots and nautical miles when specifying wind velocity, air speed and distance.
5. To be used by single or multi units.

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A-III-2


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APPENDIX III (Search Pattern Considerations) to ANNEX A (Joint Vietnamese/U.S. SAR Plan) to VN/US SAR Agreement

CREEPING LINE SEARCH

For use when survivors are reported between two points but exact position is not known, particularly when navigational error or drift may have placed survivors to either side of track.



COMMENTS:

1. Assign coordinates of search area in military grid reference system.
2. Size of search area to assign will depend on the number of aircraft available for search and their estimated duration on scene.
3. Track spacing or distance between legs will depend on size of search object and effective visibility.
4. Use knots and nautical miles when specifying wind velocity, air speed, and distance.
5. To be used by single or multi units.

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
A-III-3

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APPENDIX III (Search Pattern Considerations) to ANNEX A (Joint Vietnamese/U.S. SAR Plan) to VN/US SAR Agreement

EXPANDING SQUARE SEARCH

For use when the position of distress or survivors is known within close limits, and the area to be searched is not extensive.



COMMENTS:

1. Assign coordinates of search area in military grid reference system.
2. Length of legs will depend on nature of distress such as survivor in the water, survivor in a life raft, an aircraft ditching, etc, and effective visibility.
3. Make initial leg into the wind.
4. The first and second legs are equal in length to twice the sighting distance and each two succeeding legs are increased in length by twice the sighting distance.
5. Use knots and nautical miles when specifying wind velocity, air speed, and distance.
6. To be used by single units.

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ANNEX B (Additional Procedures to be effective during periods of hostility within the Republic of Vietnam) to VN/US SAR Agreement

1. GENERAL SITUATION: Wartime SAR is basically an extension of peacetime SAR operations, however, it does encompass those additional procedures which are necessary under combat situations. It further provides for control of all SAR elements to be invested in a single command under the supposition that civil agencies will respond to a national mobilization during an emergency. This annex provides those additional procedures to existing SAR agreements which are necessary to accomplish the SAR mission during periods of hostility within the Republic of Vietnam.
2. FRIENDLY FORCES:
 - a. VNAF: Will provide, within capabilities, aircraft and crews to participate in SAR operations. Provide Vietnamese - English speaking interpreter or personnel to accompany US forces to crash sites.
 - b. ARVN WILL: Provide, within capabilities, ground forces to provide protection for rescue parties proceeding to crash scenes. Provide Vietnamese - English interpreter personnel to accompany US forces to crash sites.
 - c. USAF WILL: Provide, within capabilities, aircraft and crews to participate in SAR operations as required.
 - d. US ARMY WILL: Provide, within capabilities, aircraft and crews to participate in SAR operations as required.
 - e. US MARINES WILL: Provide, within capabilities, aircraft and crews to participate in SAR operations as required.
3. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: Upon notification of a rescue incident during periods of hostility, the appropriate intelligence agency will be notified and requested to determine, if feasible, whether forces within the immediate proximity to the incident are friendly or hostile and the location of the nearest available friendly forces which may be of assistance. When intelligence sources indicate that the rescue incident is in a hostile area, request from the Chief, Combat Operations Division, the necessary air and ground forces to provide protection for search and rescue parties proceeding to the scene.
4. AIR EVACUATION: Missions will be coordinated through those agencies, civil or military, possessing a capability to evacuate wounded or injured personnel from forward locations.
5. MISSION: To provide immediate assistance to friendly personnel in distress due to combat operations.

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ANNEX B (Additional Procedures to be effective during periods of hostility within the Republic of Vietnam) to VN/US SAR Agreement

6. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS: Each operational unit will be under the command of its parent organization and subject to the operational control invested in the unified commander or his designated representative. All existing United States and Republic of Vietnam military and civil means of communication will be made available to the command controlling the SAR mission through the appropriate using agency.

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ANNEX C (Explanation of Terms) to VN/US SAR Agreement

Action (AT): The time which a preliminary communications search is initiated by an air traffic control agency.

Activity: A unit, organization, or installation performing a function or mission associated with search and rescue operations.

Aeromedical Evacuation: The movement of patients to and between medical treatment facilities by air transportation.

Aircraft Scramblings: Directing the immediate take-off of aircraft from a ground alert condition of readiness.

Air Route Traffic Control Center: The principal facility exercising enroute control of IFR flights within its area of jurisdiction. Each has communication capability to adjacent centers.

Air Command: A command which is composed of those organized elements of one or more of the armed services, designated to operate in specific geographical area, which are placed under a single commander; e.g., commander of a Unified Command, Area Commander.

Area of Responsibility: A designated area in which an activity is responsible for coordinating and controlling SAR Operations.

Case: The special circumstances relating to particular person or property requiring SAR operations.

Closed Mission: A mission which has resulted in the positive determination of the location of the search target and for which there exists no further requirement for rescuing the survivors or providing them with a means of survival.

Controlling Agency: An agency which has primary responsibility for a specific SAR mission and controls all operations incident thereto.

Coordination: The function of integrating efforts of SAR facilities for a concerted and harmonized execution of the SAR mission in an effective, economical manner.

Extended Communication Search: Contacting, by any means necessary, all agencies along a given route or in a given area that were not contacted by the Preliminary Communications Search and which may have or obtain information concerning the location or status of a SAR objective.

Facility: Any craft or device used to effect SAR operations.

False Alert: An incident or mission which is later proven false due to lack of a valid objective.

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ANNEX C (Explanation of Terms) to VN/US SAR Agreement

Incident: Any situation which required notification to, and alerting of SAR facilities and which may require SAR operations.

Incident Classification: Three phases in which an incident may be classified or progressed according to the seriousness of the incident and its requirement for rescue service.

Uncertainty Phase: Doubt exists as to the safety of a craft or its personnel because of lack of information concerning its position or because of knowledge of possible difficulties.

Alert Phase: Apprehension exists for the safety of a craft or its personnel because of a continued lack of information concerning its position or progress or because of definite information that serious difficulty would be unavoidable.

Distress Phase: Immediate assistance is required because of a continued lack of information concerning the position or progress of the craft or because definite information has been received that the craft or its personnel are threatened by grave or imminent danger.

Incident Processing: The procedure of receiving, evaluating and classifying incident reports; procuring and evaluating additional data; alerting and assigning mission control when rescue service is required; or terminating the incident if it is determined to be false or not requiring rescue service.

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO): An international organization consisting of contracting states (countries) whose objective is to establish international standards for aerial activity throughout the world.

JCS Commander: Commander of a command established by the Secretary of Defense.

Joint Search and Rescue Center: An installation staffed by supervisory personnel, from more than one participating service, and possessing sufficient facilities to direct and coordinate all available search and rescue facilities within a specified area.

Land Search: The search of terrain by earth-bound personnel.

Maritime SAR Region: The waters subject to the jurisdiction of The Republic of Vietnam and the high seas as outlined in VNAF Regulation 64-1.

Mission: Any situation which requires the dispatch of SAR facilities. A mission exists when the requirement for SAR operations has been determined, mission responsibility has been assigned to the appropriate Mission Coordinator and SAR facilities have been dispatched.

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ANNEX C (Explanation of Terms) to VN/US SAR Agreement

Mission Coordinator: An official designated by a SAR coordinator for coordinating and controlling a specific SAR mission.

Mission Log: A record, maintained by the Mission Coordinator, of all operational activity pertaining to one specific SAR mission.

On-Scene-Commander (OSC): An official who controls SAR operations and communications at the scene of a distress mission.

Operations Log: A record, maintained by rescue coordination centers, of all operational activities.

Preliminary Communication Search: Contacting through normal communication facilities, all agencies, along a given route or in a given area which may have obtained information concerning the location or status of a SAR objective.

Public Information: Information of a military nature, the dissemination of which through news media is not inconsistent with security, and the release of which is considered desirable by or non-objectionable to the responsible releasing agency.

Regional SAR Coordinator: The person responsible for coordinating and, as appropriate, directing SAR operations in a SAR Region.

Rescue: The removal of survivors from the site of a disaster or hazard to a place of safety.

Rescue Coordination Center (RCC): A primary SAR facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for coordinating and controlling SAR operations in a region, Sub-Region or Sector as defined by the National SAR Plan.

RCC Controller: The officer on duty in a rescue coordination center (RCC).

Rescue Cover: The deployment of rescue facilities over a given area.

Responsible Agency: The agency which is responsible for or has primary interest in the prosecution of SAR operations within a given area or for a specific SAR mission.

SAR Alert Notice (ALNOT): The notification given to interested agencies that an aircraft is overdue.

SAR Alert Status: Personnel and equipment immediately available and operationally ready to render SAR service.

SAR Alert System: The procedures by which personnel and equipment are scheduled and maintained on alert status to insure operational readiness.

SAR Alert Warning: The notification given to interested agencies that an aircraft position or arrival report is overdue.

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ANNEX C (Explanation of Terms) to VN/US SAR Agreement

Search: A systematic reconnaissance of a defined area, such that all parts of the area have passed within visual or electronic surveillance.

Search and Rescue (SAR): The employment of available personnel and facilities in rendering aid to persons and property in distress.

Search and Rescue Coordinator: The person responsible for coordinating and, as appropriate, directing SAR operations in a SAR Region, Sub-Region or Sector.

Search and Rescue Operations: All actions pertaining to the prosecution of a SAR incident or mission from the time of initial notification until the incident or mission is terminated.

Search and Rescue Operational Control: The temporary functions of control exercised by SAR Coordinators, SAR Mission Coordinators, and On-Scene-Commanders over available SAR forces for the purposes of prosecuting a specific SAR Mission.

Search and Rescue Region: The inland Maritime or overseas SAR Region as defined in the National SAR Plan.

Search and Rescue Sector: A geographic sub-division of a SAR Sub-Region.

Search Pattern: A systematic plan of search craft's track over a search area to assure complete and uniform coverage of an area.

Suspended Mission: A mission in which SAR units have been dispatched and search has been conducted, but due to uncontrollable circumstances such as unfavorable climatic conditions, exhaustion of information leads, thorough search with negative results, SAR operations have been temporarily discontinued pending further developments.

Unified Command: A joint force, under a single commander, which is composed of significant assigned or attached components of two or more services, and which is constituted and so designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or by a commander of an existing unified command which was established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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ANNEX D (Distribution) to VN/US SAR Agreement

PART I GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

<u>COMMAND</u>	<u>NO. OF COPIES</u>
DEFENSE MINISTER (INFO)	1
FIELD COMMAND	1
CHIEF JGS	1
SECRETARY JGS	1
PLAN STUDY BUREAU (JGS)	1
G-3/JGS	15
3 EACH CORPS HQ	9
HQ PARATROOP BRIGADE	10
HQ MARINE CORPS	10
VN CIVIL GUARD	2
NAVY HQ	10
VNAF HQ	10
JOC (2nd ADIV)	5
1st TRANSPORT GROUP	10
1st FTR SQ	3
2nd FTR SQ	3
1st HELI SQ	3
2nd HELI SQ	3
1st LN SQ	3
2d LN SQ	3
3rd LN SQ	3
I (ASOC)	1

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ANNEX D (Distribution) to VN/US SAR Agreement

II (ASOC)	1
III (ASOC)	1
BASE COMMANDER - TSN, BIEN HOA	10
TOURANE, NHA TRANG & PLEIKU	10
	130

PART II U.S. FORCESMACV

J3	2
J4	2
J5	2
J6	2
M&R FILE	1

MAAG

US ARMY SECTION	3
AIR FORCE SECTION	1
NAVY SECTION	1
ARMY AVIATION SECTION	1
STARCOM MAJOR RELAY STATION	1
1 EA CORPS SRADV	3

USA SUPPORT GROUP

S-1	1
S-3	1
1st AVIATION CO	3
45th TRANS BN	3
8th TRANS CO	3
18th AVIATION CO	3
57th TRANS CO	3

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ANNEX D (Distribution) to VN/US SAR Agreement

93rd TRANS CO	3
57th MED DET	3
81st TRANS CO	3
33rd TRANS CO	3
339th DS CO	3
232d SIG BN	3
611 DS CO	3
23rd AVIATION DET	3
3rd RRU	3
CINCPAC (INFO)	3
JUSMAAG, THAILAND (INFO)	3
<u>U.S. AIR FORCE</u>	
6492 COMBAT COMBAT CARGO GP	4
6220th AB SQ	5
HQ 2nd ADIV	5
DET 2, ALPHA	3
JOC	2
I ASOC	1
II ASOC	1
III ASOC	1
HQ 13th AF (INFO)	5
HQ MATS (INFO)	2
HQ ARS (INFO)	3
HQ PARC (INFO)	2

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ANNEX D (Distribution) to VN/US SAR Agreement

DET 2, PARC	1
DET 3, PARC (JOC/SARCC)	15
6221 AB SQ	5
6222 AB SQ	5
6223 AB SQ	5
CRT 5-2	1
CRT 5-3	1

U.S. MARINES

CTU 79.3.5

TOTAL	³ 139
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PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

31 August 1964

No. 0003616

Colonel Walter F. Derck
Pacific Air Rescue Center
APO 953, San Francisco, Calif.

Dear Walt

Thank you for your letters of 30 July and 13 August. I am happy to hear that with the exception of a few minor problems, the USAF IG visit and our recent LBR moves were successful. I understand Colonel Rudolph has requested that your Center forward us information that you used in your briefing to the IG team. It is most important that we receive this information so we can take every possible precaution to preclude disagreeing with your briefing and items discussed with them.

I am inclined to believe that Lt Col Hartley's remarks were either not clear or misunderstood by your personnel. Colonel Hartley agreed with our concepts of supporting all commands to the utmost with our ZI resources. It must be pointed out, however, that in war planning the ZI capability must be programmed in the proper manner. This, as you are aware, includes the placing of these requirements in the appropriate contingency plans and obtaining JCS approval. When the rescue forces are approved in a contingency plan by JCS, they, of course, are automatically released when the contingency plan is implemented. It certainly behooves us to get our name and our force requirements in JCS approved plans for equipment requirement reasons as well as ZI release authority. It is my opinion that the more we can call attention to our forces at the JCS level, the more pressure we can bring to bear on the requirement for the programming of proper combat recovery equipment and forces. If you require help in determining the number and type of forces required for a contingency plan, or you need aid in the transportation portion of such a plan, do not hesitate to call on this headquarters for assistance. It is a well known fact that you don't get equipment unless you have a requirement to use it. Therefore, put the requirement in the CINCPAC plans and this will, in turn, add emphasis on our receiving adequate forces to meet the requirements.

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I noted in your 13 August letter that you indicated the CINCPAC staff apparently overlooked the requirement for rescue forces. Although it may have been overlooked by the CINCPAC staff, it is the responsibility of all reviewing agencies or implementing agencies possessing these CINCPAC plans, to ascertain whether or not the correct forces are programmed and bring it to the attention of the supported commander - in this case, CINCPAC. I was most gratified to note your alertness to CINCPAC's oversight and correction thereof.

Naturally, I expect my Centers and my Headquarters to make every possible effort to determine these errors or overlooked forces and take whatever action is necessary to make the correction, since it is virtually impossible for one organization to consider all possibilities connected with the writing of a contingency plan, even when using the enormous check lists that we use in writing these plans.

The ARS OPLAN 510 has given us some trouble. It was our original belief that this plan would be used when implementing a contingency such as the one just experienced. However, we now know that Hq USAF apparently does not intend to use it for tactical situations. The complete reason as to why, I cannot explain at this time. We are endeavoring to straighten this out. It may be necessary for us to write another plan, or amend 510, or just talk Hq USAF into saying that 510 will apply. In any event, we must consider that up to very recently, our LBR units were, what you might call "fixed in concrete" at their bases of operation. We must also consider that in moving tactical forces, Air Force may desire to move the rescue force that is based with the moving tactical force. It stands to reason that if you are clearing all fighters out of a base to an overseas location, you might as well take the LBR at that location. However, Hq USAF may be planning to move a recalled Reserve organization into this vacated base; therefore, it would be wise to leave the LBR in place and move another LBR that is not as vital to a base operation. All of these items must be considered and only the highest approving authority that considers all of the involved forces is in a position to make this decision. If we consider these factors, probably the 510 plan would not be appropriate. This leads us back to the paragraph above in that there is one thing sure - if our rescue forces are programmed and placed in properly approved JCS plans, this situation should be cleared up.

Considering the fact that this was the first time we have had a requirement to move our LBR units in relatively large numbers, and because of the operational control structure of these organizations that is imposed upon us and that they were not included in any kind of a JCS approved plan, I feel we did a very good job. Because of this operational control structure, we do not have an opportunity to rehearse

our mobility plans and as you know rehearsal is a "key to success."

Do not limit your rescue force requirement thinking to LBR's alone. If, in your opinion, you require fixed wing resources to satisfy some of your contingency plans, they should also be included and follow the same JCS planning cycle.

Your comments concerning the high morale of our people were exceptionally gratifying to me. I am indeed proud of the spirit and professional manner in which these "Rescuemen" responded in this critical deployment for a mission of national importance. I intend to express my appreciation to the officers and airmen involved through congratulatory letters to the Center Commanders concerned.

Please keep me advised on problems you may encounter and my staff will do their utmost to aid you in overcoming them.

Sincerely

SIGNED

ADRIEL N. WILLIAMS
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

23 March 1964

No. 0003618

Brig General Adriel N. Williams
Hq Air Rescue Service
Orlando AFB, Florida

Dear General Williams:

Since your last visit to the Pacific area many things have transpired, including many false starts triggered by PACAF due to a variety of reasons. We have been directed, in no uncertain terms, on two different occasions, to put helicopters in RVN as aircrew recovery vehicles. I am certain you have read the multitude of messages floating around between PACAF and USAF on this subject. It now appears that we are just before getting Air Force approval on the modification program for the HH-43B. As a matter of fact, agreement has been reached between General Gough, USAF, and General Martin, PACAF, via telephone. This gentlemen's agreement specifies that PACAF will provide three aircraft and USAF will provide three, all modified as outlined in your study dated 17 January 1964.

We have also received a copy of USAF message AFXOPH 61055 from PACAF. PACAF supported by PARC does not agree with this approach unless there is no alternative. We feel that any money available could be applied against procurement of a more desirable and capable aircraft. Incidentally, this is the first time the AFXOPH office symbol has entered into the controversial helicopter subject. All of our previous disagreement etc has come from the AFXOPD office symbol. You may understand the significance and personalities involved in this rapid swing to the other side of the problem, but to me, not knowing the people involved, it appears to be a change of emphasis, or possibly a change in policy, prompted by Secretary McNamara's recent trip out this way.

The move of the Tachikawa LBR to Yokota has hit a temporary stumbling block caused by MATS Regulation 92-2 and PACAF Regulation 92-7. When we attempted to have the PACAF directive changed we were told that MATS had directed their bases to adopt this attitude with the ARS LBR and what was "good for MATS was also good for PACAF." The problem stems from a co-location

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concept advanced by MATS and a statement to the effect that "degree of support furnished tenant LBR detachments must not jeopardize existing primary base fire fighting and aircraft rescue capability." We have brought this problem to the attention of the ARS staff and are continuing negotiations with PACAF to make fire fighters available. I fully expect that the difficulties will be resolved in sufficient time to permit the LBR transfer on 1 May 1964.

The move of the LBR from Naha to Kadena was disapproved by Fifth Air Force based on a proven higher incident and landing/takeoff experience at Naha than at Kadena. Since we can fly from Naha to Kadena with the FSK attached, it appears that we can service both bases with the fire suppression capability providing we can receive adequate advance notice from Kadena.

As you are aware, the 33d ARS received their HH-43B during the month. Major Lyell, my Standardization Officer, qualified the 33d ARS pilots and was well satisfied with their knowledge and demonstrated ability with the aircraft. The squadron has already gone operational with the HH-43, minus the fire suppression capability, and are placing the HH-19 in permanent storage pending transfer instructions. The helicopter section of the 33d ARS is now the only LBR in the Pacific area exceeding the desired 60 hour work week, and will continue to do so until additional pilots are received. A request for helicopter pilot augmentation was initiated by the 51st FIW on 6 August 1963 in accordance with AFR 55-18. This request was forwarded through proper PACAF command channels to MATS for manning action. On 20 January 1964 PACAF was notified that the request had been forwarded to USAF. We will attempt follow up action and would appreciate follow up from your headquarters.

During the early part of this month I made a quick trip to Clark to check on the numerous problems reported by the 31st ARS. There can be no doubt that the supply situation at Clark has had an exceedingly profound effect on the ability of the squadron to become operational. Another important factor is the absence of the Squadron Commander during this critical period. I found that numerous projects could be accomplished through aggressive self help and directed the squadron to accomplish these items without delay. George Lavin, the Wing Commander, has authorized a priority one for all of the squadron work orders and is rendering excellent support and understanding. Generally, the squadron was guilty of self sympathy and needed a job to keep them occupied. Accordingly, the 31st ARS was declared

marginally operational ready on 10 March 1964, and has already performed a number of orbit missions.

We have reviewed the ARS contingency recovery proposal for Project Gemini as contained in ARS message ARXDC 06-C-55 and have held an initial meeting with PACAF and CTF-130 personnel. There are naturally many vague areas in the entire Gemini program which will remain so until more definitive information is made available. There are certain areas where we disagree with the ARS concept for contingency recovery operations, particularly the relationship with planned recovery. It is noted that the above cited message commits practically 100% of the PACAF/ARS forces to contingency operations with limited resources in reserve to apply against the planned recovery requirement. PACAF has further raised the point that they have not been approached or been info addressees on the messages that have committed forces under their operational control. I am placed in an extremely untenable position in answering questions without having proper background material or knowledge. I would appreciate any information the headquarters may have and will also attempt to obtain a good briefing from Colonel Tatum during his visit.

I would like to request that you look at ARS message ARMMT-1 20-C-03. I feel that the message is curt, moderately insulting and does not recognize a critical operational problem.

Colonel Tatum will arrive Hickam 24 March and depart two days later. I will accompany him on his tour to the squadrons, and to Hong Kong. I am certain the Hong Kong merchants will miss you and Colonel McElroy.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

WALTER F. DERCK
Colonel, USAF

HEADQUARTERS
PACIFIC AIR RESCUE CENTER
AIR RESCUE SERVICE (MATS)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO 953, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

PROJECT CORONAL HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

13 August 1964

No 0003620

Brig General Adriel N. Williams
Hq Air Rescue Service
Orlando AFB, Florida

Dear General Williams:

1. Now that the present situation has finally settled down to just mild panic, I thought you might be interested in some of the impressions gained from this operation.
2. The outstanding manner in which ARS responded to an emergency type situation in the PACOM has gained us innumerable points with PACAF. Additionally, it has conclusively demonstrated the ARS ability to react to contingency operations and has indicated the intent of ARS to support such operations with professional type SAR forces. As you are probably aware, PARC personnel furnished representation on the PACAF Battle Staff continuously during the more demanding portion of this deployment. We were in a position to note the progress, correct errors and make recommendations for more effective use of the SAR forces. Being a member of the Battle Staff and having all information available on the AOB we were able to notice the lack of SAR forces and detect the fallacious planning on the part of the CINCPAC staff. This erroneous conception of complete deployment forces can be attributed to a single procedure -- the retention of coordination, decision making and approval authority at the JCS-CINCPAC level. When queried on the absence of SAR forces, even though they are properly included in the appropriate plan, the answer indicated that they had been overlooked by the CINCPAC staff. It took many hours to correct this oversight and secure JCS approval, political clearance and CINCPAC authority to move the forces.
3. The discussion above points out the erroneous nature of the concept under which we are presently operating -- that of considering SAR a separate package from the tactical forces. In my opinion,

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when tactical forces are deployed under the same set of circumstances as existed in this case, it is mandatory to consider the SAR forces as an integral part of the deployment. The presence of the ARS forces in the operating area is as important to morale and well being as the cooks, bakers and field maintenance personnel. In many cases, the ultimate success of a tactical operation may well depend upon the rapidity of ARS deployment and the effectiveness of employment when in place. We in ARS have been highly successful in publicizing our precautionary orbit service, sometimes to the point where tactical operations are aborted due to the absence of such service. I feel we should seek the same degree of recognition for our in place support of tactical forces deployed to remote areas.

4. This particular operation afforded the opportunity to exercise the ARS 510 Plan, but, unfortunately, from my vantage point, it did not go as smoothly as planned. My comments in this paragraph are not intended to "point the finger" at any organization, but are included to give your staff information upon which to base planning and follow up action. Generally, it is my impression that the CONUS LBR units are not properly prepared or equipped to implement the ARS 510 Plan under emergency conditions. The following deficiencies are noted for the information of your staff:

a. The personnel assigned to the Central Air Rescue Center arrived Hickam without official travel orders. This did not present any particular problem; however, had we had occasion to split the load at Hickam and use industrial fund aircraft for transportation to the forward operating location or to return personnel to the CONUS, the absence of orders could have been embarrassing.

b. Also, from the Central Air Rescue Center area, our inventory of equipment authorized by TA-016B indicated these personnel were poorly equipped for this type operation. We were informed that the equipment was on order and had been back ordered for an excessive period of time.

c. The personnel assigned to the Eastern Air Rescue Center, specifically the LBR from Maxwell AFB, were completely unprepared for this operation. They possessed no weapons and a minimum of field gear. We made up the shortages at Hickam to the best of our ability by utilizing WRM assets of the 1502d Air Transport Wing.


As a consequence, my Supply NCO is charged with 20 weapons. He sure hopes he gets them back. Again we were informed that the equipment was ordered but not received and that Maxwell AFB did not have the funds required to purchase weapons for the unit.

d. All personnel assigned to the CONUS Air Rescue Service squadrons were completely equipped for the job.

5. To remove some of the stigma attached to the deficiencies above, I can say that I have never encountered a more enthusiastic group of Air Force personnel. It made me proud to be a member of the same organization. Having briefed each individual as he went through Hickam, I can say that we did not receive a single complaint or note of discord. The attitude was generally, "Let's get to it and get the job done." You can be rightfully proud of this group of "Rescuemen."

6. I will be leaving here on 17 August for a complete tour of the area including the deployed sites. Will send you a brief report on my return.

Sincerely,



WALTER F. DERCK
Colonel, USAF
Commander

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

10 November 1964

No. 0003621

Brig General Adriel M. Williams
Hq Air Rescue Service
Orlando AFB, Florida

Dear General Williams:

1. I have just returned from a visit to SEA to coordinate the bed down of our new units at Bien Hoa and DaNang. I would like to report that all is well and that the publication of the ARS 563 plan solved all of the problems associated with the activation of new units; however, such is not the case. We still have problems with facilities and supply.

2. The ARS 563 plan, supported and augmented by volumes of messages from all echelons, did recognize the problems in organizing, moving and activating new units for SEA. Unfortunately, although PACAF, Thirteenth Air Force and 2d Air Division accepted the responsibility for certain actions, these actions evidently became lost in the accelerated buildup of USAF forces in RVN. We have problems in both the facilities and office supply areas.

a. Facilities:

(1) Bien Hoa. At the time the permanent unit arrived at this base no planning or preparation had been made to provide facilities, other than billeting. During my visit this point was discussed with the Base Commander and his Deputy for Materiel. Our requirements were made known to the Deputy for Materiel and he agreed to build the facilities from "in house" capability. Providing the recent Viet Cong attack on Bien Hoa and the resultant damage to Army housing does not interfere, we should have two 25 X 50 foot buildings erected in the helicopter operating area as a permanent home. These two buildings, combined with one air conditioned alert trailer and tents for storage, should make this a suitable facility.

(2) DaNang. We had considerably less luck at this base in securing facilities. DaNang has an extensive construction program underway, but is also the most active airfield in RVN. The result is that we do not have adequate facilities for our unit and at the time of my visit did not have anything programmed. This item was discussed with 2d Air Division, Thirteenth Air Force and PACAF. The ARS requirements have been made known and have been inserted into the programmed expansion of DaNang. The earliest we could expect suitable facilities

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would be 1 January 1965. In the meantime, we can get along with the marginal facilities previously used by the TDY unit, modified somewhat by the construction of additional cages in the hangar.

b. Office Furniture: The responsibility for providing office furniture for the two PCS units was assumed by PACAF and passed to Thirteenth Air Force for action. Although we have action messages in our file indicating certain items had been shipped to RVN for ARS support, we were unable to locate any furniture for issue. The Bien Hoa unit has received initial issue of a limited number of folding chairs and lockers; however, no executive chairs, desks, tables, etc are available in SEA for issue. In the case of DaNang, we encounter a similar problem, except that absolutely no furniture is available for issue. This point has also been discussed with 2d Air Division, Thirteenth Air Force and PACAF with the result that Fifth Air Force assets are being surveyed to obtain the voluminous shortages.

3. Regardless of the existing deficiencies in facilities and office furniture, the personnel in Detachments 4 and 5 are enthusiastic about their assignment and eager to get the job done. You have probably already noted considerable mission activity for the HH-43F in the reports coming from RVN and should note increased activity in the future. The HH-43F is an adequate aircraft to perform the vital ACR mission on an interim basis, but cannot be considered an ideal vehicle due to numerous serious performance deficiencies. Although auxiliary tanks have been installed for extended range, the aircraft still does not possess the range required to be applied "across the board" in all ACR missions in SEA. I feel we should be working on an ACR vehicle with a radius of action in the neighborhood of 350 - 400 miles. The "F" model range performance is adequate for most operations in RVN, but we must be concerned with our assigned ACR responsibilities in the event we are forced out of the RVN environment. I am still most impressed with the HH-3C and feel that this aircraft, with certain modifications to fit a combat role, is the eventual answer to world wide, effective wartime aircrew recovery as well as long range recovery during peacetime.

4. My recent visit to SEA included a three day visit to the 31st ARS. I continually have the feeling that the 31st is not performing to the high standards achieved by the other ARS squadrons in the Pacific area. In looking at the record of this squadron, I guess we could apply the old cliché, "You can't argue with success." Since 1 July 1964 the 31st ARS has flown 975 HU-16 hours including 780 operational hours, or 255 hours over commitment for the period. In addition, the support of SEA rendered by this squadron has been noteworthy. The squadron has made some mistakes in maintenance scheduling of their aircraft, but overall has done an exceptional job. I feel that the recent arrival of Lt Colonel Rybos as the squadron operations officer will result in much more efficient operational direction.

4. The recent proposal of General Graham regarding the utilization of MATS facilities at Guam is indeed a step in the right direction. Retention of the MB-3 maintenance dock for ARS use has always been my position and was reflected in a personal letter to you dated 17 September 1963. This position was evidently unpopular at MATS because I was informed that I would do no more negotiation for MATS facilities.

5. ARS activity in SEA in support of tactical operations has maintained a fairly steady tempo. As of 7 November 1964 we have expended 1628 total flying hours with the HU-16 accomplishing 1281 hours. This figure includes only support time in-country and does not indicate enroute time to and from home station. Every indication points to a maintenance of the present rate. In this connection, we have submitted a request for increased augmentation for the 33d ARS with the idea that we would eventually give the entire SEA responsibility to that squadron with limited assistance from the 31st ARS. This action would put us in good shape for eventual conversion of the 31st ARS to the HC-130. Your initial reaction to this request may be that we should use the HC-54 aircraft to satisfy the SEA requirements. Up to this point base loading and the water landing capability have been influencing factors in the exclusive utilization of the HU-16. Another factor is the loss of the HC-54 for the Gemini operation, which we cannot afford. We are presently checking the situation to determine if we could use the HC-54 at Korat for brief periods to give the HU-16 aircraft and crews a rest.

6. Based on present plans you are due Hickam on 29 November for your Pacific Command visit. Diplomatic clearance has been received for Taiwan and is expected momentarily for SEA. If General Estes' visit does not conflict, we will see you on 29 November.

SIGNED

WALTER F. DERCK
Colonel, USAF

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

26 September 1967

No 0003623

Colonel Donald T. Smith
 Commander
 PAC ARRC
 APO San Francisco 96553

Dear Don

I share fully your concern that the amount and quality of training being provided by the 48 ARRSq is not of the highest order. I agree that the letter from Al Lovelady portrays, from his end, a dismal commentary on the training of aircrews reporting for duty with the 36 ARRGp. Hopefully, the picture is not as bad as indicated, but if so, it is largely a reflection of the growing pains resulting from the conversion of the 48th into a Specialized Aircrew Training School this past July. Al's commentary will be most useful in enabling the 48th to take action to correct deficiencies where indicated.

As you know, the H-53 is a new weapons system in the Air Force's inventory. Consequently, there was little operational experience from which to draw in the development of a training program. The H-3 training program was adapted to the H-53 and expanded to include basic aircraft transition training. It is now apparent that many of the original goals in the H-53 program were optimistically ambitious. As the program progressed, some of these goals had to be tempered by experience and especially by equipment limitations.

The H-53 training has been hampered from the outset by equipment problems, and it has continually been delayed by slippage in aircraft delivery. The maintenance support of these aircraft hasn't lived up to our expectations. The 48th has experienced an average OR of 45.7%, an average NORM of 29.2%, and an average NORS of 25.1% from December 1966 through July 1967. These factors have had a most serious impact on the training program. When necessary, because of equipment malfunctions, training had to be simulated. As the reliability of the equipment increases, these deficiencies should decrease. Despite the simulated training, all personnel departing the 48 ARRSq fully qualified in the aircraft, although lacking in some phases of system qualification. A variance in the actual flying time for maneuvers may exist, since all students are qualified on a proficiency basis.

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In addition to the above problems, all of the training programs conducted by the 48 AFPSq were seriously degraded by the following factors:

- a. Delay in approval of MAC PAD 68-7 by higher headquarters.
- b. Insufficient lead-in time into the training environment.
- c. The lack of a school secretary (director) to coordinate and supervise the training activities and disapproval of additional manpower spaces needed to run it properly.
- d. The lack of academic instructors; the flight instructors must also prepare and present the ground school phases of instruction.
- e. The lack of selective manning of the instructor personnel.
- f. The lack of a stabilized tour for instructor personnel that results in a continuous instructor upgrade program on top of everything else.
- g. A lack of professional training aids and equipment. Actions have been taken or are underway to correct all of these deficiencies. However, they have had their effect on the quality of the training provided to the first few classes, and it must be realized that discrepancies may continue until some of these factors can be equitably resolved.

Some shortcomings noted in the air refueling training can be attributed to the last minute change in the concept of transporting the aircraft to SFA. Originally, the aircrews were to ferry the aircraft and thereby receive additional training in air refueling prior to their arrival in SFA. Familiarization training in air refueling is presented to all aircrew members. All pilots and flight engineers receive ground and flight training in the systems associated with air refueling.

Due to the limited capability of the 48th, in both airframes and personnel, it is impractical to fully qualify co-pilots to continue the mission to completion when the KCC is incapacitated. Because of these limitations, it is only possible to provide the co-pilot with sufficient training to enable him to return the aircraft to a point of safe return.

We concur with many of Al Lovelady's recommendations, but are unable to incorporate them into the training program at this time for

the reasons listed above. Until more resources are made available, the RCC training must be accomplished at the expense of the desired co-pilot program. Although the co-pilot does not receive flight instruction in all phases of the training, he does participate on many of the RCC flights as an observer.

We have recently forwarded a revised H-53 training package to MAC for approval. This package was developed to provide an orderly flow of replacement aircrews for the 580 plan and the follow-on program within the 48th's present and foreseeable capability. The new program had to reduce the flying training hours out of sheer necessity. The revised curricula depicted the minimum, not the desired training, and was introduced as an interim measure only. To offset the reduction of flying training hours at the 48th, the following prerequisites are mandatory:

- a. Completion of the ATC H-53 course by all pilots.
- b. Completion of a Sikorsky course in the aircraft systems by all pilots and flight engineers.

It has been an arduous time consuming, and very frustrating task to overcome training deficiencies such as those presented in Al's letter, but we are making headway and each subsequent class should show an increased qualification capability. Continued evaluations by the 3d ARRGp and constructive realistic comments will assist in reaching this objective. Al's comments are being forwarded to the 48th, and where at all possible his suggestions will be included in the curriculum.

Sincerely

SIGNED

ALLISON C. BROOKS, Brigadier General, USA
Commander

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
 HQ PACIFIC AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY CENTER (HAWAII)
 APO SAN FRANCISCO 96355

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY
 18 August 1967

No. 0003624

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER

Brigadier General Allison C. Brooks
 Commander
 ARRS

Dear General Brooks

For the past nine months PACAF has assisted Rescue by providing TDY personnel from its own resources for twelve ground radio operators required in 3d Group's RCCs. This PACAF assistance will end o/a 5 September 1967. Our PRCP message of 19 May 1967 explained the situation and our recommendations.

Det 7, MAC, advises that the spaces for these radio operators have been validated, but cannot be put into UMDs until a SEA ceiling increase has been approved. These twelve radio operator requirements are still listed on PACAF's priority listing of outstanding SEA manpower requirements, however their position on this list is such that major ceiling increases will have to be approved by Sec Def before enough spaces will be available to honor this requirement.

Since these radio operators are a critical and integral part of 3d Group RCCs, the only immediate solution to the ceiling restriction is a realignment of spaces which have been approved and authorized against the ARRS ceiling. Currently, ARRS ceiling authorizations add up to 403 spaces in Thailand and 779 spaces in South Vietnam. Included in these 1182 spaces are 33 spaces each for Loadmaster and Pararescue functions in the 39ARRSq. (Total 66) At present none of the 33 pararescue authorizations in the 39ARRSq are manned, 17 of the 33 loadmaster spaces are filled. (Loadmaster manning based on Col Beall's memo to ARPDC, 24 February 1967, (attached) and follow on ARPDC and 61st CBPO manning actions.) Since these 49 spaces are charged to the approved ARRS/MAC SEA ceilings, it appears that immediate solution to the radio operator problem would be a conversion of some of these spaces.

I realize that pararescue and loadmaster authorizations are in the aircrew function and as such they are controlled by USAF. However, the only unused authorizations for Rescue in SEA are those unused crew member authorizations. If we are to fill the radio operator requirement for the 3d Group JSARC operation (and this seems unavoidable) we should do so by converting some of our presently unused authorizations. I am attaching a recent letter from 3d Group which bears on this subject.

Sincerely

SIGNED

DONALD T. SMITH, Colonel, USAF
 Commander

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**HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois**

23 March 1962

SPECIAL ORDER

REC'D	NO. CYS
OFFICE	NO. CYS
COMD	1. Detachment 3, Pacific Air Rescue Center, is designated and organized
DCSG	2 at Saigon/Cholon FMO, Vietnam, effective 1 April 1962.
DCSP	2
DCM3	a. Mission category code is R-15.
DCM4	b. Unit kind code is 2274.
DCM4	c. Manpower authorizations and personnel will be furnished from
IS	sources under control of Commander Air Rescue Service.
SURG	HQ 50 2 (M/R)
IG	2 d. Unit will be equipped in accordance with the policies and procedures
ADJ	1 contained in AFR 400-32 and Volume XXI, AFM 67-1.
FLD UNIT	
GROUPS	e. Appropriate entries will be made in the Morning Report for the parent
SQ	unit in accordance with AFM 171-6. Action directed herein will be reported
EXTN	in accordance with AFR 20-49.
DATE	1. This is an organizationally funded unit.
APPROVED	Authority: AFR 20-27, 2 Oct 59.

2 - Det 3 PAC
2 - PACC
FOR THE COMMANDER

71.
AF-100
AF-100
W. A. ATKINS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

No. 0003629

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- 1 - (MAMEQ)
- 1 - (MAMLG)
- 1 - (MAMME)
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- 1 - (MABAC)
- 1 - (MABRI)

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PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

ARRS BRIEFING FOR GENERAL GOUGH AND USAF STAFF

7 FEBRUARY 1967

No

0003757

GENERAL GOUGH, ON BEHALF OF THE COMMANDER ARRS, WE WELCOME THIS

OPPORTUNITY TO BE ABLE TO DISCUSS OUR WORLD-WIDE SAR FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES, BOTH CURRENT AND PROGRAMMED, AND HOW THEY SPECIFICALLY PERTAIN TO YOU HERE IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER.

I HAVE JUST RECENTLY RETURNED FROM A TOUR THROUGHOUT SOUTHEAST ASIA WHERE WE BRIEFED YOUR COUNTERPARTS IN PACAF ON THIS SAME SUBJECT.

ALSO, I BRIEFED HQ SAC'S STAFF ON WORLD-WIDE SAR COVERAGE IN NOVEMBER 66.

TODAY, SEARCH AND RESCUE FORCES IS A SUBJECT OF VITAL CONCERN TO EVERY THEATER COMMANDER AND TO EVERY LEVEL OF COMMAND WITHIN THE ENTIRE MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE.

WE HAVE SUDDENLY CHANGED FROM THE SERVICE THAT WAS FOR YEARS NOTED FOR ITS ANTIQUATED, CAST-OFF RECONFIGURED FIXED WING AIRCRAFT THAT EARNED US THE REPUTATION AS THE OUTFIT THAT COULD "SEARCH, LOCATE AND WAIVE." NOW WITH THE ASSIGNMENT OF FIRST LINE SOPHISTICATED FIXED WING AIRCRAFT SUCH AS THE HC-130 WITH ITS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED RESCUE AND RECOVERY SUBSYSTEMS, I.E., SURFACE TO AIR AND AIR TO AIR RECOVERY SYSTEMS, PLUS NEW HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTERS, HH-3S AND HH-53S WITH THEIR ADDED SPEED, RANGE AND LIFT CAPABILITY -- COUPLED WITH OUR NEW TEAM CONCEPT MADE POSSIBLE BY MATING THE HC-130 WITH THE HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTERS THROUGH THE AIR-TO-AIR REFUELING PROCESS -- WE NOW CAN SEARCH, LOCATE AND RECOVER

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PERSONNEL AND HARDWARE FROM JUST ABOUT ANY POINT ON THE SURFACE OF THIS EARTH. FOR EXAMPLE, WITHIN SIX MONTHS WE'LL BE FERRYING HH-53S ACROSS THE PACIFIC, AND FLYING AN HH-3 NON-STOP ACROSS THE ATLANTIC. WE'RE OUT OF THE ERA OF LITTLE FLUTTER-BUGS TIED TO THE FLAGPOLE AND INTO THE ERA OF CHALLENGING GLOBAL OPERATIONAL MISSIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, PICKING UP A 7-TON APOLLO COMMAND MODULE AND DELIVERING IT 1,000 MILES OVER WATER, REFUELING FROM THE HC-130 ENROUTE. DEEP PENETRATIONS INTO HOSTILE TERRITORY ON COMBAT RECOVERY MISSIONS HAS BECOME ROUTINE WITH THIS TEAM. HC-130S ARE NOW ACCOMPLISHING, ON A BI-MONTHLY BASIS, NON-STOP MISSIONS 4500 NM LONG WITH A SURFACE-TO-AIR RECOVERY AT MIDPOINT. RECOGNIZING THIS CHANGE IN SAR CAPABILITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES, I ASSURE YOU ARRS HAS BEEN WORKING HARD TO MEET THIS CHALLENGING MISSION. WE HAVE TAKEN EVERY ACTION TO SECURE THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT TO DO THIS EXPANDED JOB. THREE COMPREHENSIVE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS STUDIES (THE SILVER BOOK, GOLD BOOK, AND BLUE BOOK) WERE SUBMITTED THROUGH CHANNELS TO HQ USAF, WHICH RESULTED IN THE SUBMISSION OF TWO PCP'S -- FIRST IN 1965, THEN ANOTHER AGAIN IN 1966. TO GIVE YOU A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF ALL THE RAMIFICATIONS CONNECTED WITH OBTAINING SUFFICIENT SAR EQUIPMENT TO ACCOMPLISH THIS VITAL AND COMPLETELY VALIDATED MISSION, I HAVE BROUGHT WITH ME THE PCP BRIEFING THAT WAS PRESENTED TO THE AIR STAFF ON THE SAR REQUIREMENT LAST JULY. SELECTED PORTIONS OF THIS WILL GIVE YOU A COMPLETE PICTURE OF WHAT HAS BEEN DONE, BY WHOM, AND THE RESULTING DECISIONS BY THE AIR STAFF, JCS AND THE DOD THAT WILL GOVERN THE SAR CAPABILITIES SITUATION FOR THE PRESENT AND NEAR FUTURE.

FIRST, IN MAY 1966, AN ALL COMMAND MESSAGE WENT OUT FROM USAF REQUESTING PROJECTED SAR REQUIREMENTS. WITH THIS INFORMATION IN HAND, COLONEL PAUL LESKE, ARRS DCS/PLANS AND MYSELF ASSISTED THE AIR STAFF PROJECT OFFICER IN PREPARING PCP 66-27.

QUOTE FROM PCP 66-27

APPROVED BY-AIR STAFF PANEL

AIR STAFF BOARD

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBMITTED TO OSD

REVIEWED BY JCS

OBJECTED TO BY NAVY

LAST MINUTE BEFORE REVIEW BY JCS CHIEFS -- NAVY WITHDREW OBJECTION!

PCP 66-27 RECEIVED RED STRIPE -- CLEAR JCS APPROVAL FORWARDED TO OSD.

I MIGHT ADD THAT THIS REQUIREMENT RECEIVED 100% BLUE-SUIT BACKING PLUS ARMY AND NAVY -- A POSITION WE NEVER ENJOYED PRIOR TO THIS.

RESULTS OF OSD REVIEW ARE BEST OUTLINED BY A LETTER DATED 29 DECEMBER 1966 TO GENERAL ESTES, COMAC, FROM MAJ GENERAL JACK CATTON, DIRECTOR OF AEROSPACE PROGRAMS, WHICH I QUOTE IN PART:

QUOTE "I HAVE REVIEWED THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE AIR STAFF DURING THIS BUDGET CYCLE TO BUILD AND HOLD THE RESCUE FORCE. HEREIN IS A BRIEF OF THOSE ACTIONS LEADING TO THE OSD FINAL BUDGET DECISIONS.

AS A RESULT OF ARRS PROJECT REQUIREMENTS STUDY II, THE PCR WAS SUBMITTED TO OSD REQUESTING ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT AS FOLLOWS:

- A. 26 HH-3E'S, WHICH WOULD INCREASE UE FROM 43 TO 64.
- B. 41 HC-130H'S, TO INCREASE THE UE FROM 54 TO 91.

OUR ACTION ON THE "SAFE RETURN" STUDY OF LAUNCH ABORT AND POST-DE-ORBIT RECOVERY WAS SUBMISSION OF ANOTHER PCR IN NOVEMBER 1966. THIS PCR REQUESTED 30 ADDITIONAL HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTERS TO INCREASE THE UE FROM 6 TO 27.

OSD DISAPPROVED BOTH THESE PCR'S. IN PROGRAM CHANGE DECISIONS F-6-021 AND F-6-041 DATED 38 NOVEMBER 66 AND PROGRAM BUDGET DECISIONS 245 AND 246 DATED 13 DEC 1966. THE DISAPPROVAL WAS GIVEN PENDING EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES AND FURTHER DETERMINATION OF NASA'S REQUIREMENTS.

RECLAMAS ON THESE TWO DECISIONS WERE SUBMITTED TO OSD ON 19 DEC 1966. THESE ACTIONS WERE BASED ON DATA CONTAINED IN THE REPORT OF THE JOINT DOD/NASA/SERVICES GROUP AND ALSO A RE-EVALUATION OF SEASIA ATTRITION. THE JOINT GROUP RECOMMENDED DEPLOYMENT OF 22 HC-130H FOR SPACE OPERATIONS AT A 22% USAGE RATE AND 3 HH-53'S FOR LAUNCH ABORT RETRIEVAL. THE RECLAMA REQUESTED THE FOLLOWING PROCUREMENT TO BE FUNDED.

	<u>FY 1967</u>	<u>FY 1968</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HC-130H		15	15
HH-3E	4	6	10
HH-53B	4	3	7

THE TEN HH-3E'S AND FOUR HH-53B'S WERE TO PROVIDE ESTIMATED ATTRITION REPLACEMENT THROUGH FY 1974. THREE HH-53B'S ARE ADDED UE AND IS THE NUMBER SPECIFIED BY THE JOINT STUDY GROUP FOR LAUNCH ABORT RETRIEVAL. THE FIFTEEN HC-130H'S ARE ADDED UE -- THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM. THE QUANTITY OF FIFTEEN WAS DERIVED BY USING A 75% IN-COMMISSION RATE AGAINST THE 54 UE WHICH PROVIDES 41 AIRCRAFT. WITH ELEVEN COMMITTED TO SEA AND 22 DEPLOYED TO SPACE SUPPORT, THERE WILL BE EIGHT HC-130H'S REMAINING FOR ARRS NON-SEA MISSIONS. THESE EIGHT WITH THE ADDITIONAL FIFTEEN WOULD PROVIDE FOUR AIRCRAFT FOR SAR COVERAGE IN THE ATLANTIC, FIVE FOR SAR IN THE PACIFIC AND FOURTEEN FOR EMERGENCY ALERT.

REPLY TO OUR RECLAMA RESULTED IN APPROVAL TO PROCURE EIGHT HH-53'S; FOUR IN FY67 AND FOUR IN FY 68. THE OSD RATIONALE FOR THE PARTIAL APPROVAL IS:

THE ATTRITION WAS BASED ON SEA LOSS OF THREE HH-3'S IN THE LAST TWO QUARTERS OF THIS FISCAL YEAR (1967). WE PROJECTED THIS TO AN ATTRITION OF ONE PER QUARTER THROUGH THE PROGRAM PERIOD. OSD QUESTIONS THE VALIDITY OF THIS PROJECTION BECAUSE OF LIMITED ACCRUAL DATA. APPROVED HH-53 BUY WAS BASED ON PROTECTING PRODUCTION OPTIONS THAT COULD BE EXPANDED SHOULD INCREASED ATTRITION TRENDS DEVELOP. ALSO, OSD FEELS THE HH-53 PROVIDES GREATER CAPABILITY AND SHOULD ULTIMATELY REPLACE THE HH-3 THROUGH ATTRITION. WE THINK THIS IS SATISFACTORY FOR THE PRESENT.

THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE NASA REQUIREMENT AND CURRENT FUNDING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN NASA AND OSD HAS CAUSED OSD TO DEFER A DECISION ON AN ADDITIONAL HC-130 AND HH-53 BUY TO SUPPORT THE FUTURE SPACE RECOVERY MISSION.

IN SUMMARY:

A. OSD WILL NOT RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR INCREASED UE IN THE ARRS AND WILL APPARENTLY ONLY ACT IF AND WHEN NASA UNEQUIVOCALLY STATES ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

B. ATTRITION FOR THE HELICOPTER PORTION OF THE FORCE IS SATISFIED FOR THE PRESENT AND PRODUCTION OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR THE FUTURE." UNQUOTE THIS PRETTY WELL SUMS UP WHERE WE STAND TODAY. HOWEVER, SINCE OSD DISAPPROVED THESE PCP'S PENDING FURTHER EVALUATION AND DETERMINATION OF NASA'S SPACE RECOVERY REQUIREMENTS, I BELIEVE WE MAY HAVE A DEVELOPMENT IN THIS AREA THAT COULD GIVE US SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT.

AS A RESULT OF THE TREMENDOUS SAVINGS INDICATED BY THE "SAFE RETURN STUDY," WHICH RECOMMENDED THE FEASIBILITY OF USING HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTERS TEAMED WITH HC-130 AIRCRAFT TO ACCOMPLISH THE ENTIRE SPACE RECOVERY PROGRAM, REPLACING THE NAVY'S LARGE CARRIERS AND DESTROYERS, HQ USAF DIRECTED A JOINT ARRS-NASA FEASIBILITY TEST PROGRAM, TITLED COMBAT HARVEST, TO PROVE OR DISPROVE THAT THIS WAS A FEASIBLE AND PRACTICAL METHOD OF RECOVERY FOR THE SPACE PROGRAM. AS A RESULT, WE HAVE JUST COMPLETED PHASE I OF THIS TEST. LAST MONTH, THE HH-53 FULLY DEMONSTRATED THAT IT CAN PICK UP THE 7-TON APOLLO CAPSULE AND FLY UP TO 140 KTS WITH NO PROBLEM AT ALL, PLUS BEING ABLE TO SUSTAIN SAFE FLIGHT EVEN ON SINGLE ENGINE. -- SO HERE WE MAY GAIN SOME RELIEF.

TO SHOW YOU WHAT THIS PCP WOULD HAVE MEANT TO YOU, THIS CHART SHOWS THE BED-DOWN OF THE SAR FORCES IF PCP 66-27 HAD BEEN APPROVED. NOTE A TOTAL OF 24 HC-130'S AT MORON, LAJES AND WHEELUS, AND 14 HH-3'S AT LAJES, MORON, GIGLI AND WHEELUS.

HOWEVER, SINCE THAT WAS NOT APPROVED, THE PROJECTED BED-DOWN, POST SOUTHEAST ASIA IS:

NOTE A TOTAL OF 10 HC-130S,

10 HH-3S.

HOWEVER, THE HH-3 WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

WITH THESE VERY LIMITED SAR FORCES, HQ AIR FORCE WAS REQUIRED TO
ESTABLISH THESE PRIORITIES ON UTILIZATION OF OUR RESOURCES, WHICH WE WILL
HAVE TO LIVE WITH FOR SOME TIME.

EVEN IF WE DID GET A REVERSAL OF THE OSD DECISION, WITH THE BUDGET
CYCLE, IT WOULD BE $2\frac{1}{2}$ YEARS BEFORE ANY DELIVERY OF AIRCRAFT COULD BE
REALIZED.

CHRONOLOGY
of the
AIR RESCUE SERVICE (MATS)
1 July 1964 - 30 June 1965

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
DO NOT DESTROY

No. 0003773

Historian
Office of information
Headquarters ARS
October 1965

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ARS CHRONOLOGY

1 July 1964 - 30 June 19651964

1 Jul Det. 3, 36th ARSq, Itazuke AB, Japan, was discontinued IAW MATS SO G-76, 1 Jun 64.

1 Jul Det. 17, WARC, was designated and organized at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, IAW MATS SO G-76, 1 Jun 64.

2 Jul Under the provisions of AFR 35-54, Colonel Donald E. Matthews assumed command of Hq Atlantic Air Rescue Center, effective this date, vice Colonel Harlan C. Wilder, relieved.
Authority: Hq AARC, SO 214, 2 Jul 64.

15 Jul Det. 4, EARC, Westover AFB, Massachusetts, was discontinued 15 Jul 64 IAW MATS SO G-83, 10 Jun 64.

20 Jul Hq ARS lead all organizations on Orlando AFB in the recent bond drive with a 32% increase in participation.

23 Jul Minor accident, HH-43B, #62-4551, Det. 5, AARC. Engine failure in hover resulted in a hard landing. No injuries were suffered by Lt. Charles Dunn, pilot, or other crew members.

26 Jul Lt. Col. Robert I. Hodson was designated Comptroller of ARS, VICE Lt. Col. Donald H. Gehri, in 1360 ABGP SO P-237. 11 Aug 64.

30 Jul Det. 17, WARC, Davis Monthan AFB, Arizona, began equipping 30 Jul 64 when two HH-43B helicopters were received.

1 Aug The 301st Air Rescue Squadron (Reserve) completed a two-week active duty training period at Ellington AFB, Texas, on this date and returned to Homestead AFB, Fla.

7 Aug Five thousand dollars were received for funding an alteration and airconditioning project of the MATS HU-16/HC-54 school at Eglin AFB, Fla.

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- 9 Aug The 55th Air Rescue Squadron, Kindley AFB, Bermuda, which received its first HC-97G on 18 May received its last on 9 August thereby becoming the first squadron to be fully re-equipped with this type aircraft.
- 10-14 Aug HC-130H Recovery Kit. Personnel of the 48th Air Recovery Squadron performed handling tests on the recovery kit which consisted of:
- (a) Erecting a 680-foot balloon station on the land and in the open sea by single survivors unfamiliar with the recovery kit or its operation.
 - (b) Erecting of the balloon station in the water by a three-man trained pararescue team.
 - (c) Evaluating the bouyancy and water proof characteristics of the kit.
 - (d) Evaluating the maintenance aspects of the kit to be performed by pararescuemen.
 - (e) Evaluating the validity of deploying the kit in an MA-1 kit type configuration. These tests conducted under the supervision of AFSC's Aeronautical Systems Division and in concert with Lockheed-Georgia Company indicated that recovery kit which consists of two helium bottle packages, one accessory package (balloon, lift line and personnel suits/harness), and two six-man rafts appears to be manageable by mobile survivors without previous knowledge of the kit. However, it was apparent that familiarization training would considerably reduce the time period required for the recovery operation. The most serious problem associated with kit maintenance will probably be the charging of helium bottles and the means of periodically checking the helium charge. The MA-1 kit type configuration appeared to be the most feasible for deploying the recovery kit on water surfaces.
- 15 Aug The 76th Air Rescue Squadron, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, became the third Air Rescue squadron to re-equip with HC-97G aircraft when it received the first HC-97G on 15 August. The squadron completed its re-equipping action on 3 November with receipt of the last aircraft.
- 1 Sep The following units were designated and organized:
- Det. Prov, First, Bien Hoa AB, Viet Nam, IAW MATS SO G-122, 19 Aug 64, as amended by G-131, 16 Sep 64 and G-160, 27 Oct 64.
 - Det. Prov, Second, Da Nang Airport, Viet Nam, IAW MATS SO G-122, 19 Aug 64, as amended G-131, 16 Sep 64 and G-160, 27 Oct 64.
 - Det. Prov, Third, Nakhon Phanom Airport, Thailand, IAW same orders cited above.
 - Det. Prov, Fourth, Korat R.S.I., Thailand, IAW MATS SO G-122, 19 Aug 64.

- 11 Sep An Air Rescue Service liaison office was established at Patrick AFB. It is located in the National Range Division Building 425, Room 1-172, telephone 494-4730. The primary function of this office is to provide ARS liaison and planning capability to the DOD representative of Project Gemini and space follow on subjects. A secondary function includes providing ARS liaison to NRD, AFETR and any other base or local function required by this headquarters. This office is manned by Mr. Robert F. Shrigley who works directly for the Vice Commander ARS and will respond with capabilities to the requirements of any ARS agency to include ARS units, i.e., squadrons, centers and detachments.
- 15 Sep Det. 2, 36th ARSq., was designated and organized at Yokota AB, Japan, IAW MATS SO G-119, 14 Aug 64.
- 18 Sep The QOR for air/air refueling CH-3C helicopter from HC-130H aircraft has been approved by USAF for feasibility study.
- 18 Sep ARS was allocated 30 additional Airman First Class authorizations effective FY 3/65. Hq MATS advised that a recent change to AFM 39-1 reflects a minimum grade of A1C for pararescue authorizations, whereas the previous minimum grade was SSgt.
- 25 Sep The first two modified HH-43F helicopters have been declared available at Kaman. These helicopters are for support of ARS Programming Plan 563.
- 29 Sep The 58th Air Rescue Squadron, Wheelus AB, Libya, received its first HC-97G aircraft on 22 Jun. The last aircraft of this type was received in this squadron on 29 Sep 64, thereby completing the reequipping of the second squadron to receive this type aircraft.
- 1 Oct Det. 15, EARC, was designated and organized at Patrick AFB, Fla., effective this date, to support the Air Force Eastern Test Range. This unit is to be equipped with the CH-3C helicopter which is new to Air Rescue Service.
- 5 Oct ARS Project Clean Sweep II. This project was initiated on 5 October to review all outstanding TCTO's for necessity and to initiate actions to reduce actions to reduce our outstanding 4,000-manhour backlog (as of 21 Sep) to the lowest possible figure.
- 8 Oct Det. Prov, First, (CH-3C Test) Hq ARS, was discontinued at Tyndall AFB, Fla., effective this date. Authority: Hq MATS SO G-140, 29 Sep 64.

- 9 Oct ARS OP Order 490/64 (Project King's Ransom) distributed to staff agencies, AARC and ZI Centers. This OPS order outlined the requirements to provide helicopter support coverage for the Ethiopian-U.S. Mapping Survey of the 70th Photo Mapping Wing Aerial Survey Team #4 located in Azamara, Ethiopia.
- 12-24 Oct Gemini training team visit. A Gemini training team from NASA and ARS visited all Atlantic squadrons and AARC between these dates. Basic indoctrination on the Gemini program and electronic training was accomplished at all units. Pararescue collar training was performed at the 58th ARSq for all Atlantic area pararescue personnel during 19-24 October.
- 20 Oct Det. 4, PARC, Bien Hoa AB, Viet Nam was designated and organized IAW MATS SO G-116, 10 Aug 64, as amended by G-131, 16 Sep 64.
- 20 Oct Det. 5, PARC, was designated and organized at Da Nang Airport, Viet Nam, effective this date. The primary mission is aircrew recovery and the secondary mission is local base rescue. Authority: Hq MATS SO G-131, 16 Sep 64.
- 20 Oct Det. Prov, First, and Det. Prov, Second, Hq PARC, were discontinued, effective 20 Oct 64. Authority: Hq MATS SO G-131, 16 Sep 64.
- 22 Oct The "F" series of the HH-43 helicopter which is combat configured with armor to withstand enemy fire was delivered as follows: Two on 22 Oct 64; two on 3 Nov 64 and two on 17 Nov 64 for a total of six to be used in Southeast Asia.
- 23 Oct ARS Programming Plan 560 "HC-130H Conversion Equipage of Air Rescue Squadrons with HC-130H Aircraft" was distributed today by DCS/Plans.
- 23 Oct HC-97G galley and crew rest equipment. Chief of Staff Air Force approved the installation of galleys and bunks in the HC-97G aircraft on a no cost in modification money basis. Equipment within the Air Force assets would be used and work will be accomplished at base level.
- 26 Oct Promotions. The ARS airman promotion board convened on 26 Oct for the 1 December '64 cycle. Lt. Col. Reid, commander 54ARSq, was president of the board.

- 26 Oct Fifty-hour phase inspection HH-43B. ARMMT-4 sent a message to the field authorizing a 50-hour phase interval for all HH-43B aircraft. This will result in a substantial manhour saving and increased operational flexibility and availability.
- 26-30 Oct The USAF IG team visited Western Air Rescue Center on these dates, accompanied by Lt. Col. Hicks, representative of this headquarters.
- 27 Oct 64 Paragraph 1, Hq MATS SO G-131, 16 Sep 64, as pertained to the discontinuance of Det. Prov, First, Hq PARC, Bhen Hoa AB, Viet Nam, and Det. Prov, Second, Hq PARC, Da Nang Airport, Viet Nam, was revoked. Authority: Hq MATS SO G-160, 27 Oct 64.
- 29 Oct - ARS, through CARC, supported Exercise Gold Fire I. Major Lane, 13 Nov CARC, was mission commander of ARS forces.
- 28 Oct ARS OPS Order 413-64, Air Rescue Support for GT-2, was issued to all participating units on this date.
- 3 Nov The last of the HC-97G aircraft was accepted from Fairchild Stratus Corporation, St. Augustine, Fla., and delivered to the 76th Air Rescue Squadron at Hickam. That completed the delivery of the first new type aircraft received by ARS which began on 18 May when the first HC-97 was delivered to the 55th Air Rescue Squadron at Kindley AFB, Bermuda.
- 10 Nov Det. Prov, First (SAR), Atlantic Air Rescue Center, was designated and organized at Azamara Airport, Ethiopia, effective this date, and attached to Hq AARC. Personnel and equipment were provided by ARS. Authority: Hq MATS SO G-162, 30 Oct 64.
- 12 Nov The last HC-97G to be accepted by this command arrived at the 76th ARSq, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, on 12 Nov 64.
- 16 Nov Rotor blades -- HH-43B. The prohibition from flight in rain with the HH-43 rotor blade has been lifted. All Goodyear thin flaps on ARS aircraft have been replaced.
- 16 Nov Det. Prov, Third, Hq PARC, was discontinued at Nakhon Phanom Airport, Thailand, effective this date. Authority: Hq MATS SO G-171, 16 Nov 64.
- 19 Nov Secretary of Defense McNamara announced the transfer of Orlando AFB from the Air Force (MATS) to the Navy in 1967 and the movement of Hq ARS to Scott AFB, Ill., in the same year.

- 28 Nov HH-19 helicopter leaves ARS. The last helicopters of this type to be disposed of by ARS were reclaimed in place and dropped from ARS records on 28 Nov 64.
- 4 Dec The last HH-43B Kaman helicopter for ARS is available for pickup. Prior to delivery to Det. 14, EARC, at MacDill AFB, this helicopter will undergo prototype installation of C&E equipment at MAAMA estimated to consume five working days.
- 8 Dec The HC-130H aircraft which is being built for ARS by Lockheed Marietta was test flown on 8 Dec 64. This aircraft has longer range than any other aircraft assigned to ARS and is fitted with special tracking and communications equipment designed for the ARS mission.
- 8-9 Dec The 54th Air Rescue Squadron, Goose Bay, Labrador, Newfoundland, completed Operation Reindeer, the aerial drop of 2,500 lbs. of holiday gifts to the residents of the bleak Labrador coast.
- 11 Dec USAF has directed ATC to put 75 non-prior service basic trainees into pararescue training. These three groups of 25 each will begin training in late February, late March and late July 1965. This input, if favorable training completion is attained, will bring our Rescue strength close to our increased authorizations. However, they will be graduating several months later than the effective date of new authorizations.
- 11 Dec The Atlantic Air Rescue Center has been awarded the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award for outstanding service during the period 1 January 1962 to 31 December 1963.
- 14 Dec Minor aircraft accident, HH-43B, 58-1858, Det. 10, CARC. The fuel governor failed and the aircraft landed on the fire suppression kit. Neither 1st Lt Arthur F. Machado or his crew members were injured.
- 16 Dec ARS pararescuemen made a night jump into the ocean 600 nautical miles southeast of Bermuda to aid a critically injured seaman aboard a Honduran freighter. This is the first known night jump into the ocean for medical aid.

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- 17 Dec Specific Operational Requirement (SOR) 203 defined the performance and configuration requirements for a weapons system to meet the specific operational requirements of the ARS mission, and resulted in development of the HC-130H aircraft. USAF revised SOR 203 on 17 Dec 64, to include air-to-air retrieval of materiel as part of the ARS mission with operational capability to be attained by FY66/2 (Oct 1965). This requirement was originally established by this headquarters in May 1964.
- 18 Dec The 57th Air Rescue Squadron has been awarded the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award for exceptionally meritorious service from 1 June 1959 to 31 December 1963.
- 18 Dec Det. 1, 54 ARSq, has been awarded the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award for exceptionally meritorious service from 1 June 1963 to 31 May 1964. Detachment 1 is at Thule AB, Greenland.
- 21 Dec Minor aircraft accident, HH-43B, 62-4559, Det. Prov, First, AARC. The aircraft landed in Ethiopian rough mountain terrain due to weather and the auxiliary gear was broken off. No injuries were suffered by Lt. Tommy L. Brown, pilot, or his crew members.

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- 11 Jan Authority was granted by MATS to ARS to designate Agent Contracting Officers in remote areas world-wide.
- 15 Jan Det. 16, CARC, was designated and organized at McConnell AFB, Kansas, effective this date. This is a Local Base Rescue Detachment. Authority: Hq MATS SO G-166, 9 Nov 64.
- 16 Jan An Air Rescue Service maneuver exercise was conducted by the five Reserve squadrons on Saturday, 16 Jan 65, at Nellis AFB, Nevada.
- 19 Jan ARS provided the following support for Gemini-Titan 2, unmanned sub-orbital flight:
- Aircraft: 3 HC-97G, 7 HC-54D, 3 HU-16, 3 CH-3C.
- Personnel: 156 including 32 pararescuemen none of whom parachuted since the spacecraft was recovered by a USN carrier.
- Support for this flight had been positioned earlier in the month but was then released to return home due to a delay.

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- 22 Jan Det. 16, CARC, McConnell AFB, Kansas, was organized 15 Jan 65, and began equipping with HH-43B helicopters on 20 January 65.
- 22 Jan A flight surgeon is once again assigned to Hq Air Rescue Service. USAF approved an increase in headquarters manpower ceiling to enable a transfer of one medical officer space and two staff sergeant spaces from our field units. Dr. Robert A. Gay arrived on this date.
- 1 Feb The 48th Air Rescue Squadron was redesignated the 48th Air Recovery Squadron and reorganized under appropriate UMD, effective 1 February 65. This is the first of the Air Rescue Service squadrons to be redesignated to reflect the new mission. Authority: Hq MATS SO G-163, 5 Nov 64.
- 1 Feb Under the provisions of AFR 35-54, Colonel Lucian A. Dade, Jr., assumed command of Eastern Air Rescue Center, effective this date. Authority: Hq EARC SO 336, this date.
- 2 Feb Major accident, HH-43B, 59-1567, Det. Prov, First, AARC, Ethiopian support mission. Aircraft crashed attempting a go-around from a mountain site at 11,500 feet. No injuries. Pilot was Capt. Kael G. King.
- 6 Feb The 305th Air Rescue Squadron (Reserve) was at Brookley AFB, Alabama, for their annual 15-day active duty tour during the period 6-20 February 1965. The Chief of Reserve Affairs, Major Murihead, and SMSgt. Maloney made an advisory visit from 8 to 11 Feb 65.
- 18 Feb Det. 9, Hq ARS, was discontinued at Olmstead AFB, Pa., effective 1 Apr 65. Authority: Hq MATS SO G-20, 18 Feb 65.
- 28 Feb MATS advised that effective 1 September 65 the ARS Manpower and Organization Office would be discontinued and personnel would be merged with Detachment 36, MATS, Orlando AFB, Fla. This action is based on that part of USAF project ECONOMAN pertaining to the centralization of manpower activities. Similarly, APCS and base M&O offices will merge with Detachment 36, and this detachment will serve all units on the base from a centralized office.
- 8 Mar Colonel Allison C. Brooks, 4361A, assumed command of Air Rescue Service (MATS) vice Brig. Gen. Adriel N. Williams, 1970A, relieved. Authority: Hq Air Rescue Service (MATS), SO G-11, 8 Mar 65.

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- 8 Mar Det. 15, EARC, organized 1 October 64, received the last of four CH-3C helicopters on 8 March 65 for use in support of the Air Force Eastern Test Range at Patrick AFB, Fla.
- 19 Mar Minor aircraft accident, HH-43B, 59-1549, Det. Prov, Second, PARC. Hard landing sheared main gear. No injuries. Pilot was Captain Larry Salmons.
- 19 Mar The 58th Air Rescue Squadron was designated to share in the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award recently awarded to the 464th Troop Carrier Wing for participating in Operation DRAGON ROUGE from 20 November 64 to 28 November 64.
- 23 Mar ARS provided the following support for Gemini-Titan 3, manned orbital flight of Astronauts Grissom and Young.
- Aircraft: 17 HC-97G, 16 HC-54D, 4 HU-16B, 4 CH-3C.
 Personnel: 486, including 97 pararescuemen, of which two (TSgt. Johnson and A2C Poole) parachuted to the capsule in the Atlantic Ocean and were the first persons to reach the astronauts.
- March 65 Hq ARS was awarded the MATS Commander's Trophy for the most effective composite ground accident program for 1964. The trophy was awarded and presented by the Commander, MATS, at the Commanders' Conference, Ramey AFB, P. R., and cited this headquarters outstanding accomplishments in industrial, traffic and recreational safety. (Reference ALMATS message MAIOS-G ALMATS 132/65 Mar 65).
- 1 Apr Det. 9, Hq ARS, Olmsted AFB, Pa., was discontinued, IAW MATS SO G-20, 18 Feb 65.
- 8 Apr Colonel Allison C. Brooks, Commander ARS, and staff personnel visited MATS on 8 April to brief the MATS staff on the proposed ARS Force Structure 1965-1975. The formal ARS documentation "Air Rescue Service 1965-1975" was prepared as a coordinated Hq ARS effort and embraces the entire spectrum of ARS requirements, mission, equipment, aircraft, organization and doctrine. It was in essence a comprehensive look at ARS as it stands today, and the posture which it must achieve to meet the requirements of tomorrow. Following MATS coordination it was anticipated a presentation would be given to the Air Staff.
- 14 Apr Det. Prov, Third, Hq PARC, was designated and organized at Ubon Airfield, Thailand, effective this date and attached to Det. 3, PARC, for operational control. Authority: MATS SO G-39, 12 Apr 65.

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- 16 Apr Utilization of Reserve Squadrons. All five Air Rescue Service Reserve squadrons were extensively utilized during the week 9-16 April. Two squadrons, the 302d and 303rd, provided crews and airlift to support the 31st ARSq on "Two Buck" movement. The 301st provided a crew and aircraft to search for a DC-3 enroute from Haiti to Florida. The DC-3 was found by an HU-16 from the 301st. The 301st and 305th provided crews and aircraft in support of mission EARC-11 in search for two missing T-33's that had departed Craig AFB on a local flight. The 304th provided one crew and aircraft on strip alert in support of a NORAD exercise.
- 19 Apr Minor accident, HU-16B, 51-5294, 33 Air Rescue Squadron. Aircraft flown onto river at high speed and sustained damages. No injuries. Pilot was Captain Luther Waechter.
- 3 May Det. Prov, Fifth, Hq PARC, was designated and organized at Udorn AFD, Thailand, and attached to Det. 3, PARC, for operational control. Authority: Hq MATS SO G-47, 3 May 65.
- 4 May Det. Prov, Sixth, Hq PARC, was designated and organized at KungKuan Air Base, Taiwan, effective this date.
- 6 May Corrosion in the Air Force, FR 510, a film produced by ARS, in conjunction with APCS, was released.
- 14 May The HH-43B NORS rate for the month of April reached an all-time low of 5.6%. The major contributing item for the failure to achieve the MATS 5% standard was the accumulation of approximately 89 days NORS conditions due to lack of cargo hooks. The command average NORS rate for all types of aircraft was 4.3%.
- 21 May The ARS request to assign pararescue volunteers from the Pacific area to Viet Nam was indorsed by MATS to USAF. MATS supported our position of a 100% volunteer pararescue core in Viet Nam.
- 21 May SFP 1175a "The SAR Mission Coordinator" was distributed to USAF film libraries throughout the world and made available to all units. It is approved for public showing.
- 31 May The 55th ARSq (HC-97) attained a zero NORS rate for the month of May 1965. This is an ARS first.

- 3 Jun ARS provided the following support for Gemini-Titan 4, four day manned orbital flight of Astronauts White and McDivitt.
- Aircraft: 22 HC-97G, 18 HC-54D, 2 HU-16B, 4 CH-53.
 Personnel: 548, including 94 pararescuemen, none of whom parachuted to the capsule.
- 8 Jun Colonel Allison C. Brooks, Commander ARS, briefed Airlift Panel, Hq USAF, on the ARS projected requirements study regarding additional aircraft and the capability to meet increased recovery requirements in the latter part of the 1960's.
- 14 Jun Minor aircraft accident, HH-43B, 59-1562, Det. 3, CARC, (O/L Det. Prov, Third, PARC). Engine failed in flight. Aircraft autorotated into a small jungle clearing. No injuries. Pilot was 1st Lt. Vance Need.
- 15 Jun Under the provisions of AFR 35-54, Colonel Donald T. Smith assumed command of the Pacific Air Rescue Center on 15 Jun 65, vice Colonel Walter F. Derck relieved. Authority: Hq 1360th ABGp SO P-207, 6 July 65 and PARC Unit History Jun 65.
- 15 Jun The following detachments were discontinued at locations indicated, effective this date:
- Detachment 4, Hq ARS, Homestead AFB, Fla.
 Detachment 5, Hq ARS, Luke AFB, Arizona.
 Detachment 6, Hq ARS, March AFB, Calif.
 Detachment 7, Hq ARS, Portland IAP, Oregon.
 Detachment 8, Hq ARS, Selfridge AFB, Mich.
- Authority: Hq MATS SO G-61, 24 May 65.
- 17 Jun Colonel Theodore P. Tatam, Vice Commander ARS, departed for assignment to the 62d Air Transport Wing, McChord AFB, Washington, for duty as Vice Commander reporting during July 1965.
- 18 Jun MATS directed Det. 36 to develop standards for Air Rescue recovery (LRH)-Patrick and Goodfellow. An Air Rescue project officer with a broad knowledge in the Air Rescue recovery (LRH) field was designated to provide technical advice and assistance to the Det. 36 team.
- 18 Jun Grade authorizations for operations officers at AARC and PARC have been increased from 12. Colonel to Colonel effective FY1/66. In addition, the grade of officer in charge of the operational control function is adjusted to 12. Colonel.

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- 18 Jun HU-16 aircraft to crew ratio. Added crew members (1.5 ratio for the 31st and 33rd ARSqs) have been approved and included in the manpower file in the 15 June update with effective date of FY2/66 (Oct. - Dec. 65).
- 18 Jun ARS provided the following support to the Titan IIIC test.
- Aircraft: 4 CH-3C, 1 HU-16B, 1 HC-54D.
 Personnel: 42, including six pararescuemen, four of whom deployed into the ocean to recover two camera cassettes and a thrust vectoring control tank.
- 19 Jun Major aircraft accident, HU-16B, 51-287, 31 Air Rescue Squadron. Open sea landing to recover aircrew from B-52 accident. Rough seas and mechanical difficulties prevented takeoff. Aircraft was taken in tow and subsequently sank. Pilot was Captain Anthony A. Muehling.
- 21 Jun The following operating locations were designated and established at locations indicated:
- OL 1, Hq ARS, Olmsted AFB, Pa.
 OL 2, Hq ARS, Homestead AFB, Fla.
 OL 3, Hq ARS, Luke AFB, Arizona.
 OL 4, Hq ARS, March AFB, Calif.
 OL 5, Hq ARS, Portland IAP, Oregon
 OL 6, Hq ARS, Selfridge AFB, Mich.
- Authority: MATS SO G-74, 21 Jun 65.
- 30 Jun The following Air Rescue Service Provisional Detachments of Hq PARC were discontinued at locations indicated effective this date:
- Det. Provisional First, Taebh AB, Thailand.
 Det. Provisional Second, Nakhon Phanom Airport, Thailand.
 Det. Provisional Third, Ubon Airfield, Thailand.
 Det. Provisional Fourth, Korat RSI, Thailand.
 Det. Provisional Fifth, Udorn AFD, Thailand.
 Det. Provisional Sixth, Kung Kuan AB, Taiwan.
- Authority: Hq ARS (MATS), SO G-71, 14 Jun 65.
- 30 Jun The FY 65 Cost Reduction Program goal of \$135,000 was exceeded by \$48,700 when the amount of \$183,000 was validated.
- 30 Jun The Air Force Spectrometric Oil Analysis Program was implemented in ARS units during FY 65.

13

30 Jun During FY 65 ARS attained the highest operationally ready rate for any fiscal year of operation. The ARS aircraft in-commission average for the year was 80.4%. This rate was based on all assigned HH-43, CH-3C, HC-54, HU-16 and HC-97 aircraft.

30 Jun As of this date ARS personnel in Southeast Asia have received 218 awards and decorations. These are listed below.

Silver Star	16
Legion of Merit	1
Distinguished Flying Cross	6
Airman's Medal	4
Bronze Star	3
Air Medal	168
Purple Heart	8
Air Force Commendation Medal	10
Republic of Viet Nam Distinguished	
Flying Cross	<u>2</u>
	<u>218</u>

Jun 65 The 10,586 flying hours logged in ARS during this month was the greatest amount logged in any one month since 10,810 were logged in March 1957. A new monthly record was established in ARS when 6,282 hours were flown on missions alone.

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Historical Program

This program was not started until the 30th ARRSq was activated in July 1965. This unit forwarded its own histories until organization of the 3d Group and 37th ARRSq on 8 January 1966. At that time, 3d Group began forwarding consolidated histories in an effort to relieve the subordinate units of some administrative workload. This system apparently did not work as separate unit submissions were resumed in April 1967. When the 39th ARRSq was activated in January 1967, their first report was sent directly to Hq ARRS, as was the first report for the 40th ARRSq which was activated in March 1968.

Since the beginning of the 3d Group's historical program, there has been steady improvement in the quality of the reports. There was, and still is, a lack of detailed information required to provide a comprehensive record of the Group and its units. This inadequacy stemmed from inexperience of personnel who were given the responsibility for the Historical program for a relatively short period of time prior to rotation. These additional duty historians, who were not previously qualified failed to realize the importance of documenting the ARRS SEA effort. As a result, much valuable detail was lost. Another detrimental practice was the "sanitizing" of histories, i.e., excluding classified information which would have provided a more accurate picture of unit activities. The net result was a lessening of the research value of these histories.

W. E. Alford
W. E. ALFORD
ARRS Historian

161

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24 Jul 64

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

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No 000 3794

STANDARD ARS BRIEFING

GENERAL ESTES

It is a pleasure to have this opportunity to brief you and to discuss with you my favorite organization; that is, "THE AIR RESCUE SERVICE."

CHART #1

This chart quotes the ARS mission as stated in AFR 20-54. The Air Rescue Service is charged with the search, rescue and recovery of personnel and aerospace hardware. This includes hardware being used in research and development programs.

Although the search and rescue of personnel is our most demanding responsibility, we are continuously engaged in an ever-increasing requirement for the recovery of aerospace hardware. The responsibility for the recovery of R&D hardware does not mean that we are responsible for the development phase of this hardware, only the recovery phase. Other responsibilities as noted on this chart are also time consuming. To accomplish this overall mission, we will go anywhere, anytime and support anyone when we receive requests from proper authorities.

(94)

CHART #2

With Headquarters located at Orlando Air Force Base, Florida, we control our world-wide forces through 7 prime Air Rescue Centers, 4 of these are overseas:

CHART #3

They are:

Atlantic Air Rescue Center, Ramstein AB, Germany
Alaskan Air Rescue Center, Elmendorf, Alaska
Latin American Air Rescue Center, Panama
Pacific Air Rescue Center, Hickam AFB, Hawaii

Three are Zone of Interior Centers:

Eastern Air Rescue Center at Robins AFB, Ga
Central Air Rescue Center at Richards-Gebaur AFB, Mo
and the
Western Air Rescue Center at Hamilton AFB, Calif

To aid the Pacific Air Rescue Center in properly accomplishing its responsibilities we have established 3 small centers - 1 at Hq 5th AF in Japan; 1 at 13th AF Hq in the Philippines; and 1 at the 2d Air Division Hq in Saigon.

CHART 40

We have 12 fixed-wing squadrons. These squadrons operate HC-54s, HU-16s and HC-97s. They are located at: Wheelus Field, Libya; Prestwick, Scotland; Azores; Bermuda; Goose Bay, Newfoundland; Eglin AFB, Florida; Hamilton AFB, Calif; Hickam AFB, Hawaii; Anderson AFB, Guam; Tachikawa AB, Japan; Naha AB, Okinawa and Clark AB, Philippines.

CHART 40

At 64 bases around the world we have Local Base Rescue units operating HH-43B helicopters. These organizations, consisting primarily of 2 airframes each, are generally located in the blue area on this chart. We have 3 special units, one at Homestead AFB, Florida, to supervise and control our rescue requirements in the Cuba/Caribbean area, one at Goodfellow AFB, Texas, operating CH-21 helicopters, have the job of recovering Atomic Energy Commission/weather sampling balloons, and we have a Provisional Organization at Tyndall AFB that is presently accomplishing Category III Testing of the CH-3C helicopter. This, then, gives us a total of 87 different organizations located on 78 bases from Turkey on the East to ^{TH Air Station} ~~base~~ on the West, Thule AB in the North to Panama in the South. We own no bases, and

therefore, are tenants wherever we go. At 79 ~~locations~~ ^{and located} ~~through-~~ ^{in 27} ~~out the world~~ we have control and aircrew personnel on duty 24-hrs a day, 7 days a week. We ~~operate~~ ^{are located} in 27 different countries, and territories outside the Continental United States. From a command and technical control viewpoint, we control our fixed-wing squadrons and prime centers directly from our headquarters. From an operational standpoint, the Atlantic Center answers to the requirements of USAFE and the Pacific Air Rescue Center answers to the requirements as established by PACAF. The Alaskan Center handles the Alaskan Air Command requirements and the Latin American Air Rescue Center handles the requirements of AFSOUTH. Our headquarters at Orlando operationally directs the 4 North American Squadrons. The Local Base Rescue units operationally answer to the requirements of the base commander of the base on which they are located. From a command and technical control viewpoint, the LBR's are either administered by one of our centers or one of our fixed-wing squadrons. Our resources are limited.

CHART #6

For this fiscal quarter, we are authorized 941 officers; 2332 airmen and 35 civilians. This gives us a total authorization of 3308. Nearly all of the civilians are located in the Orlando

1967
LBR
position
list

Headquarters. Our present population is around 3,000. Included in this authorization is 150 pararescuemen. These highly specialized personnel must successfully complete 4 different schools before we consider them minimally qualified. These schools are medical, parachute, survival and SCUBA. We also give them a short course in tree jump operations.

CHART # 6

We are authorized a U.E. of 36 HC-54 aircraft. This aircraft is over 21 years old. P A U S E

CHART # 7

We are authorized a U.E. of 30 HU-16 aircraft. This airplane has the capability to land on either land or water and in the past 14 years has played a most important role in the Air Rescue Service. It is getting tired however in its present configuration and maintenance costs are rising.

CHART # 8

Our rotary wing aircraft consist primarily of HH-43B's. We are authorized a U.E. of 150 of these helicopters. Within a 60 mile area of the airbase on which they are located, they have done a terrific job. When required, the HH-43 will carry with it a fire suppression kit, firefighters and a medical technician. The responsibility of this team is to suppress the fire sufficiently to enable the removal of personnel from the flaming wreckage. This

unit is responsible for saving the lives of personnel involved in the accident and not to fight or put out the fire. As soon as the personnel have been removed from the aircraft, the team's responsibility is to get the survivors to the hospital.

CHART #10

Let me now outline the responsibilities and functions of the 21 Air Rescue Centers. You will remember they are located at Robins AFB, Ga; Richards-Gebaur AFB, Mo and Hamilton AFB, Calif. The Commander of these organizations have 2 prime responsibilities.

CHART #11

First, he is responsible for accomplishing the Inland Search and Rescue Plan. The Implementation of this plan was Presidentially directed in 1956. At that time the USAF, with ConAC as the action agency, was given the responsibility. This function was transferred from ConAC to the Air Rescue Service in 1961. ARS is responsible for the landmass of the ConUS. The Coast Guard has the responsibility for the water areas. Commanders of the Centers must continually coordinate with the state governors, state police, sheriff's offices, forest rangers, Civil Air Patrol, military units within his area of responsibility and any other civilian or private organization that can provide aid during a SAR mission. At each center

AT A TOTAL OF 36
 we have 14 officers and airmen that maintain these centers on a 24-hr basis. These personnel coordinate and direct all search and rescue missions as they happen. This is accomplished from the Center itself or at an on-the-scene location. They may be looking for a lost hunter in the mountains of California or coordinating a search for a missing civilian or military aircraft.

CHART #12

Their second function is to supervise local base rescue units that may be assigned for this purpose. They are responsible for command, training, administration, materiel, supply, etc. We have 39 such units in the Zone of Interior.

CHART #13

This chart portrays only a few of the many missions that we accomplish around the world. Search, rescue and recovery of personnel lost in downed military or civilian aircraft is one of our prime jobs; however, we find ourselves frequently engaged in such missions as looking for lost boy scouts and fishermen. We perform precautionary orbits for Tactical Air Command aircraft moving overseas, and Air Defense Command fighters when they leave the CONUS. Normally TAC and ADC will not move their aircraft over a water environment unless Air Rescue Service aircraft are orbiting at assigned positions. We are responsible to be within 30-minutes of Presidential flights outside the Zone of Interior. ~~Many MR flights~~

~~likewise require special coverage.~~ When an aircraft becomes lost or is in distress, we are called on to find and escort it to a haven of safety.

CHART #14

Last year we accomplished over ~~12,000~~ missions, ~~or over~~ 35 each day. ~~4 1/2 of these daily missions were in the emergency~~ category. 84 % of this total was in support of USAF aircraft. Some of these missions are short, some of them long. As an example, the C-124 Pacific mission last year logged over 5000 hrs. Of the total mission hours that we flew during this time period, 88 percent supported USAF aircraft. We are normally looking for someone, somewhere, although we are equipped and funded for USAF missions only. We are also called on to orbit and monitor Army and Marine aircraft movements.

CHART #15

I indicated previously that we are authorized 150 ~~pararescue-~~men. These personnel are a part of each fixed-wing squadron. On the Eastern Test Range they operate in the recovery of cassettes, and the retrieval or recovery of any other piece of R&D equipment that the Eastern Test Range may want returned. On the Western Test Range our squadron at Hickam stands by as backup for the AFSC Recovery Squadron activities. We stand by for possible aborts during launchings at Vandenberg AFB and during the re-entry phase. If the AFSC Recovery Sqdn

aircraft should miss in their normal recovery procedures, we parachute our pararescuemen into the sea and recover the valuable R&D instrument packages. These pararescuemen are highly trained and motivated. Their ~~world-wide rescue capability~~ will be improved with the receipt of our HC-130M aircraft. They are continually trained to remove astronauts from spacecraft and to provide flotation gear for the spacecraft itself. They will jump under most conditions and once on the surface of the earth whether it be land or water, we continue to support them by parachute drops until their job is done and they are recovered by surface vessel, helicopter or ground means.

CHART #16

We have 5 Air Rescue Reserve Squadrons. They have a UE of 4 HU-16s each. As shown on the chart they are located at:

Homestead AFB, Fla
Selfridge AFB, Mich
Luke AFB, Ariz
March AFB, Calif and
Portland AFB, Oregon

Provide supervision of training and flying safety programs, conduct surveys, and administer inspections.

CHART #17 16

The Air Rescue Service has been involved in supporting the man-in-space national program since its start. We are responsible for covering the world for any contingency that may

develop. This chart indicates the 28 different locations where ARS aircraft were deployed during the last Mercury flight. We also cover the planned landing areas even though the Navy has considerable effort in these areas. In the forthcoming GEMINI, APOLLO and MOL programs, It is well established that the Air Rescue Service will become more and more involved.

CHART #17

As defined in the DOD Overall Plan for Project GEMINI operations, dated 7 Nov 1963, the DOD Representative is responsible for the development of the overall GEMINI DOD Support Operations Plans. The DOD Representative is charged with effecting final coordination with the ^{Army, Navy, and} ~~field agencies~~ of those plans developed in the support of this project.

The DOD Overall Plan also states that the Commander, Air Rescue Service, when requested, provides representation

on an ad-hoc basis to the Project GEMINI Support Planning Office to assist in planning the optimum procedures in the employment of Air Force resources in support of GEMINI recovery operations. This will include planning for the employment of especially equipped ARS aircraft to conduct re-entry tracking and post-landing locations of the spacecraft on a world-wide basis. To make maximum use of available DOD resources with experience in world-wide search, rescue and recovery operations, the DOD Rep for Project GEMINI requested in February of this year that ARS develop for the DOD a Global Air Recovery Plan. It was requested that this plan include: suggested world-wide deployment of long range aircraft, numbers of pararescue teams, staging bases, communications control centers, communications equipment, recovery techniques, training and equipment, inter-area considerations and other planning information necessary to support the overall contingency recovery situations. We were given the option to coordinate our effort directly with the agency appointed by area commanders or through our own centers. We chose to establish our Center Commanders as our agencies for this purpose. Our draft 'DOD Air Recovery Force' plan has been coordinated as outlined and was forwarded to the DOD Rep at Patrick AFB on

13 July. This plan included to the maximum, conditions and recovery requirements projected through the 1970 time period as we visualized them. In this planning, we considered to the maximum extent that is possible at this time, the MOL Project.

CHART #18

Recovery requirements that were considered were these four:

1. On-pad ejection and ejection after launch.
2. Launch abort area
3. Primary and secondary landing areas.
4. Landings outside these areas.

CHART #19

We are responsible for providing and operating 4 HH-3C and 1 HH-43 helicopters for launch site recovery. The forces are responsive to astronaut ejection on pad as well as ^{immediate} after lift off. These aircraft will carry our own pararescuemen. Deployment will be in the immediate launch area where rapid contact can be made with the astronauts as they descend by parachute. Our forces must provide immediate assistance to the astronaut upon landing and provide rapid transportation to the medical facility. The access time varies as noted on the chart; however, it is our intention and we feel that we are completely capable of being on-the-spot upon the astronaut's landing.

18
12

CHART #

Our area of responsibility is 28 miles long and about 16-1/2 miles wide as noted. This area is also supported by a number of small boats and Army Larks. The Commander of the array will control the force from one of our helicopters.

CHART #

The launch abort area reaches from the coast of Florida to the Coast of Africa. Within this area our forces consist of our search aircraft, with teams of 3 pararescuemen on each aircraft. We will have our forces airborne along the spacecraft route at launch time in order to provide search and recovery of the spacecraft within the minimum of time. When required, our pararescue personnel will be deployed to provide spacecraft flotation equipment and medical assistance. The NASA access time established for this area is 4 hrs.

CHART #

This chart indicates the general location of our aircraft during launch. Note that we also have in this area Navy P3's and EC-121 aircraft that will aid in the search effort. As presently planned these Navy fixed-wing aircraft will operate under our cognizance. If they locate a spacecraft before one of our planes arrive, they will become the on-scene commander, until such time as our aircraft arrives with pararescuemen aboard.

48 13

1138

CHART #

Within the primary and secondary landing areas, our requirements are very similar to the abort area; however, the access time varies from 1 to 5 hrs depending on the mission. This chart indicates the 5 primary and secondary landing areas where we are required to provide coverage with aircraft and pararescue personnel. The ARS Forces will respond from a strip alert posture to provide pararescue and spacecraft flotation equipment well within the 1 to 5 hour access time. Navy surface vessels will also be operating in these areas. We will deploy our pararescuemen only when the surface ships are not on the scene.

CHART #

Outside the primary landing areas, requirements basically remain the same, however, the access time has increased to a maximum of 18 hours. You will note on this chart that the world-wide deployment is between 29°N and 29°S. This is for GEMINI missions only. When we are operating in support of an APOLLO mission, this requirement becomes 40°N to 40°S.

CHART #

This chart indicates our recommended deployment for our aircraft starting with GT-4 or approximately 1 year from now. We can support the access time of 18 hrs from the locations indicated.

20/14

CHART #33

I noted earlier that the Air Rescue Service is performing the Category III testing of the CH-3C helicopter. We believe that this is a very excellent aircraft. It has a good range of action, has a heavy-lift capability, and is considered all-weather capable. We only have one of these airplanes at the present time but are programmed to receive more. We are programmed to establish a 4 UE Det at Patrick AFB in October 1964. The Patrick Det will be used for spacecraft pad abort recovery at Cape Kennedy and for hardware recovery and logistic support throughout the entire Eastern Test Range. A 4 UE Det is also programmed for Goodfellow AFB. These aircraft will replace the CH-21's that we are now using to accomplish the AEC balloon recovery mission. We have requested two squadrons of these helicopters of 6 UE each within the 21 to aid in the accomplishment of our normal Inland SAR responsibility. Whether it be airlift, strategic bombardment

or rescue, there is no substitute for professionalism. Most of our resources involved in any given ZI SAR incident are not professional forces. Our relationship with the semi-professional CAP has proven quite successful and to some degree fills the gap between ARS requirements and resources. Except for the vicinity of Eglin and Hamilton, where Air Rescue Squadrons are located, the lack of ARS professional forces and deployment distance involved is a handicap in prosecuting any ZI mission. Our aircraft are not well suited for search missions over rugged terrain, wooded areas or deep snow. These aircraft, while too slow for quick reaction, are too fast for visual survivor search where handicaps such as the above exist. This is especially acute as long as our primary search method is dependent upon human vision. Until electronic crash locator beacons and adequate individual aircrew location beacons are in general use, visual sighting is our only means of locating downed airmen. CAP also has almost 100% fixed wing aircraft and, therefore, fall into the same category of difficulty as the ARS planes; i. e., too slow for quick reaction and too fast for visual search.

CHART #

By placing one helicopter squadron at Travis and one at Bunker Hill AFB we can cover the US within a maximum of 12 hrs.

LA
16.

Our helicopters programmed for Goodfellow and Patrick AFBs can also be used when available. Last year there were 522 such-missions within the ConUS. We prepared a Special ARS Plan to implement these two squadrons if and when approved. I have briefed Hq MATS and USAF on this plan. The requirement is under consideration in the Pentagon at the present time. This will provide us with a minimum capability to accomplish the Inland SAR requirements. I must point out that there are many other requirements for these aircraft and that the number suggested will not provide enough depth of operations to completely satisfy all of the jobs simultaneously. Proper scheduling should go far, however, in accomplishing the requirements. We believe that the Air Rescue Service should have a detachment of these helicopters at Panama for normal search, rescue and to aid in the accomplishment of the cold war objectives in Central and South America. We certainly need to replace the HH-43Bs at Thule AB with these all-weather long range helicopters. The HH-43Bs at Thule at the present time are doing the best job that can be expected within their capability, however, long-range, all-weather aircraft are required. We should have 10 such helicopters in Alaska where there is a continuous search and rescue requirement. For example, last year there were 416 such missions in that state. We are also recommending that a few of these helicopters be

45

1170

1142

placed in each squadron until such time that a better vertical take-off and landing aircraft is available. We need air-to-air refueling capability for these helicopters, refuelable from our HC-130H aircraft using a pelletized refueling kit. There is nothing new or unusual about this requirement, the refueling kit for the HC-130 has already been developed and is being used at the present time by the Marine Corps in refueling their fighters. The hardware for the helicopter is expected to be a simple installation. We also require an air-to-air recovery capability. This will give us the ability to recover the AEC balloons on their descent rather than allowing them to hit the ground and thus damage valuable AEC equipment as well as damaging crops, knocking down high tension wires, and causing damage to other personal property.

CHART #

Last November we strongly recommended that a combat aircrew recovery force be established in the Republic of South Vietnam. Actions that followed by the Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Headquarters 13th AF and Second Air Division prompted us to perform a study on the movement of such a force to RVN. This study was completed and forwarded during January of this year. The study was favorably considered by Pacific Air Force and Hq MATS and processed to Hq USAF. As a result of this study and efforts on the part of Pacific Air Force, CINC Pacific recommended to the Joint Chief of Staff that this force be provided. The JCS directed Air Force to prepare such an organization for deployment to RVN. Six aircraft are being modified for this job by Kaman Aircraft Corporation with an out of the factory delivery date around the middle of November. We prepared an ARS Programming Plan to implement our portion of this move when Air Force gives us final approval. Many actions on our part have already been taken to ready our force consisting of 6 aircraft and 86 personnel. The main item yet to be accomplished is specialized training for our aircrews. Arrangements have been made with Hq Air Training Command to accomplish this training at Stead AFB. We expect to get the clearance to proceed with this project momentarily.

Upon receipt of this directive we expect to have an active aircrew recovery force operating from two bases in South Vietnam. In addition we have a 2-helicopter unit TDY at Nakhon Phanom, ~~Laos~~. This unit deployed from NAHA during mid-June to support US aircrew recovery in this area. Also two additional ZI LBR units have been alerted for possible movement to this Southeast Asia area.

CHART #

In conclusion, General Estes, I would like to briefly cover the basic objectives of the Air Rescue Service.

As outlined in AFR 20-54, It is the responsibility of this Command to single manage all Air Force rescue and recovery missions and resources. I am sure you are aware that there are several recovery missions being accomplished within the Air Force that are not under the cognizance of the Air Rescue Service. It is our opinion that only through consolidation

and central control of this capability will the Air Force be able to economically utilize the in-being forces to accomplish this abundance of jobs. Through centralization it is no secret that fewer airplanes can accomplish more missions. It is an age-old Air Force doctrine that "entity of force" will do the best job. ~~As our aircraft become faster, greater mobility is available to us.~~ When the force is split between several commands the depth of operation is lost and of course efficiency is lost accordingly. With our forthcoming HC-130Hs and an adequate air refuelable HH-3C force, it is our opinion that we can shuffle this force throughout the world and accomplish any rescue and recovery job within the lift limitations of the aerial system being employed. Within our capability we continually study ideas that will provide progress to our Nation and our Service. Two of these studies have been forwarded under the ICE Project for MATS consideration. One idea is that of Integrated Combat Airlift Support (ICAS). This will bring the entire spectrum of Combat Airborne Logistics and battle zone Air Force Services under the single management of MATS. This concept applies to space logistics and space recovery as well as surface operations. This single-managed MATS family mission should include:

Fast airlift movement of personnel and material from global ports, depots, factories, etc., to the most forward combat areas.

Rho

Rescue and recovery of downed combat aircrews.

Local base crash rescue for forward air strips.

Pictorial documentation.

Evacuation of wounded, sick and other returnees.

This MATS family system would require fixed and rotor wing aircraft to accomplish this family mission.

Another ICE study forwarded by this Headquarters recommended a single manager for USAF rotary wing resources. All missions for which USAF has or is programmed to procure rotary wing aircraft fall into one or more of these missions: airlift, search, rescue and recovery. These all fall within the purview of MATS. Single managership offers the only logical and the most economical and desirable solution to the problem of increasing the combat effectiveness of all USAF rotary wing resources. ARS has the experience and the basic staff to accomplish this concept. Operationally, the helicopters would be controlled by the user.

One of our prime objectives is to obtain as soon as possible adequate equipment that would provide us an "in-being" combat aircrew recovery capability. The CH-3C is the off-the-shelf equipment that could be provided to give us an immediate "best" capability to accomplish this mission. In addition to what I have already said about this helicopter, we are accomplishing a study which will indicate our world-wide requirements.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIRCRAFT RESCUE AND RECOVERY SERVICE (AARCS)
ORLANDO AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 32813

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

REPLY TO: ARIOS (Col Rottmann/2367)

SUBJECT: Trip Report

TO: ARCCO

No. 0003797

23 OCT 1967

1. During the 12 day period 22 September through 3 October 1967 the undersigned visited the following ARRS units in Southeast Asia. The purpose of the visit was to follow up on the Southeast Asia Survey Report and for a discussion of safety matters.

3 ARRGp	Tan Son Nhut	Colonel Lovelady - Cmdr Colonel Leske - Cmdr (new) Lt Col Freshwater - Vice Cmdr Lt Col Rudrud - Operations Major Brubaker - Safety Lt Col Holman - SAR Center
38 ARRSq	Tan Son Nhut	Lt Col Rudrud - Cmdr Major Lee - Operations
39 ARRSq	Tuy Hoa	Lt Col Marshall - Cmdr Lt Col Costello - Operations Major Wallace - Safety
Det 11, 38 ARRSq	Tuy Hoa	Major Elliff - Cmdr
37 ARRSq	Danang	Lt Col Coughron - Cmdr Lt Col Wells - Operations Capt McGhan - Safety
Det 7, 38 ARRSq	Danang	Major Cline - Cmdr
Det 1, 37 ARRSq	Nakhon Phanom	Lt Col Britton - Cmdr Lt Col Lowe - Operations Major Russell - Safety Capt Etzel - Standardization
Det 2, 37 ARRSq	Udorn	Lt Col Dixon - Cmdr Major York - Operations Major Williams - Standard- ization Capt Montrem - Safety
Det 5, 38 ARRSq	Udorn	Major Jones - Cmdr
OL 1, 39 ARRSq	Udorn	Lt Col Peterson - Cmdr

150 7.14 B.

2. Prior to the SEA trip a safety survey was conducted of Hq Pac ARRC, Hickam AFB. Key personnel contacted included:

Colonel Smith - Cmdr
Major Foster - Safety
Major Warden - Safety.

3. A general improvement of condition over those observed in the January 67 survey was evident. All except a few of the 33 previously noted problem areas were resolved or were no longer considered an operational limiting factor. Areas of mission interest in which problem areas still exist follow:

PERSONNEL

a. Units are not receiving information on newly assigned personnel nor are they advised when shipping dates change or assignments are cancelled. For example: the 37 ARRS had received August EDCSA on three pilots none of whom had arrived by 28 September; crew members assigned to the 39 ARRS are still being sent to Udorn in some cases; newly assigned people suddenly arrive without prior unit notification; a significant number of personnel inputs are made by AFSC only and individual qualification was learned only after the individual arrived (AFSC does not, in every case, reveal experience level i.e. RCC or copilot). In general, those concerned with personnel expressed a wish for closer personnel coordination, timely information, advance notice on personnel qualification, and advice on assignment changes (to note a few needs) from all echelons of personnel. *e*

b. The quality of air crew training at Eglin needs improvement. *and many*

(1) Some crew members have not received a complete training course prior to over seas departure. To name a few examples: incomplete air to air refueling training for H-3 personnel, simulated rather than actual hoist training, personnel of the first four H-53 crews to arrive at Udorn did not receive live hoist training and inflight mini gun indoctrination.

(2) Training records were not always complete and records the school planned to forward had not been received or were incomplete.

(3) Det 1, 37 ARRS (NKP) had not received one pilots' flight training records as of 30 Sept although he arrived 2 Aug.

c. Some crew members were arriving in SEA units without going through jungle survival school, e.g. 37 ARRS, Danang, had 2 P.J., 3 pilots and 5 flight engineers who had not attended.

d. Recurring manning problems were evident in units visited. These include disproportionate crew ratios, out right personnel shortages and low skill personnel. For instance, the following was noted at Danang: copilot overage existed (12 RCC and 19 Cp); 3 level airmen assigned necessitated a heavy OJT program (maintenance was 86% manned with 39% assigned on OJT). A supply and an administrative officer were needed; forecast manning was Oct 74%, Nov 68% and Dec 69%.

2.

e. A number of the fixed wing conversion pilots voiced a morale problem coincident with their assignment into the helicopter program. As conversion pilots they have little hope of upgrading to RCC during the one year SEA tour and spend the time as copilots. When they PCS from SEA they stand a good chance of returning to ZI helicopter units - still as copilots. AFM 36-11A, para 8003i, prescribes a two year commitment for graduates of the helicopter school while para 8003i (1) authorizes pilots trained for SEA in other type aircraft a one year tour. Helicopter conversion pilots not wishing to stay in helicopters believe this directed duty in SEA is inequitable and that a waiver of the AFM 36-11A directed duty was warranted. *Amended*

MAINTENANCE

a. Portable fuel pumps used by HH-3E's at forward operating locations remain a problem. Pumps were subjected to considerable handling and arduous use resulting in above normal wear and tear. Pumps had been repaired locally and parts were scarce consequently there were periods when pumps were in short supply. HH-3E and HH-53 crews need a better, reliable light weight portable pump. (This subject is noted in a classified SEA report by ARXDC dated 10 Oct 67.)

(1) Larger fuel pumps mounted on wheels and maintained at FOLs were/are subjected to poor conditions of weather, dust, environment and possible abuse by local people. One had two flat tires and could not be moved easily for helicopter refueling. When large pumps are inoperative portables are the only method of refueling.

b. Procurement of supplies has improved for the HH-3E but shortages exist in some prime spares. For example:

(1) Flexible couplings have caused one NORS-G and two A-NORS (1 Oct).

(2) 8 of 10 Danang assigned H-3s did not have operable radar altimeter. Those at NKP had a similar status. This instrument has been almost a prerequisite during ACR missions flown over water during inclement weather and at night. A most prevalent cause of instrument problems was lack of spares and lack of test equipment.

(3) The H-3 doppler system has not operated properly and has been needed by both 37 ARRS Det 1 and Det 2 helicopters for operating over unmapped regions, during instrument flight conditions and for night ACR missions. Inoperative systems were caused by lack of supplies and the test equipment needed to unite the black box system into one integral unit (only test equipment known to be available was located in Japan and Nha Trang). Note: HH-53 personnel envision similar operational problems with the doppler and radar altimeter in their helicopters.

(4) An IRAN program has been established at Bangkok for Pony Express H-3 helicopters with an anticipated 60 day per aircraft schedule. 3 ARRGp has obtained four slots on the end of the Pony Express program

for ARRS H-3's. (Probably in or later than Jan 68.) As airframe time has been reaching toward a high figure it may be well to extend the H-3 IRAN to include all ARRS H-3's that have been in the theater for a long period and/or have reached an arbitrary airframe time.

(5) Udorn HH-53 and the NKP HH-3E personnel stated that supply problems caused by unit moves were being resolved. Some problems existed in HH-3E special tools as these were divided between ARRS and Pony Express when the move from Udorn to NKP began.

(6) HH-43 LBR helicopter FSK hooks were not modified on 3 aircraft. WRAMA has located one kit and shipped it to SEA the week of 18 Sept 67. They will have to assemble two more kits to complete the TCTO modification of SEA assigned HH-43 helicopters. A supply search in SEA revealed no TCTO kits available, therefore, any HH-43 replacements sent to SEA should have this modification completed.

SQUADRON STATUS DET 2, 37 ARRS

(1) Liaison between the 37 ARRSq and its Detachments 1 and 2 has been hindered by poor communications and geographical separation. Squadron status has been request by Hq ARRS and this requirement, as noted in the SEA Survey, was still valid. Both detachments report direct to 3 ARRGp.

PERSONNEL EQUIPMENT

(1) Crew Members questioned about the value of ceramic armor replied that it protected as advertised but was not suitable for the helicopter ACR mission. Weight and size was a deterrent to ease of movement which was necessary in every crew member's duty. Because this armor was form fitting it was worn next to the body beneath the survival vest and parachute. This large bulk restricted movement and necessitated inflight personal equipment changes for the pararescue man prior to deployment on the forest penetrator. Except for the pilots "King Arthur" metal chest protector, crew members state the pliable nylon "armor" was best suited to the mission.

(2) The "King Arthur" torso armor was apparently issued with the HH-3E helicopter when it was introduced into SEA, and crew members have insured this armor stays with the HH-3E. Udorn HH-53 pilots were anxious to obtain similar armor but have been unable to find the source. Recommend this type armor be afforded HH-53 crews as soon as possible, prior to ACR mission activity. A e

AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT

(1) The HH-43 radio system was not compatible with the assigned mission. A real need existed for FM radio equipment. HH-43 pilots have been unable to talk to ground parties and crew members of other US military aircraft. Army Huey pilots flying escort have been unable to communicate. In one case a Huey escorting an HH-43 fired a smoke to

mark an enemy 50 caliber gun position. Our H-43 pilot thinking this marked the rescue area flew directly to the spot to make the rescue. Fortunately, for some reason, the enemy did not fire and a narrow escape was effected. In another case an HH-43 had to circle over hostile area while trying to direct a ground rescue party to a crash site. The ground party had FM radio and had it been installed in the 43 it would have been a simple matter to direct the ground party, saving time and limiting exposure of friendly forces. All HH-43 pilots interviewed were unanimous in requests for FM radio.

*MAC:
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do
stand on
this?*

FOL STATUS

(1) Operating conditions/hazards noted in the SEA Survey (Secret) Report remain the same, basically.

(a) The primary site runway has been stabilized over the entire length eliminating the dust hazard. Holes remain in the runway surface. Parking was limited, however, a stabilized area had been prepared for the HH-53s.

1. Living conditions have improved at the RON station.

(b) Conditions at the secondary site, except for construction of an "alert" building, remain the same.

4. This concludes specific comment on items noted in the Jan 67 SEA Survey.

5. Other subjects of interest observed during this safety visit are discussed in general terms below. Some items, although listed under one unit, may be applicable by nature of the subject to other possessing the same type aircraft/mission.

a. 3 ARRGp, TAN SON NHUT

(1) The 3 ARRGp Joint Search & Rescue Center will be augmented by and Army Lt Col o/a 15 Oct 67. The U.S. Navy declined to send a representative and stated in Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, letter, 16 Sept 67, the USN would maintain liaison from COMNAVFORV, in Saigon by direct wire to the 3 ARRGp JSARC. This arrangement was satisfactory with all concerned and should increase rescue effectiveness of U.S. Forces in SEA.

(2) PUBLICATIONS/ORDERS

(a) Field publications issued by MAC arrive late in the field because of the distribution system. Pubs now go MAC - ARRS - PARRC - 3 ARRGp. Suggest a change such as MAC - PARRC - 3 ARRGp or MAC - 3 ARRGp. ARRS/PARRC supplements, if written, could follow on in the same manner in which MAJCOMS supplement USAF pubs.

(b) 3 ARRGp has established a good procedure for unit Special Order publication. Authority has been granted by 3 ARRGp SUP 1/AFM 10-3

5.

to each unit permitting publication of certain orders directive on the unit mission and personnel. This eliminates the need for:

1. A detachment letter requesting Special Orders,
 2. Group orders preparation,
 3. Publication and exchange of mail between units.
- Suggest use of the same procedure for ARRS Centers.

(3) Ground accident potential at Tan Son Nhut and surrounding areas of Siagon was very high. All manner of vehicles and pedestrians crowd the streets day and night except during curfew hours. During this visit a traffic survey was conducted by a USAF civilian representative from Washington D. C.. On a sample day, 22 Sept 67, the following statistics were recorded from 0600 to 2300 at the main gate:

- (a) 11,800 pedestrians entered the base.
- (b) 7,000 two wheel vehicles entered the base.
- (c) 8,200 other vehicles entered the base.
- (d) The peak pedestrian traffic occurred in five minutes between 0600 and 0605 when 600 people entered the base.

Departures were not recorded as these may go out other than the main gate. It goes without saying that numerous traffic jams happen and accidents occur frequently. The base looks for some traffic improvements as result of this survey particularly in bus scheduling and routing. In addition the base is clamping down on two wheel vehicle operation by the military.

(4) Pararescue

(a) Sgt Hawkins, recently assigned to the new pararescue position in the 3 ARRGp, has been making extensive field trips to all ARRS SEA units coordinating pararescue mission and training activities. He has made arrangements for medical training of P.J.s with local base hospitals and conducted standardization visits. The latter were/are requisite in most units because of the variance of mission assignments.

(b) Hq ARRS (AROAS/P.J.) has tasked Sgt Hawkins to complete the Sky Genie evaluation in SEA. He had received no instructions concerning test parameters, type of harness, environmental conditions, terrain requirements etc. as of 3 Oct 67. Suggest this Headquarters make periodic contact with Sgt Hawkins to insure all phases of this test are completed and to render assistance if necessary.

b. 39 ARRSQ, TUY HOA

(1) Operations, facilities, administration, personnel, safety were observed to be in good condition after the move from Udorn. Buildings, ramp space, revetments, quarters and support facilities

were adequate. An aggressive self help program in progress was indicative of good morale and corporate spirit within the unit.

(2) On 27 Sept the last HC-130 to phase at Tachikawa returned and all future phase inspections were scheduled for Clark AB, P.I.

(3) The divided base of operation between Tuy Hoa and Udorn was subject of a 15 day test during which all operations were originated and ended at Tuy Hoa. There were definite advantages to both staging at Udorn and single base operations at Tuy Hoa. For instance:

ADVANTAGE	DISADVANTAGE
Good Personnel Management	Increase of Non Productive Flying Hours
Closer Maintenance Surveillance	Loss of FOL Close to Mission Activity
	Flight Area Intelligence Degradation

All headquarters concerned were aware of this operational change test and objectives.

(4) The unit was required to maintain a surface to air capability which necessitates a complete inventory of modules, kits and support equipment. Flight crews must stay current by training in Japan/Iwo Jima. TAC maintains a unit with a surface to air mission at Nha Trang. Maintaining a surface to air capability has been something of a burden to the 39 ARRS. Suggest the surface to air need be verified. If the 39th keeps this mission suggest currency be maintained at Clark AB concurrent with HC-130 phase inspections (when an HC-130 unit is operational at Clark.)

c. DET 11, 38 ARRSQ, TUY HOA

(1) Personnel problems were evident. Four pilots were available to maintain a 24 hour per day first and second alert with 3 HH-43 helicopters. This was fatiguing for the pilots (one of whom said he hadn't had a beer for three weeks). One pilot was inbound and another due back from R and R, however the Commander was scheduled to rotate soon and another pilot was departing for R and R.

(2) Helicopter parking ramp space was limited and HH-43s exposed to blowing sand and salt spray. Sand blast effects were evident on the paint, inside and outside the airframe. Corrosion control was a problem. Work orders for a revetment had been approved but erection dates not established. With advent of the windy season (30 to 50K) in November problems from sand blast and salt spray will be compounded. Maintenance work conditions will also deteriorate.

(3) The LBR building appeared to be adequate but required finishing work. Personnel assigned were too busy to do much self help construction. The central air conditioner had been broken for 30 days and the building was very hot inside particularly in the evening. Gun storage was not satisfactory.

(4) Suggest 38 ARRS assistance in getting this LBR back on its feet.

d. 37 ARRSQ, DANANG

(1) ARRS facilities at Danang were poor, however, squadron personnel were making progress in improving unit buildings through a self help program. Most of the maintenance function has moved into an old RVN hanger at the south end of the flight line.

(2) The hanger roof, loosened by explosions during a V.C. attack, had two large holes. Pieces of loose corrugated tin roofing flapped around in the breeze causing a hazard to both men and aircraft inside. Recommended to the unit they have the roof repaired, or removed or move out. Prior to SEA departure 3 ARRGp advised the roof had been removed. Suggest the new roof work order #DAN 45-8 submitted 10 Aug 67 receive expeditious follow up action. *now fixed*

(3) Location of the maintenance section at one end of the ramp and the rest of the squadron at the other end generated some administrative and communication deficiencies. However, the Commander has requested squadron offices be moved into three empty RVN buildings near the hangar. These buildings can house all except perhaps the pararescue operations. This move, if approved, would put the unit in its best position since activation at Danang.

(4) Most of the HH-3E revetments located near the hangar were completed. The area was congested and taxi hazards were evident. When H-3s were parked in revetments the refueling probes extended beyond the revetment into the road/taxi area exposing them to possible damage. The probes were marked and barricaded to preclude accidents. Completion of construction will reduce safety hazards but crews (ground and flight) will always have to exercise extreme caution in this area.

e. DET 7, 38 ARRS, DANANG

(1) Facilities available to the LBR are less than satisfactory. All offices and the alert function were located in a trailer with less than 400 sq feet of space. The alert HH-43 was parked 1/4 mile from the trailer and was across a very busy ramp. When an alert sounds the crew must go to the helicopter by vehicle for which they cannot obtain an emergency blinker and which is limited to 15 MPH.

(2) HH-43 parking, including the alert bird, was on PSP laid over sand. Blowing dust and sand has been a constant irritant and a source of deterioration for precision aircraft equipment as well as airframe general.

(3) A better location for the detachment that could accommodate both det buildings and HH-43's has been found near the ramp. A work order for construction of a new facility was approved in April 1967 but no action has been taken on this project. The LBR has been very active and needs to relocate in order to provide the best possible rescue service.

f. OL 1, 3 ARRG, MONKEY MOUNTAIN. The undersigned did not visit this location but those who did noted some hazards to flight during use of the new helicopter pad on top of the mountain. This pad located near the radar site and TACC complex was exposed to frequent strong gusty winds on at least three sides. Suggest a safety survey of this pad be conducted by a safety group including HH-43 and HH-3E pilots to determine a standard set of rules for use e.g. wind velocity and direction limits, weather conditions, pad condition, wind sock, approach procedures, who can fly helos into the pad (if high skill level/proficiency is a factor) etc.

g. DET 1, 37 ARRS, NAKHON PHANOM

(1) The detachment was just completing a move from Udorn. Of nine aircraft assigned five were at NKP, two at Bangkok for air refueling modification and two at Udorn NORSG (one flex coupling, one combat damage). All personnel were in place except those soon due rotation from SEA. The latter remained at Udorn assisting HH-3 and HH-53 operations.

(2) Det 1 facilities including quarters were generally good. Space, except for the pararescue section, was adequate with all sections housed in close proximity to the flight line. The parking ramp was PSP and, although crowded, appeared adequate for unit HH-3E's. Some maintenance such as jacking was done on PSP in an area subject to use by other units. Closing of this area to the Detachment would pose a hardship until new ramp construction can be completed. More flying units are scheduled for assignment to NKP but, other than causing aircraft congestion, posed no immediate problems.

(3) The NKP move has not changed Det 1's alert status. Two H-3Es were staged up north each day and two were on alert at NKP. With but 5 HH-3Es available this alert posture has taxed unit resources to the limit, leaving no aircraft available for training. A number of pilots needed transition, air refueling work etc.

(4) Some concern was voiced over the proposed mission concept once the HH-53s become operational. Unit personnel stated that with present resources they would be unable to perform a two ship orbit mission in belief the added flying time would soon eat up supplies and available airframe hours. They were interested in obtaining new forward sites in the area of primary assignment from which they could stand alert. A single ship operation would not be operationally sound in the Det 1 area of responsibility.

(5) Real concern was expressed with weight of the HH-3E during ACR missions. Several touch and go missions have occurred wherein weight was a real problem. In one case rescue had to be postponed from one afternoon until the next morning where cooler temperatures prevailed. The HH-3E could not hold a hover at the high altitude rescue location with hot afternoon temperatures. (Later the rescue was successful.) The following equipment has been deleted from NKP HH-3Es: winch, blige pump, altus lamp, first aid kits, hot cup, pyrotechnic kit, anchor and line, G file, ILS control and associated electrical equipment,

P.A. set and speakers, heater, blower and ducting, VOR set, all except six seats, some crew armor and ammunition. The H-3 cannot stand any more weight and perform its current mission (e.g. bullet proof windshield, more armor plate etc.) See comments this subject, Capt Panzarella's (ARXDC) Trip Report, 10 Oct 67, Secret.

h. DET 2, 37 ARRS, UDORN

(1) Unit facilities were exceptionally fine, probably some of the best ARRS has in SEA. Prior to moving to NKP, Lt Col Britton and Det 1 personnel did an outstanding job preparing for HH-53 helicopter and personnel arrival. Very little in the way of facility acquisition had to be accomplished by Det 2 people. Helicopter parking was expected to be congested, but new concrete ramp construction for the HH-53 was programmed. Supplies were still short but coming in in large quantities and the maintenance officer anticipated no problems with known consumption levels.

(2) Four crews and two aircraft were in place during this visit. Personnel were busy getting organized. Operations personnel were not award of the concept of operations so operation up north could be discussed only in general terms. Some crew members had been north with HH-3E crew. Ops procedures and policies and mission procedures had not been firmed up in directive form. Some necessary pre mission training was required. Suggest the following:

(a) Experienced crew members from H-3 operations at Det 1 accompany H-53 crews north during initial operations.

(b) Qualified H-53 pilots go north with H-3 crews for the purpose of site survey as it fits HH-53 operations.

(c) The complete concept of operations (flight and ground handling) be known to all HH-53 crew members prior to mission operations.

(d) 3 ARRGp staff personnel review and monitor concept of operations with the unit to insure continuity of operations.

(e) Training missed at Eglin i.e. actual hoist work, mini gun firing and air refueling currency with 39 ARRS crews be completed as soon as possible and preferably prior to ACR mission assignment.

(3) Liaison with the Marine HH-53A unit at Marble Mountain has been excellent. Marine problems with common use parts has been made known to Det 1's Maintenance Officer. Some of these were significant e.g. engine start malfunctions caused by failure of hydraulic shut off valve (there was no emergency start system/procedure in being) and blade erosion from debris, sand etc at unprepared landing sites. Marine information revealed that the H-53 can weather a lot of combat punishment. NOTE: Other military users have built up a wealth of information on the HH-53 during past operations that would be of great value to ARRS such as failure patterns of common use items, accident/incident circumstances and cause factors, unsatisfactory reports and the like. We are required

by regulation to send the Navy Aviation Safety Directorate all HH-3E/CH-3C and HH-53 accident/incident information but we have never received any reports from that service. Requests for this information from DIG/Safe, Norton have not been productive. Recommend MAC attempt to get summaries of maintenance failure reports, accident/incident reports and establish, through channels, the necessary liaison that will permit a free flow of vital information on the HH-53 and HH-3 helicopter.

(4) The GE tech rep stated HH-53 engines and spares were in good shape. He could not build up the spares received in cans because special tools needed had not arrived. Also, he said he had been advised the HH-53 engine repair facility was to be located at NKP. It would be more advantageous to have this facility located at Udorn where the HH-53 will be stationed.

i. DET 5, 38 ARRS, UDORN

(1) The LBR facilities were outstanding, centrally located and had no problem areas to speak of. HH-43's were in very fine condition and the mission was well managed, offering local base rescue services in a commendable manner. Major Brubaker, 3 ARRGp Safety Officer, completed a safety survey here on 2 Oct and found no major deficiencies.

j. OL 1, 39 ARRS UDORN

(1) A short visit here revealed no outstanding operational problems. Quarters and facilities for transiting HC-130 crews were adequate. The Commander was awaiting a decision on HC-130 operations resulting from the test of direct operation from Tuy Hoa. Base personnel had expressed interest in attaching OL 1 facilities should OL 1 staging operations decrease in size or cease. USAF operations from Udorn have been on the increase causing a run on quarters, buildings and airfield spaces.

k. General Recommendations:

(1) Insure ARRS air crew personnel attend jungle survival school preferably at Clark AF prior to SEA assignment. This school, in the opinion of ARRS personnel in SEA is more important than the USAF survival school at Fairchild AFB, Washington. *Agree*

(2) Provide pararescue personnel assigned SEA an orientation course in the use and handling of hand grenades.

(3) Develop a windshield for the HH-3E (not bullet proof type) that does not scratch.

(4) Obtain for SEA units the new standard pen gun and pen gun flares model 201, gyrojet. This flare is designed to continue upward through foilage etc. even if it deflects off a limb or obstruction. (39 ARRS had no pen gun flares available, other units the old style flare.)

11.

(5) Consider armor plate for the HC-130H/P in the area of the 25 liter LOX container.

(6) 39 ARRSq HC-130H/P use the 781E aboard each aircraft to record information on installed pyrotechnics.

(7) 3 ARRGp be authorized a space for an OJT specialist.

(8) 3 ARRGp assist the 37 ARRS in its current OJT program.

(9) ARRS advise Det 2, 37 ARRS, Udorn results of tests and restrictions set forth in ASD message ASZTH 89173 June 67 on HH-53 SN 66-14430. Restrictive items include auxiliary tanks, rescue hoist limited to dummy, air refueling, release from VFR flight only limits.

(10) Expedite delivery of engine particle separation (EPS) kits for the HH-53s in SEA.

(11) Hq ARRS and Hq PARRC continue to send airmail copies of important messages to SEA or require an acknowledgement of receipt.

(12) 3 ARRGp Safety request a one time unit audit for distribution of the USAF Safe Driver Magazine and order as necessary to insure units receive this publication.

(13) Eglin CCTS concentrate more high altitude training in the HH-3E on:

(a) High gross weight hover and

(b) high gross weight maximum performance take off and landings. Also, give crews actual practice in ground taxi over rough terrain.

(14) Send the 1370 PMW an ARRS hoist for training use during high altitude CH-3C flying.

(15) ARIOS prepare an OHR on the Flight Information Publication (Terminal) for the Pacific and Southeast Asia. This book published by 7651 ACISq Hickam AFB is poorly bound and falls to pieces when used.

(16) ARMDC advise SEA HH-43 units the status of the TCTO for the large altitude indicator.

(17) ARASG review 39 ARRSq reports of tests on drinking water exposed to high temperatures when stored aboard aircraft. Tests at Tuy Hoa revealed heat build up in parked aircraft caused rapid breakdown of chlorine from 2.0 parts/million to 0.0 PPM. This could render emergency drinking water unfit for consumption. The 39th has established a procedure which necessitate a daily change of aircraft stored water.

Carl W. Rottmann, Jr.
CARL W. ROTTMANN, JR., Lt Col, USAF
Chief, Office of Safety
Office of the Inspector General

USAF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT REPORT								
(Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s).)								
1. DATE OF OCCURRENCE (Year, month and day) 1967, December 27 Wednesday			2. VEHICLE(S)/MATERIAL INVOLVED (TMS & Serial Nr., if applicable) HH-3E, SN 66-13290			3. FOR GROUND ACCIDENTS ONLY (Base Code and Report Serial No.) 		
4. PLACE OF OCCURRENCE, STATE, COUNTY, DISTANCE AND DIRECTION FROM NEAREST TOWN. IF ON BASE, IDENTIFY. IF OFF BASE GIVE DISTANCE FROM NEAREST BASE. Gulf of Tonkin; 173ON/10706E; approximately 100NM NW of Da Nang AB, RVN						5. HOUR AND TIME ZONE LOCAL 1555 Hotel		6. DAY NIGHT BAWN DUSK
7. ORGANIZATION POSSESSING OWNING VEHICLE OR MATERIAL AT TIME OF MISHAP								
Major Command MAC		Subcommand or AF ARRS		Air Division	Wing PACARRC	Group 3d ARRGF	Squadron or Unit 37ARRSQ	Name and Base Code DaNang AB EZEM
8. (List organizations of second vehicle, if they differ from those above)								
9. BASE AND COMMAND SUBMITTING REPORT (Do not abbreviate) Hq Pacific Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Center, Hickam AFB, Hawaii (Military Airlift Command)								
10. LIST OF PERSONNEL DIRECTLY INVOLVED (For aircraft include operator and all other persons whether in plane or not. If more space is required to list all personnel, use additional sheet(s).)								
Last Name	First Name	MIL	Grade	Service No.	Assigned Duty	Aero Rating	Injury to Individual	
Jolly Green O4	Briscoe	D	1Lt	FV315A115	Pilot	Pilot	None	
Cordile	Frank	NMI	Capt	FR70771	Co Pilot	Pilot	None	
Rodriguez	David	NMI	Sgt	AF19683816	Flt Eng	None	None	
Deets	Vincent	E	Sgt	AF13893535	ParaRescue	None	None	
GARNINE LEADER	Martin	A	1Lt	FV3162509	Pilot (F-4C)	Pilot	Fatal (Drowned)	
11. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT: Give a detailed history of flight, or chronological order of facts and circumstances leading to the mishap as applicable, the results of investigation and analysis to include discussion of all cause factors listed, findings, and recommendations, and any corrective action taken. (Continue on reverse, if more space needed.)								
A. History of Flight: Jolly Green O4 (HH-3E, SN 66-13290) was on alert at a forward operating location when the crew was alerted for an F-4C bailout. The helicopter proceeded to the scene, arriving in approximately 30 minutes. The pilot established a hover over one of the two survivors in the water; and the pararescueman was deployed into the water to insure the F-4C pilot was secured properly in the rescue sling (horse collar). The survivor was then raised in the hoist. When he was even with the door of the HH-3E, he attempted to reach for the flight engineer and climb into the doorway. In doing so, he slipped from the horse collar, fell into the water, drifted away, and disappeared before the helicopter could be repositioned to effect the rescue. A search of the area failed to locate the survivor and he is presumed drowned.								
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED; SEE AFR 127-4)								
12. AUTHENTICATION								
CERTIFICATION BY (Title) Investigating Officer		TYPED NAME AND GRADE ROBERT D. BRUBAKER, Major, USAF	SIGNATURE 				DATE 31 Dec 1967	

AF FORM 711 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE.

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1943 - 711-081

D. Findings:

(1) The primary cause of this accident was personnel factor. The survivor, in his anxiety to board the helicopter, forgot his pre-briefed and pre-practiced water hoist procedures. He reached up to help himself in the door. In doing so, he slipped from the rescue sling, fell in the water and disappeared before the helicopter could be repositioned to effect the rescue.

(2) A contributing cause of the accident was the puncture of the LPU by the sump drain on the HH-3E refueling probe at STA 110.

E. Recommendations:

(1) That this accident be briefed to all USAF aircrew members, with emphasis on the fact that the rescuee should not attempt to assist the hoist operator in any way. He should allow himself to be faced away from the door and pulled inside the helicopter cabin by the hoist operator. This procedure is standard for all rescue devices: Jungle penetrator, rescue sling (horse collar), etc. Recommend safety media such as Rex Riley poster be utilized as the briefing device. (ACTION: Directorate of Aerosp Safety - AFIAS; technical assistance by Hq ARRS)

(2) That consideration be given to the addition of a snap fastener on the rescue sling. This fastener could be attached to the rescuee's chute harness as a back up means of being secured in the sling. The 5th AF Sea Survival School has worked with such a device in the past. (ACTION: ASD)

(3) That the HH-3E refueling probe be equipped with a different sump drain at STATION 110. A simple "push-to-drain" type with no sharp edges is recommended. If an easy fix is not immediately available, notify 37ARRSQ and Det 1, 37ARRSQ, of what steps to take to shield this sump drain temporarily. (ACTION: WRAMA)

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